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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis starts from the distinction it is possible to make between modernisation 
(i.e. the teleological drive towards formal and ontological purification) and what 
modernity has been in practice (Latour 1993, 2012). As the concept of the 
Anthropocene leaves geology and enters philosophy, art, architecture and human 
sciences, such a distinction allows to explore alternative conceptions of what 
modernity has been and continues to be about. This, it is argued, is especially true 
of architecture, where a canonical history based on movements and styles keeps 
masking more continuous trajectories (Koolhaas and al. 2000; Jencks 2002). 
Exploring different architectural models and projects that have marked the recent 
history of architecture in relation to the city, this thesis aims to identify in the 
anonymous city the main heuristic diagram according to which the discipline of 
architecture has understood and sought to transform urban conditions throughout 
modernity. Although it has been intensely invested by the Modern Movement, the 
anonymous city cannot be confined to modernist architecture. First conceived along 
the possibilities offered by industrial standardisation, the anonymous city seems to 
be mainly driven, today, by generic processes. The distinction between the logics of 
standardisation and the logics that underpin the generic is a central concern of this 
thesis. Emphasising this transformation, this thesis explores the normative relation 
that architecture entertains with the urban condition in ways that do not only index 
contemporary capitalist globalisation, but also potentially challenge its organisation 
(see Sloterdijk 2005, 2006; Laruelle 2011). Focusing on the research project that 
Rem Koolhaas lead on Lagos, Nigeria, this thesis postulates that the concept of the 
generic might not be crucial for the future of architecture, but might also open 
critical possibilities to respond to the challenges prompted by global urbanisation.  
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Cy Twombly. Panorama (1955) 
 
 
 
One hundred years ago, a generation of conceptual breakthroughs and supporting 
technologies unleashed an architectural Big Bang. By randomizing circulation, short-
circuiting distance, artificializing interiors, reducing mass, stretching dimensions, 
and accelerating construction, the elevator, electricity, air-conditioning, steel, and 
finally, the new infrastructures formed a cluster of mutations that induced another 
species of architecture. The combined effects of these inventions were structures 
taller and deeper – Bigger – than ever before conceived, with a parallel potential for 
the reorganization of the social world – a vastly richer programmation.  
 
Rem Koolhaas. “Bigness, or the problem of Large — Manifesto”, 1994 
 
 
When the deserts reaches the homes,  
the fact of not presupposing anything is the beginning of wisdom 
 
Peter Sloterdijk. Écumes: Spheres III, 2003 
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INTRODUCTION	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ANONYMOUS CITY 
 
 
 
This thesis explores the relation architecture entertains with the city. At once 
descriptive and normative, this relation structures the political and social 
dimension of architecture. The city is where the demiurge aspirations of 
architects meet social space, where utopias confront material complexities, 
and where architecture’s capacity to enclose and determine space faces 
present and future contingencies. Confronted to the city, architecture 
appears to be much more than the activity of designing buildings. Conceiving 
spatial structures, accommodating social forces, producing symbolic and 
aesthetic forms, architecture makes culture concrete. Architecture is a 
technology of environmental adaptation. It is that technique according to 
which humans build and transform their environment. And the city is where 
this becomes at once a collective and large-scale question.  
 Historically contingent, this problem can nevertheless be seen to have 
been modernity’s constant preoccupation. Modern history has seen 
architecture conceiving, programming, planning and imagining the future 
city in different ways. But the city has remained its constant problem. From 
Modernist architecture to post-Modernist claims about context and diversity, 
and from the critical utopias developed by Archigram, Archizoom, 
 9 
Superstudio and others in the 1960s and 70s to Rem Koolhaas’ writings 
about the generic city, this thesis explores the many ways in which modernity 
and the city have been thought together, and develops the idea that 
architecture’s relation to the urban environment should be seen as having 
produced increasingly anonymous and generic conditions.1  
 Modernist architecture mainly conceived its relation to the city in 
normative and deterministic ways, imagining standard models that could be 
universally imposed.2 Criticising a programme that they generally considered 
to be reductive, the post-Modernist current has on the contrary greatly 
emphasised complexity and, calling for a return to context, has notably 
argued against architecture’s pretention to be all-encompassing and able to 
handle universal models.3 This has encouraged the development of more 
descriptive approaches. Architects started to develop more inductive 
perspectives on the city: starting by analysing and trying to understand 
present conditions instead of starting by imagining how the city should be.4 
However, this tended to overlook the descriptive aspects of Modernist 
approaches. While the Modernist city mainly emphasised homogeneity and 
functional hierarchy, post-Modernist architects insisted on the contrary on 
diversity, the complexity of present conditions, and the impossibility for 
architecture to contain them. Strongly criticising planning, they also 
disengaged architecture from any form of analytical and operational relation 
to the city altogether. Post-Modernism soon became a formalist movement, 
mainly considering architecture in terms of communication, and emphasising 
symbolical representation and ambivalent semiotics.  
 
                                            
1 Andrea Branzi. No-Stop City: Archizoom Associati, New York: HYX, 2006. 
2 See notably Le Corbusier. Towards an Architecture (1923),  Trans. Eng. by John Goodman. 
Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2008; Idem. The City of To-Morrow and its Planning 
(1925), trans. Frederik Etchells, Dover: Dover Publications, 1987.  
3 See Robert Venturi. Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, The Museum of Modern 
Art Press, New York, 1966; Charles Jencks. The New Paradigm in Architecture: The Language 
of Postmodernism, seventh edition, Yale: Yale University Press, 2002.  
4 Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour. Learning from Las Vegas (1972), 
revised edition Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977; Rem Koolhaas. Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto, 
New York: Monacelli Press, 1978; Idem. “Atlanta: Journalism (1987-2004)”, in Idem. 
S,M,L,XL, New York: Monacelli Press, 1995.  
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Le Corbusier. A Contemporary City (1925) 
 
In contrast to this opposition, this thesis contends that Rem Koolhaas’ work 
on the generic city offers decisive and radical propositions for rethinking 
architecture’s relation to the contemporary city. Recalling the articulation 
between the normative and the descriptive at play in Modernist architecture 
and urban models, I will notably argue that Koolhaas’ theoretical work must 
be read in continuity, rather than in contradistinction, to the modernist 
project. While his work closely relates to the descriptive turn initiated by 
post-Modernism, it draws very different conclusions.5 His position remains 
debatable, but this thesis contends that the theoretical work he developed 
over the past thirty years decisively contrasts with the way contemporary 
architecture seems largely to be moving away from any critical engagement 
with the contemporary city. This thesis contends that Koolhaas’ work may 
help to understand this relation both beyond the normative conceptions 
developed by Modernism and in contradistinction to the contemporary 
emphasis on complex forms exemplified by parametric architecture.6 In 
                                            
5 Rem Koolhaas and al. Mutations, Barcelona: Actar, 2000; Rem Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995.  
6 See Rem Koolhaas. “The Generic City” (1994), in Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995: 1237-1268; For a 
general presentation of parametric architecture, see Patrick Schumacher. “Let the style war 
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analysing and extending Koolhaas’ work on the generic, I intend to explore 
the ways in which this concept can reinvigorate the descriptive (i.e. 
epistemic) and normative (i.e. political) relation between architecture and the 
city.7 
 
The Anthropocene 
 
The concept of the Anthropocene, developed recently by geologists in order 
to define the new period into which we have been precipitated in the wake of 
the industrial revolution, sheds new light on our understanding of 
modernity.8 The Anthropocene refers to the period in which human history 
has crossed over to geological time and in which human activities have 
transformed nature in irreversible ways.9 The Anthropocene also accounts for 
a profound reversal concerning our understanding of space and the urban 
environment in that it contends that nature can no longer be separated from 
the technical operations to which humans have submitted it.  
 While architecture must still be understood as the particular technique 
according to which humans do not only adapt themselves to their existing 
environment but adapt and construct their own environment, this 
                                                                                                                                        
begin” (2010), Architects’ Journal: http://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/patrik-schumacher-
on-parametricism-let-the-style-wars-begin/5217211.article; Idem. “Parametricism as style 
– a parametric manifesto”, Presented and discussed at the Dark Side Club, 11th Architecture 
Biennale, Venice 2008: 
http://www.patrikschumacher.com/Texts/Parametricism%20as%20Style.htm 
7 This argument mainly relates to the way Michel Foucault, following Georges Canguilhem, 
constantly considered that epistemological questions were always also political questions. 
On the one hand, his work consisted in showing that the way we describe and understand 
things are always also imbued by practical dynamics concerning the way we act and the way 
we manipulate these things. On the other hand, he also repeatedly argued that political 
questions about hierarchy, domination and governmentality were also always imbued with, 
and even determined by, specific modes of knowledge production. Michel Foucault. 
Territory, Security, Population: Lectures at College de France 1977-1978 (2004), trans. 
Graham Burchell, London: Picador, 2009; Idem. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences (1966), Pantheon Books, 1970; Georges Canguilhem. The Normal and the 
Pathological (1946), trans. Eng. Caroline R. Fawcett, London: Zone books, 1991. 
8 I would like to thank all the participants at The Matter of Contradiction, a cycle of 
conferences and workshops organised between 2011 and 2013 by Fabien Giraud, Ida 
Soulard, Tom Trevatt and Sam Basu, whose collective work has largely determined these 
considerations about the anthropocene. See: http://lamatiere.tumblr.com/ 
9 See notably Jacques Grinevald, « Le concept d’Anthropocène, son contexte historique et 
scientifique », in Antropia, no 12, Spring 2012: 22-38; and Paul Crutzen and Eugene F. 
Stoemer, “The ‘Anthropocene’“, Global Change. IGBP Newsletter, no 41, 2000: 17-18. 
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understanding can no longer be based on any clear ontological separation 
between nature and culture. Peter Sloterdijk shows that the spheres humans 
built have always been shields with which they could simultaneously protect 
and emancipate themselves from nature. But he also showed that the process 
of scientific and technological explicitation intensified by modernity 
completely transformed our relation to both nature and the built 
environment.10 Manipulating and engineering nature as much as isolating 
and understanding the laws according to which it unfolds, modernity 
relentlessly developed multiple links between nature and culture. These links 
have progressively transformed nature in irreversible ways. Nature no longer 
exists completely isolated from human activities. It no longer unfolds as an 
extrinsic relation with humanity. As the recent nuclear disaster in Fukushima 
showed so forcefully, nature appears to be produced, controlled and 
managed by humans just as much as it can in turn eradicate them. Largely 
produced by human activities, it nevertheless continues, and perhaps more 
than ever before, to be determined by dynamics that do not only largely 
exceed humans in terms of scale, but that also prove to be largely indifferent 
to them. The concept of the Anthropocene underlines the paradox whereby 
humans have become the centre of a world in which they nevertheless only 
occupy a very peripheral position. Destroying the harmonious concept of 
Nature on which the Moderns based their constructions, the concept of the 
Anthropocene implies not only a different reading of our relation to the 
environment, but also a different reading of modernity. Both modernity and 
modernist architecture shared the project of emancipating humans from 
natural vicissitudes. Emphasising the ways in which nature, now largely 
engineered, transformed, and controlled by various social, technical, and 
scientific apparatuses, strikes back at humans, the Anthropocene seems to 
register the failure of the modern project. It can however be argued that it 
rather underlines the dynamics that really constituted this project. Rather 
than looking at its teleological ambitions, we must look at what modernity 
actually produced.  
                                            
10 Peter Sloterdijk. “Nearness and Da-sein: The Spatiality of Being and Time”, in Theory 
Culture Society # 29, 2012 : 36-42; Idem. Écumes: Sphères III (2003), trans. Fr. Olivier 
Mannoni, Paris: Maren Sell Éditeurs, 2005.  
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 Contrary to what it generally claimed, and especially contrary to the 
way postmodern critiques ended up describing it, modernist architecture 
may have been much more contextual than what is commonly understood. 
To be more specific, modernist architecture must not have been contextual, 
but it has certainly been environmental, in the sense that it transformed our 
environment in unprecedented ways. Modernist architects may not have 
transformed the urban condition as radically as they aspired to. But the way 
they endorsed the transformations prompted by the industrial revolution, 
their conception of standardising logics, and their ambition to produce a 
truly industrial architecture has had more profound consequences than what 
they actually build. Aiming to understand these consequences, this thesis 
looks beyond the confines of architectural culture. It does not look at 
buildings and urban plans, but rather at the models and diagrams that have 
characterised the relation that architecture has entertained with the city 
throughout modernity. It can thus be said that, at its more general level, this 
thesis explores the spatial architecture of modernity.  
 This can notably be read in the recent ecological turn that arose in 
continental philosophy and humanities. Bruno Latour and Peter Sloterdijk are 
amongst the most important representatives of this turn. Very attentive to 
the Anthropocene question, they had already some years ago began to 
translate its consequences in more theoretical terms. They notably 
emphasised spatiality, arguing that the many problems we suddenly 
encountered with the modern project was not only due to political and 
sociological critiques, but also, and perhaps more profoundly, to the way it 
had framed our understanding of space. Although they certainly cannot be 
identified with one another, they share the same idea that it is impossible to 
navigate the Anthropocene according to the Euclidean coordinate system.11 
                                            
11 Bruno Latour notably argues: “There is probably no more difference among thinkers than 
the position they are inclined to take on space: Is space what inside which reside objects and 
subjects? Or is space one of the many connections made by objects and subjects? In the first 
tradition, if you empty the space of all entities there is something left: space. In the second, 
since entities engender their space (or rather their spaces) as they trudge along, if you take 
the entities out, nothing is left, especially space. Tell me what your position on space is, and 
I’ll tell you who you are: I suspect such a touchstone is equally discriminating for 
philosophers, architects, art historians, and others.” Bruno Latour. ‘Spheres and Networks: 
Two Ways to Reinterpret Globalization’, Paper presented at Harvard School of Design 
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Euclidean geometry posited that it was possible to isolate space from the 
entities that were populating it. Things were residing in space. They were 
circulating within space. Space was hence conceived as a container that could 
be looked at from the outside. In revealing that the Modern separation 
between a universal nature on the one hand, and a multiplicity of cultures on 
the other hand, could no longer stand, the concept of the Anthropocene 
revealed how many dynamics were looked over by this conception of space. 
By revealing that things could no longer be looked at from an outside 
position, the Anthropocene creates a kind of epistemic dust bowl. Things 
cannot be looked at from the outside. Exemplified by what happened at 
Fukushima, everything appears suddenly much more related, as phenomena 
that we used to separate and isolate in different domains are revealed to be 
weaved on the same immanent plane. Space is no longer a container, rather, 
space is the product of various entities as they circulate, relate to other 
entities, and are submitted to various processes. Spatial paradigms inherited 
from both Euclidean geometry and Cartesian metaphysics are no longer 
adequate to grasp the complexity of contemporary urban dynamics: relations 
between urban space and the natural environment can no longer be 
understood exclusively, as if they were intertwined but hermetic containers 
that could be looked at from the outside. They are rather morphing realities, 
merging with each other, multiplying connections that can only be addressed 
from inside.12  
 This transformation suggests that space must be conceived 
topologically. Contrary to Euclidean geometry, which assumed that space was 
in fact an absolute extrinsic dimension in which entities were circulating and 
in which their position and transformations could be calculated and 
measured, topology implies a more relational definition of space according 
to which there are no displacements that do not imply transformations.13 
                                                                                                                                        
(organized with Peter Sloterdijk) (17.02.2009), published in Harvard Design Magazine n°30, 
Spring/Summer 2009. 
12 See René Thom. Paraboles et Catastrophes. Entretiens sur les mathématique, la science et 
la philosophie (1980), Translated from Italian to French by Luciana Berini, Paris: Flammarion, 
1983.  
13 Gabriel Catren. “The Thing and The Shrink”, paper presented at a conference held in the 
Dark Materialism programme organised by Kingston University London, 12 January 2011, at 
 15 
Topological forms do not move and circulate within space, they do not occur 
in space, they are not contained in space (e.g. like a bed would be in a 
bedroom), but rather are constantly modifying their dimensions and 
generating new ones. Latour and Sloterdijk have different views on this. Their 
theoretical models do not share the same topological architecture. Latour 
emphasises relations. His universe is composed of networks.14 Sloterdijk, on 
the contrary, can be seen to emphasise separation, to emphasise the 
importance of borders. His universe is composed of spheres.15 For Sloterdijk 
these spheres are immune structures whose internal organisation depends 
on the borders they draw with their surrounding environment. Focusing on 
their relative autonomy, he examines the internal conditions that they frame, 
rather than the dynamic links that connect them together, as does Latour.16 
Latour and Sloterdijk’s systems can thus be seen as focusing on different 
implications of topology. Stressing on different aspects, their systems display 
different architectures. But both address the transformations implied by the 
Anthropocene. Going back to the discipline of architecture, what Latour and 
Sloterdijk share is probably more important than what they do not. Their 
philosophies imply a different conception of modern spatialities, one that 
insists on their relational (i.e. ecological or mereological) dimension, and 
thus one that emphasise their relation to the environment rather than on 
their teleological constructions. This means that rather than emphasising on 
the decontextualised nature of modernist architecture, the question bears on 
the redefinition of what the context means for architecture.  
                                                                                                                                        
the National History Museum of London. See: 
http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2011/01/gabriel-catren-the-thing-and-the-shrink/ 
14 Bruno Latour. An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence (2012), trans. Catherine Porter, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013; Idem. Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Idem. We 
Have Never Been Modern (1991), trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993.  
15 See Sloterdijk’s grand trilogy. Peter Sloterdijk. Globes: Spheres II (1999), trans. Olivier 
Mannoni, Paris: Maren Sell Éditeurs, 2010; Idem. Écumes: Sphères III (2003), trans. Fr. Olivier 
Mannoni, Paris: Maren Sell Éditeurs, 2005; Idem. Bulles: Sphères I (1998), Trans. Olivier 
Mannoni, Paris: Pauvert, 2002.  
16 For a presentation of the differences and the common points between Latour’s and 
Sloterdijk’s conceptions, see: Bruno Latour. “Some Experiments in Art and Politics”, in e-flux 
journal, #23, March 2011. http://www.e-flux.com/journal/some-experiments-in-art-and-
politics/ 
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Normative conditions 
 
This topological transformation does not only entail epistemological 
challenges, but also normative transformations, transformations that affect 
not only architecture’s normative dimension, but also the definition of 
architecture more generally.  While contemporary architecture is increasingly 
evaluated and understood according to its capacity to generate autonomous 
and innovative forms, this thesis rather emphasise older categories of 
structure and function. But it also acknowledges that these categories should 
be largely redefined.  
 Manuel Castells argues that the culture that matters for the 
development of a given economic system is the one that materialises in 
organisational logics.17 Because it contends that contemporary organisational 
dynamics are subjected to important transformations that no longer unfold 
in Euclidean space but rather according to topological dynamics, this thesis 
does not consider architecture to merely organise elements within space, but 
further defines its activity in terms of the conception, the engineering, and 
the active adaptation of our environment.18 While architecture is thus defined 
as the technique through which humans actively transform and adapt their 
environment, it is seen to produce spatial conditions that in turn condition its 
practice.  
 Developed in relation to Sloterdijk’s notion of spheres, the term 
condition here extends what in architecture is generally referred to in terms 
of context. The notion of context usually defines the metric spatial extension 
in which things can unfold and expand. The notion of condition is 
topological, in that it does not suppose any extrinsic spatial container in 
which things would reside, and rather consider space to be emergent, 
produced by the encountering of different entities. While it largely draws on 
Sloterdijk, the conception I develop here can also be seen to relate to the way 
Hannah Arendt famously argued in The Human Condition (1958) that the 
                                            
17 Manuel Castells. The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring 
and the Urban-Regional Process, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989: 152.  
18 See Peter Sloterdijk. Le palais de cristal: à l’interieur du capitalisme planétaire (2005), 
trans. Fr. Olivier Mannoni, Paris: Maren Sell Éditeurs, 2006 
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only thing that can be said to be universally true of human beings is that they 
are conditioned beings.19 Imagining a movement of massive emigration to 
another planet, Arendt argued that although the fundamental conditions 
under which humans live on Earth would no longer be relevant, these cosmic 
migrants would still be conditioned beings.20 The important and complex 
technical nature of the different cells and capsules that humans actually need 
to navigate in extra-terrestrial space indicate that these conditions are 
effectively at once spatial and immunological. Nothing expresses this better 
than the space suit and the interface it constitutes between the human 
condition and the infinite and un-human dimensions of the universe. 
Humans can navigate through space only once they possess this artificial, 
specially-designed envelope in which they carry their specific life conditions. 
Stanley Kubrick’s famous film, 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), perfectly 
exemplified, through its careful stage design, the way we can generally 
define architecture to be the technique of spatial conditioning. There is 
probably no best architectural than Kubrick’s Space Odyssey in the history of 
cinema. This film indeed extends the definition of what architecture is about. 
Far from being limited to the buildings, drawings, and design plans that 
populate architectural magazines, architecture can be seen to include more 
generally all spatial envelopes: from birds’ nests and igloos to space suits, 
airports and the complex systems that form contemporary informational 
networks. 
 From this standpoint, architecture acquires an existential dimension. 
Clearly visible in Arendt’s account, this may be even more true in Sloterdijk’s 
work. By elevating the notion of sphere to the level of a fundamental 
anthropological and topological concept, Sloterdijk has indeed greatly 
                                            
19 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition (1958), second edition, Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1998. 
20 Hannah Arendt writes: “The most radical change in the human condition we can imagine 
would be an emigration of men from the earth to some other planet. Such an event, no 
longer totally impossible, would imply that man would have to live under man-made 
conditions, radically different from those the earth offers him. Neither labor nor work nor 
action nor, indeed, thought as we know it would then make sense any longer. Yet even these 
hypothetical wanderers from the earth would still be human; but the only statement we 
could make regarding their "nature" is that they still are conditioned beings, even though 
their condition is now self-made to a considerable extent.” Hannah Arendt. Op cit., 1998: 
10.  
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stressed the essential relation existence entertains with space. The 
contribution that his massive anthropo-technical history makes to 
architecture is entirely bound to his conception of Martin Heidegger’s early 
idea that existence does in fact depend on neighbourly relations.21 Taking 
distances with Heidegger’s existential focus on subjective isolation and 
modern loss, Sloterdijk recalls these early insights of the (in)famous German 
philosopher, according to which “Dasein is spatial”,22 and following which it 
can be argued that an essential tendency toward nearness lies in all forms of 
existence.23 Sloterdijk took this idea seriously, coming to consider that 
ontological questions were always also morphological questions. Following 
him, it can be said that architecture is nothing more than the technique that 
both extends and confirms the fundamentally spatial orientation of 
existence. No longer simply symbolic, simply defensive, simply comfortable 
or purely functional, architecture thus appears to be constitutive of 
organisational systems that are at once semiological (i.e. signs and meaning) 
and immunological (i.e. about the material conditions of existence). 
 
 
 
Stanley Kubrick. 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) 
                                            
21 Drawing on Martin Heidegger, Sloterdijk argues that “(…) Dasein already brings with him 
the sphere of possible neighbourhood.” Sloterdijk. Op cit., [2003] 2005: 11.  
22 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time (1927), trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1996: 103 
23 Heidegger. Op cit., [1927] 1996: 98 
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 Architecture cannot be positioned outside the conditions that it 
produces. The extended definition of architecture that implicitly runs 
throughout Sloterdijk’s work conceives its activity to be that through which 
humans produce their own conditions of existence. This, however, does not 
merely depend on free will. The spheres humans keep drawing and building 
around themselves to secure their existence are not only subjective bubbles 
created out of specifically human needs and desires, but rather entire 
ecological and metaphysical systems implying many assemblages between 
natural and social norms. From this standpoint, it can be argued that cities 
constitute one of the most decisive incarnations of the fact that all societies, 
all cultural entities, “(…) can only be understood as morphogenetic processes 
that engender themselves”.24 As Hannah Arendt argued, the fact that these 
morphogenetic processes are self-produced does not mean that they do not 
possess the same conditioning power as external natural things.  The term 
condition must be understood here both actively and passively. It insists on 
what conditions architecture and on what architecture conditions. The 
normative conditions in question here do not only refer to social conventions 
and cultural preferences, but also to the logical and logistical operations that 
shape specific relations between architecture and the city, and by extension, 
between the society and the environment.  
  
Inductive architecture 
 
It is through this redefinition of the context as the dialectic of spatial 
conditioning in which architectural interventions engage that this thesis 
approaches Koolhaa’s work. Arguing that the urban condition seemed to be 
least understood at the very moment of its apotheosis, Koolhaas has largely 
participated in inventing new discursive and conceptual strategies to think 
simultaneously about architecture and urban space.25 This attention to the 
                                            
24 Peter Sloterdijk. Globes: Spheres II (1999), trans. Olivier Mannoni, Paris: Maren Sell 
Éditeurs, 2010: 176.  
25 Koolhaas writes: “The absence, on the one hand, of plausible, universal doctrines and the 
presence, on the other, of an unprecedented intensity of production have created a unique, 
wrenching condition: the urban seems to be least understood at the very moment of its 
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analysis of urban dynamics is generally seen to include Koolhaas within post-
Modernism. Following people such as Robert Venturi and Colin Rowe, 
Koolhaas can be said to belong to a movement which, in architecture, sought 
to move away from the abstract and prescriptive models imagined by modern 
architects such as Le Corbusier and Walter Gropius. At the same time, the 
movement was more attentive to contextual matters and more favourable to 
complexity, ambiguities and contradictions.26 It must however be argued that 
Koolhaas’ obsession for the generic and the programmatic dimension of 
architecture puts him at odds with this movement.  
 
 
 
Le Corbusier. La ville radieuse (1922-1925) 
 
 Koolhaas partakes in what could be called the descriptive turn in 
architecture. The title he gave to his text on Atlanta — “Atlanta: Journalism 
1987/1994” (1995) —exemplifies well this change in perspective. Breaking 
                                                                                                                                        
apotheosis.” Rem Koolhaas and al. (eds.). Great Leap Forward: The Harvard Project on the 
City I, Cambridge: Harvard University Press/ Koln: Taschen, 2001: 27. 
26 See notably Robert Venturi. Op cit., 1966; and Charles Jencks. Op cit., 2002.  
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with the long tradition that made architecture relate to the city in either a 
historical or directive way, Koolhaas argues for the necessity to engage in the 
description of actual urban conditions.27 His well-known book on New York 
— Delirious New York (1978) — already presented many similarities with the 
works of what the French critic and theoretician Sébastien Marot has called 
the situated manifestos.28 Through this notion, Marot regroups books that 
seek to derive architectural principles and solutions from the study of a 
specific city. Colin Rowe’s Collage City (1978) found its model in Rome, 
Oswald Mathias Ungers’ Green Archipelago (1977) found its model in Berlin, 
and Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown found theirs in Las Vegas (1972), 
while Rem Koolhaas found his in New York.29 These books emphasise the way 
architecture knowledge started to draw explicitly on actual cities to deduce 
certain principles. Architects became visitors. They started to describe before 
starting to build. They started to collaborate with theoreticians, artists and 
photographers in order to multiply evidences about the complex 
environments they approached in the manner of journalists. Although this is 
generally seen to mark an important separation between the universal and 
programmatic impulse that drove modernist architecture and the descriptive 
and contextual attitude defining the postmodern position, it seems possible 
to argue that Koolhaas’ work actually points towards another distinction.  
 His emphasis on the programme distinguishes his work from the more 
contextual and situated perspectives adopted by these other architects. While 
most post-Modern architects can be understood according to the position 
they took regarding the dialectical opposition between the site and the 
programme, it seems that Koolhaas’ work largely escapes this alternative. 
                                            
27 Koolhaas introduces his work about Atlanta in these terms: “Sometimes [Koolhaas writes], 
it is important to find out what the city is — instead of what it was, or what it should be. 
That is what drove me to Atlanta — an intuition that the real city at the end of the 20th 
century could be found there…” Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995: 835. 
28 Rem Koolhaas. Op cit., 1978. For a definition of these situated manifestos, see Sébastien 
Marot. “Exile on Main Street – a relative manifesto of suburbanism”, conference held at 
Pavillon de l’Arsenal, Paris, 2011:  
http://www.pavillon-arsenal.com/videosenligne/collection-6-174.php 
29 Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter. Collage City (1978), Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984; Sébastien 
Marrot and Florian Hertwerk (eds.). Ungers – The City in the City, Berlin: A Green Archipelago 
1977), Lars Müller Publishers, 2013; Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour. 
Learning from Las Vegas (1972), revised edition Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten 
Symbolism of Architectural Form, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977.  
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Although Delirious New York belongs completely to the descriptive turn and 
to the list of the situated manifestos that have indexed it, the pragmatic and 
programmatic trajectory it already defines distinguishes it from the more 
contextual and situated practice implied by Learning from Las Vegas (1972) 
and Collage City (1978). But the descriptive attention it pays to present 
conditions, from which the programme has to be induced, also distinguishes 
Koolhaas’ trajectory from the more autonomous and abstract programmatic 
strategies that characterise the practice of people such as Peter Eisenman, 
Frank Gehry, and contemporary advocates of parametric architecture.  
 This thesis thus proposes to understand Koolhaas’ position according 
to another, more profound distinction. This distinction operates between 
what could be called generative architecture on the one hand, and inductive 
architecture on the other. I argue that generative architecture is what 
dominates contemporary parametric and biomorphic practices as notably 
represented by the work of Frank Gehry, Greg Lynn, or Zaha Hadid and 
Patrick Schumacher. Although they oppose the prescriptive attitude adopted 
by modern architecture, this group could be said nevertheless to privilege 
prescription over description.30 Seeking to determine architectural principles, 
solutions and strategies from the analysis of external conditions, inductive 
architecture constitutes an ensemble that, despite opposing to generative 
architecture in ways that mobilise the traditional distinction between the site 
and the programme, however exceeds this dialectical opposition. Exemplified 
by the works of Koolhaas (from his books to the practice of the Office for 
Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) and the research projects he conducted at 
the Harvard Design School), it privileges description over prescription. Not so 
much concerned with the autonomy of architecture, this second group 
engages more explicitly in urban research. Although this distinction does not 
necessarily correspond to one between architecture and urbanism, it defines 
practices that clearly emphasise the urban dimension rather than the built 
object. Though it understands architecture from what conditions its practice, 
                                            
30 See notably Patrick Schumacher. Op cit., 2008 and Idem. Op cit., 2010. For an interesting 
critique of this approach see Owen Hatherley. “Zaha Hadid Architects and the Neoliberal 
Avant-Garde”, in Mute magazine, Double Negative Feedback, Volume 3 #1, Spring/Summer 
2011: 38-53.  
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this inductive perspective does not consider the conditions it then produces 
to be the mere product of external determinations. Rather it considers the 
buildings and the situations it engenders to be part of the same continuum 
of forces that condition its practice.  
 
 
 
Rem Koolhaas & Elia Zenghelis. The City of The Captive Globe (1972) 
 
 Here, inductive architecture refers to architectural strategies that tend 
to consider the programme in conditional terms. The programme is not 
opposed to the context because the programme is not merely imposed on 
the situation here, but rather can be understood and induced from the 
situation. When Koolhaas analyses the impact of shopping on urban 
organisation, for example, he looks at the way buildings and urban situations 
have been progressively contaminated by the logic of shopping; the logic can 
be understood from the architecture, and may then serve to inform Koolhaas’ 
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(or any architect’s) practice.31 This attention to the conditions that 
simultaneously constrain and determine architectural practice and that 
architecture in turn produces lays out a continuum that does not only go 
beyond the traditional opposition between the site and the programme, but 
also beyond the common opposition made between Modern and post-
Modern architecture. In this way, Le Corbusier and Koolhaas are much closer 
than what is generally argued. Despite what is usually claimed, Le Corbusier 
is nothing like an abstract formalist. Although abstract and formalist, his 
language is derived even more profoundly from his analysis of the 
programme implemented by the industrial revolution. His architectural 
language could therefore be said to have been deduced from a more 
profound political project that sought to connect architecture to the 
industrial revolution. Koolhaas reverses this relation. But it is the same 
question that dominates his work. The way Koolhaas’ work relates to 
contemporary globalisation and its impact on the urban environment can be 
seen as more inductive than deductive. However, both share an attitude that 
is not exclusively generative.  
 Although deeply rooted in New York, Delirious New York also already 
dealt with the more programmatic drive that allowed the modern encounter 
between the radical rationalism of the grid and the extravagant superposition 
of the fantastic worlds of the skyscraper.32 More than a mere generalised 
description of Singapore, his well-known text “The Generic City” (1994) must 
be seen to be an enthusiastic, critical and pragmatic meditation about the 
                                            
31 This example is particularly problematic. The relation between the Harvard project on 
shopping and OMA’s Prada project suggests that the analytical and critical take of the former 
can be then simply used for the same purposes. This on the mode of irony, radicalisation, 
and apparent neutrality that gives Koolhaas the possibility, very much like Quentin Tarantino 
in his films, to give a surplus of cultural and aesthetic value to things that were previously 
considered rather poor and unsophisticated. And as OMA’s work for Prada shows, this only 
bolsters the current state of affairs (here the domination of shopping over urban 
organisation) while seemingly subverting it. See notably Rem Koolhaas and al. (eds.). The 
Harvard Guide to Shopping: The Harvard Project on the City II, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press/Koln: Taschen, 2002; and Rem Koollhaas. “Junkspace” (2002), in October, vol. 100, 
spring 2002: 175-190. This is the second version of the text. The first version, which is 
much shorter and excludes many developments, was published in 2000 in Mutations. See 
also Rem Koolhaas/OMA. Unveiling Prada Foundation, Milan: Prada Foundation, 2008; and 
Roemer von Toom. “Architecture Against Architecture: Radical Criticism within 
Supermodernity”, in CTheory.net, 1997: 
http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=94 
32 See notably Koolhaas. Op cit., 1978: 54-76.   
 25 
way this modern programme extended and changed under other latitudes 
and in different times.33 I would argue that the ensemble defined by inductive 
architecture allows us to understand that the modernity of modern 
architecture’s programme may in fact be largely exceeding what is generally 
mobilised in the opposition between modernism and postmodernism. 
Dealing ith both the analysis and the production of normative conditions that 
go beyond the traditional scope of architecture, these inductive practices 
present interesting cases to analyse the ways in which modernity has 
profoundly transformed the environment in which we live.  
 
Modernity 
 
Following Latour, I would argue that the Anthropocene could be seen to 
register what modernity has done in practice, whereas what we generally call 
modernity refers only to the many discursive formulations that, though 
supporting it, never really grasped what it was doing in practice.34 Latour 
distinguishes between modernity in theory and modernity in practice.35 For 
him, the former has always mainly been about purification, about producing 
separated, homogeneous and hermetic domains; whereas the latter 
constantly produced more hybrids, entities, systems and categories that were 
increasingly mixed, increasingly complex, multiple and whose boundaries 
were more often crossed and blurred than firmly established. I would argue 
that the concept of the Anthropocene may indeed underline what Latour has 
repeatedly called the unconscious of the Moderns: modernity in practice. 
From this standpoint, I propose to distinguish between modernity (the 
continuous process through which the formation we call the Anthropocene 
has been formed) and modernisation (the discursive and theoretical drive 
towards progress that shaped the Anthropocene without knowing it). 
                                            
33 See notably Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995: 1249-1250.  
34 Bruno Latour. We Have Never Been Modern (1991), trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993.  
35 Bruno Latour. Enquête sur les modes d’existence: une anthropologie des modernes, Paris: 
La Découverte, 2012. Although an English translation was published this year (see Bruno 
Latour. An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence (2012), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2013), I refer to the pages of the original French edition.  
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Modernisation on the one hand, the Anthropocene and modernity on the 
other.  
 This distinction allows us to build an interesting bridge between 
Latour’s conceptual couple of purification and hybridation on the one hand, 
and Sloterdijk’s conceptual couple of immunization and explicitation on the 
other. Sloterdijk argues that human societies are defined by a constant 
shuttling between the explicitation of their conditions of existence and the 
production of immunological spheres of protection. This more general 
framework allows for a more specific localisation of Latour’s contribution. 
With it, we are able to understand that Latour focuses on the particular 
moment when both movements of explicitation and immunization become 
more intense. The more modern sciences unmask natural structures, the 
more industrial modes of production lay bare both material and social 
structures; the more entangled technology and military ends become, the 
more decisive and intense the design of immune spheres of protection 
become. This connection between Latour and Sloterdijk further allows us to 
understand the role played by architecture in this process. Drawing on 
Sloterdijk, I would argue that modernity defines the moment when 
architecture no longer only stands on the side of immunology, but begins to 
partake in the movement of explicitation notably triggered by experimental 
sciences. Following both Latour and Georges Canguilhem, we may argue 
that, while this double movement can be defined in terms of rationalisation, 
it is mainly a question of the techniques of spatial organisation.36 Making 
increasingly explicit the conditions to which human existence is bound, 
(modern) architecture is thus understood to have played an important role in 
the production of increasingly anonymous and indifferent conditions. What I 
would like to call the anonymous city refers to the diagram this 
rationalisation produced. But it also constitutes the model that conditioned 
this process of rationalisation.  
 
                                            
36 See Canguilhem. Op cit., [1963] 1991; See also Latour, Op cit., [1991] 1993 
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NASA. First photograph of the earth from the moon, 23 August 1966, 16:35 GMT (1966) 
 
This relation between anonymity and explicitation might not seem obvious. It 
could even seem paradoxical, for indeed explicitation may contradict the 
production of anonymous conditions. Unfolding the project of identifying, 
isolating and naming things in always more detailed ways, bringing to light 
and to the fore all the background forces that previously looked like mere 
noise, the processes of explicitation that mark modernity would seem to be 
the opposite of what anonymity implies. The perspective adopted in this 
thesis however argues that, very much like the hiatus modernity created 
between science and phenomenology, between technical explicitation and 
human perception, the progressive explicitation of the spatial conditions to 
which human existence is bound produced some kind of void, some kind of 
bland interval that continuously, and perhaps even exponentially, grew as 
things were increasingly named, designated and defined. The urban 
condition modernity produced continuously escaped the more singular 
histories in which traditional agglomerations were inscribed. It is anonymous 
in the way that it progressively escaped the domination of the human subject 
and that it progressively appeared, in its material and technical dimension, 
more indifferent to singular definitions and identity than ever before. The 
anonymity in question here may first address a discrepancy. That is, it 
addresses that which slips away from the phenomenological gaze; the 
technical and scientific wounds inflicted on the narcissistic subject. But more 
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generally, it addresses the fact that the rationalisation of urban organisation 
progressively escaped particular determinations and local contexts, and thus 
acquired always more general and generic qualities.  
 
The anonymous city  
 
Unfolding according to standard formats, the anonymous city is the 
functional and homogeneous city that the Modern movement imagined to be 
universally reproducible, everywhere and for everyone. But it is also the 
urban substance produced by contemporary automatic processes, 
proliferating along infrastructures like pure mathematical products and 
unfolding like a floating currency that is no longer indexed by buildings 
alone but by generic protocols.37 At once the product of the industrial 
revolution and of contemporary globalisation, the anonymous city is marked 
both by the disciplined metropolis of industrial capitalism and by the mobile 
and fragmented urban system of financial capitalism.38 It makes up the 
spatial, historical and technical continuum that connects these different 
models to more profound normative and organisational transformations. As 
such, the anonymous city is what I understand to be the spatial consequence 
of modern explicitation. 
 Like Sloterdijk’s foam structures and atmospheres, the anonymous city 
is “(…) (an entity) whose flagrancy is late, and that only the ability to be 
manipulated — in the constructive as well as in the destructive sense — 
called to a thematic and technical career.”39 It could be defined as the 
ongoing question that the rationalisation of both our spatial environment 
and conditions of existence never ceased to pose. It is this condition that 
                                            
37 Sanford Kwinter and Daniela Fabricius write: “Boxes — or “buildings without qualities” — 
proliferate along American freeways and feeder roads as if generated by the same 
mathematical DNA that engineered the arterial infrastructure itself. This new building logic, 
like a virus jumping the species barrier, generates not buildings at all but pure generic 
infrastructures. At once uncommitted and totally flexible they re-conform like a floating 
currency to any temporary use: from storage facilities to doctor’s offices, insurance 
headquarters or car showrooms.” See Sanford Kwinter and Daniela Fabricius. “The American 
City: An Archival Probe”, in Rem Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2000: 528.  
38 Le Corbusier. Op Cit., [1925] 1987; Rem Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995: 1238-1267.  
39 Sloterdijk. Op cit., [2003] 2005: 57.  
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informed Le Corbusier’s plans for A Contemporary City (1925)40. But it is also 
the conditions that the more critical utopias imagined by the radical 
movements of the 1970s, from Archigram and Superstudio to the models 
imagined by Constant, addressed both programmatically and analytically. It 
is what architects have always had in mind when thinking about technical and 
technological innovation - a city increasingly transformed and translated into 
numbers and impersonal dynamics. Like the No stop city (1970) imagined by 
Archizoom, it could be defined by a series of generic patterns implemented 
on a grid.41 Modularity is its main function, its main ability,  and so could be 
defined, similarly to Musil’s character, by all the qualities it does not have.42 
The anonymous city concerns both the programme of contemporary 
globalisation and the condition we inherit from modernity. Though the 
attendant realities develop on the periphery of both identified cities and 
architecture canonical knowledge, they spread underground, expanding from 
the blind spots of what we generally understand in terms of city and urban 
life. The anonymous city hence does not only point toward those bland and 
anonymous spaces created by urban sprawling and defining suburban 
conditions, but it also points toward the more abstract mathematical DNA 
according to which contemporary infrastructures are engineered, and that 
form the basic structure underlying most informational systems. Like a 
meta-model that is continuous and pervasive rather than super-structural 
and inclusive, it forms the abstract landscape of concrete information.  
                                            
40 Le Corbusier. Op Cit., [1925] 1987 
41 Andrea Branzi. Op cit., 2006. 
42 Robert Musil. The Man Without Qualities, Vol. 1 & 2 (1927-1942), trans. Burton Pike and 
Sophie Wilkins, Toronto: Knopf Random House, 1995. Rem Koolhaas makes an allusion to 
this book in his text on the typical plan, written one year before “The Generic City”. See 
Koolhaas. “Typical plan” (1993), in Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995: 334-353. 
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Archizoom. No stop city (1970) 
  
 During the time it was synonymous with Modern standardisation, the 
anonymous city could seem simply bland and alienating. The critique of 
modern architecture generally emphasised the way this huge and 
monumental city imagined in particular by Le Corbusier corresponded to the 
disciplinary project described by Michel Foucault, dissolving differences and 
submitting individuals to meticulous procedures of normalisation.43 But when 
normative procedures and organising protocols no longer unfold according 
to extensive standardisation but rather entail the detailed management of 
economical, ethical, political and personal differences, the anonymous city 
gains more positive qualities. The anonymous city expands both horizontally 
and intensively in domains previously foreign to architecture and urbanism. 
Former distinctions between natural and cultural dimensions no longer 
                                            
43 Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975), trans. Allen Lane, 
Prescott: Peregrine Books, 1977. 
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stand. Former oppositions between physical and virtual space are no longer 
valid to describe the complex entanglements to which our contemporary 
environment is both bound, and of which it is the product. The anonymous 
city expands beyond anyone’s ability to contain urbanisation,44 but also 
displays unsuspected generic capacities. No longer strictly planned, it 
dissolves the traditional opposition between the different and the same, and 
develops according to dynamics of convergence that exceed traditional 
standards. It forms a new landscape that, although coextensive with the 
capitalist economy that it largely indexes, also possibly escapes what can 
effectively be capitalised and reduced to economic evaluation.45 
 Without necessarily following the most provocative and lyrical 
comments made by Koolhaas about this contemporary condition, it can 
indeed be argued that the anonymous city is what expands beyond identities 
and escapes centralisation.46 Considering that the active modulation of 
differences that define contemporary modes of control are becoming 
increasingly banal and pervasive47, this thesis seeks to consider both critically 
and heuristically Koolhaas’ provocative hypothesis according to which the 
move away from difference and toward similarity that characterises the 
development of the anonymous city may represent a global liberation 
movement.48 Dissolving former modes of segmentation, new modes of 
generic convergence replace the standard homogenisation of separated 
domains and entities. Normative processes are indeed no longer the same. 
Articulating natural forces with cultural dynamics in ways that are neither 
                                            
44 Jencks. Op cit.,  2002: 178 
45 Although I do not necessarily follow the way Marina Garcés identifies anonymity as a figure 
of resistance, this argument on the new positivity it could take relates to what she argues in 
her conference: “The Anonymous City: The City and Anonymity”, 2010. 
http://w2.bcn.cat/bcnmetropolis/arxiu/en/page234a.html?id=23&ui=415 
For a discussion of the way the generic may exceed the capitalist structure in which it 
intervenes, see François Laruelle. “The Generic as Predicate and Constant; Non-Philosophy 
and Materialism”, trans. Eng. by Taylor Adkins, in Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham 
Harman (eds.). Op cit., 2011: 237-260. Although I do not necessarily follow Laruelle all the 
way, and although this thesis does not engage in depth with the complex system he designs, 
Laruelle’s conception of the generic is an important reference for me here, and will be 
further discussed in the course of this text.  
46 Koolhaas, Op cit.,  1995: 1238. 
47 Gilles Deleuze. “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (1990), first published in English in 
October, Vol. 59, Winter, 1992: 3-7.  
48 This provocative positive take on homogenisation and convergence is what opens 
Koolhaas’ famous text on the generic city. See Rem Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995: 1248.  
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absolutely different nor identical, the logic governing the organisation of 
what Koolhaas calls the generic city does not only concern cultural 
formations. Following Keller Easterling, it may be argued that, from the most 
familiar commercial formulas to the more complex informational protocols, 
the forces that organise and structure our contemporary environment of 
existence are not only effective in dissolving differences, but also in enacting 
capacities for managing these differences.49 But it must also be added that 
these differences concern dimensions that can no longer be organised 
according to the separation made between the universal image of nature 
(absolute differences that are universal) and the multiple cultural 
perspectives adopted on top of it (relative differences that are always 
contextual). Arguing that we must address normative conditions hence 
means that the critical gesture performed by Foucault towards institutional 
and later managerial social norms has to be extended to problems that are 
now both natural and social, cultural and technological. From this standpoint, 
this thesis argues that the distributed and dynamic configurations that define 
and organise contemporary co-constitutive relations between society and the 
environment do not necessarily absorb discontinuities and differences, but 
rather define a new topological plane of constantly changing deformations.50 
 Not only synonymous with homogeneity and standardisation, today the 
anonymous city describes converging processes that spread in the interstices 
of the variations emphasised in the postmodernist model of the Heteropolis. 
Opposing ambiguity and contradiction to this generalised standardisation, 
postmodernism is most of the time seen, within architectural culture, to have 
replaced the modern mode of standardised alienation with the emphasis on 
much more differentiated, heterogeneous, ambiguous and even contradictory 
processes. The Heteropolis described by Charles Jencks is seen to replace the 
                                            
49 Keller Easterling. Enduring Innocence: Global Architecture and Its Political Masquerades, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005: 1.  
50 See Deleuze. Op cit., [1990] 1992; Celia Lury, Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova. “The 
Becoming Topological of Culture”, in Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 29 no. 4-5, September 
2012: 4. Arguing that the topological singularity of the contemporary city must be 
addressed in terms of meta-agglomeration, Sloterdijk also notably argues that: "The urban 
macro-foam can only be understood according to its spatial complexion (…) when viewed as 
a meta-collector gathering gathering places and non-gathering places". See Peter Sloterdijk. 
Op cit., [2003] 2005: 579. 
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homogeneous coercive models imagined by the Modern Movement with 
actual variety, diversity and heterogeneity.51 Following Gilles Deleuze, this 
thesis contends, however, that this proliferation of differences is also marked 
by the formation of new modes of social control that feed precisely on these 
differences.52 The Heteropolis is in fact today none other than the incarnation 
of capitalist logics and logistics. This increasing diversity, this game that 
plays with contradictory significations, references and irony, is only the logic 
through which architecture, and spatial organisation more generally, can be 
seen to index the contemporary development of capitalism. Contemporary 
cities are no longer ruled and organised according to centralised modes of 
standardisation and according to the engineering of separated functions. 
They rather follow the continuous modulation of economic, cultural and 
subjective differences. This radically transforms the normative landscape: the 
continuous modulation of the multiple and discrete variables making up 
contemporary urban life, produces new conditions for anonymity.53 In these 
conditions, the anonymous city may no longer be synonymous with 
alienation and the abolition of subjective singularities, but rather with that 
which escapes the selective miniaturisation of control procedures. We may 
therefore regard the anonymous city not as the alientaing legacy left by 
modernism, but as what should be recalled to rethink about modernity in 
different terms, and to propose different scenarios for the future.   
 
Generic logics 
 
While it has historically been designed according to the definition of typical 
functions and their hierarchical ordering, the anonymous city now spread 
along dynamics that are more topological than typological. The definition of 
particular functions and categories becomes less important than the 
continuous process of deformation to which various categories, entities and 
functions are subjected. The standard typology designed by modernist 
architecture essentially unfolded according to the dialectics of difference and 
                                            
51 Charles Jencks. Op cit., 2002.  
52 Gilles Deleuze, Op cit., [1990] 1992.  
53 Idem.   
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identity. From the formal emphasis on styles and symbolic meanings to the 
actual distribution of streets and the spatial indexation of different 
functionalities, difference and identity long constituted the operational 
referent according to which elements were localised and arranged within 
space. This question has also been central to the debate between Modernist 
and post-Modernist architecture. Koolhaas has often been regarded as 
taking a very paradoxical position on this matter, at either extreme of the 
argument.54 His text on the Generic City clearly and provocatively praises the 
move away from difference and toward similarity (1994).55 His project on the 
Pearl River Delta region in China (2001), rather emphasises a new form of 
urban coexistence that he calls the City of Exacerbated Differences© — 
COED©.56 But this should not be regarded as contradictory. As he had already 
argued in Delirious New York, it is the homogeneity and the repetition of the 
grid that allowed the highly differential engineering of the different blocks 
composing Manhattan.57 The Generic City expresses the reversal of this 
programme. With the Generic City, it is the proliferation of differences, the 
increasing variety of variety characterising the post-industrial city that 
produces generic outcomes. Difference is no longer the product of repetition. 
It is convergence that is the product of differentiation.  
 Drawing on Koolhaas, this thesis contends that this problem may be 
better addressed in topological terms; that is, in terms of continuous 
deformations. The question bears on the continuous and discontinuous 
dynamics that reconfigurate the relations between the general and the 
particular on the one hand, and the local and the global on the other. Far 
from merely reversing the dialectical opposition between identity and 
difference, what Koolhaas calls the generic addresses the continuous 
operations through which these typologies are constantly reconfigured. Not 
only emphasising typology in descriptive terms but considering the operating 
logic that governs these typologies, Koolhaas’ project on the Roman Empire 
— interestingly called Roman Operating System — helps to disconnect the 
                                            
54 Charles Jencks. Op cit., 2002: 180.  
55 Koolhaas. Op cit., (1994) in Idem. Op cit., 1995.  
56 Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2001.  
57 Koolhaas. Op cit., 1978.  
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model of the Generic City from a generalised situation presented by cities 
such as Atlanta and Singapore. It also helps to consider that the Generic City 
is not a representation or an image, but rather an analytical model centred 
on the dynamic logics determining the organisation of the contemporary city. 
It is by following these insights that this thesis seeks to understand how 
contemporary architecture relates to the anonymous city. It will be argued 
that this relation comes through these generic operations, and that these 
generic operations, whether it be their identification or their active 
operational use, make up the interface through which architecture relates to 
the contemporary production of anonymous conditions. And this is why this 
thesis contends that the anonymous city no longer unfolds within the 
traditional dialectics of difference and repetition but according to generic 
operations allowing both constant modulation and indifferent variations.58  
 The concept of the generic may thus help us to navigate the complex 
environment that appears when the modern ground vanishes. The problem 
may not so much concern the actual description of generic constants in the 
way modernist architects used to describe standard and typical forms and 
functions, but rather the rational and normative logic that is implied by the 
identification and the possible operative usages of generic constants in 
general. Rather than specify how Koolhaas’ text “The Generic City” does in 
fact accurately represent the contemporary city, I wish here to argue that the 
complexity of the contemporary city can only be described in generic terms. 
Instead of specifying new principles according to which local descriptions 
could be accurately generalised, this thesis seeks to delineate the conceptual 
and practical operations according to which it is possible to define the 
descriptive and operational capacities of generic models. Although I do not 
claim to develop a conception of the generic that would be consistent with a 
rigorous mathematical and geometrical conception of topology, this thesis 
does not deal with topology in mere metaphorical way. Beyond Koolhaas’ 
                                            
58 Rem Koolhaas notably argues that: “The Generic City is the apotheosis of the multiple-
choice concept: all boxes crossed, an anthology of all the options.” Koolhaas. Op cit., (1994) 
in Idem. Op cit., 1995: 1253. But this definition of the generic in terms of indifference to 
difference more closely draws on François Laruelle. See François Laruelle. Op cit., 2011. This 
article presents a summarised version of what is developed in Francois Laruelle. Philosophie 
non-standard : générique, quantique, philo-fiction, Paris: Kimé, 2010. 
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conception of the generic in terms of homogeneous heterogeneity, this 
thesis seeks to delineate the conceptual coordinates according to which 
generic operations could be defined topologically.   
 Understood in continuity with modern standardisation, the concept of 
the generic does not substitute another dialectical opposition, but rather 
unilaterally privileges convergence over difference. Analysing the relation 
that architecture entertains with the production of the modern city according 
to this notion means that these terms should not be opposed but rather 
understood on different but connected planes. From this standpoint, what I 
propose to call the anonymous city also indexes these contemporary 
dynamics of urban convergence which, far from opposing homogeneity and 
differences, rather orchestrate the continuous articulation of heterogeneous 
assemblages and processes.  
 This general logic informs the structure of this thesis. First it asks 
whether the generic simply repeats the logic of standardisation: how is the 
generic different from the standard? How does that underline the formation 
of another type of anonymous city? It then asks how it does more than mirror 
the modular dynamics in which Deleuze saw the advent of a society of 
control. How does the continuous articulation operated by the generic differ 
from this universal modulation of control? This can only be answered 
following another major question: what are these convergences and 
continuous lines that the concept of the generic may permit us to identify? 
And finally: how can they help us to navigate the complex landscapes of the 
Anthropocene? This thesis explores these questions genealogically.  Starting 
with modern standardisation, it focuses on the rational dynamics that have 
historically shaped the relation between architecture and the anonymous city. 
The first chapter focuses on the rational continuities we may establish 
between these precedents and the later models imagined by the different 
radical movements in architecture in the ‘60s, before more explicitly moving 
to Koolhaas’ work on the generic and the generic city. The second chapter 
brings a second layer of complexity by examining these questions in relation 
to normativity. It explores the rational constructions that determined 
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architecture’s relation with the anonymous city as well as the normative 
principles, logics and questions that these entailed.   
 The third chapter investigates the ways in which these questions can 
be tested in relation to the polemics that recently arose in architectural and 
urban theory about Lagos, the former capital of Nigeria. Lagos is one of the 
cities that grow and change the fastest today. These dynamics alone are 
almost unprecedented in history. They bring problems that European 
urbanisation never experienced. Much more continuous and much slower, 
European urbanisation did not transform any city the way in which 
contemporary dynamics of urbanisation do in the Global South. In Lagos, this 
has been rendered even more problematic and chaotic by its conjunction 
with military dictatorship, large scale corruption, harsh environmental 
conditions, and a long lasting economic crisis that followed the oil boom that 
the country experienced immediately after the independence of the country, 
in 1960. Lagos does not only present multilayered levels of complexity, but 
also multilayered dysfunction. As such it could seem totally alien to the 
subject of this thesis. The connection is not only made by the fact that 
Koolhaas’ conducted one of its most important research project about this 
city, but by the idea that, although Koolhaas emphasised on informal 
dynamics, it was in these highly chaotic and dramatic urban conditions that 
the descriptive and normative qualities of the anonymous city could be best 
tested. Contrary to cities in which the generic could be very easily confused 
with standardisation, the complex dynamics that Lagos is facing may be 
more suited to see to what extent the generic emerges from highly 
differentiated and chaotic dynamics.  
 Considering that the generic is always an emergent abstraction, this 
thesis seeks to disentangle its definition from the universal movement of 
modern standardisation it could be identified with. The implicit argument 
here is that the generic quality of the anonymous city, indexed by particular 
models, may be considered a vector of social and political emancipation from 
the current multiscalar crisis that we face. No longer identifiable with the 
standard rules that characterised the old modernist project, this thesis 
ambitions to contribute to the definition of “a new modernism”. Following 
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François Laruelle, it will be shown that the subtractive operations that 
determine the specific locality of the generic cannot be reduced to the 
average definition of prescriptive standards.59 Although the generic does not 
escape the standard procedures determining the expansion of contemporary 
capitalism, it must be argued that it does however not only introduce a 
difference, but that by ultimately resisting capitalisation, the idempotent 
operations that it produce may contribute to transforming the normative 
structure in which it intervenes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
59 Francois Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 239; 252.  
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CHAP 1 
 
 
 
 
 
RATIONAL CONTINUUMS 
 
 
 
This thesis argues that the anonymous city is foremost a rational 
construction. It corresponds to the model imagined by modernist 
architecture, that is, to what modernism imagined to be the city of the future 
that architecture should built. More than to any particular model, it unfolds 
primarily according to the way modernism understood the rationalisation of 
urban organisation. This first chapter starts by focusing on the internal logic 
that commands the way modernist architecture engaged with the question of 
standardisation. This will be explained through the conceptions of two main 
figures of the Modern Movement: Le Corbusier on the one hand, and Walter 
Gropius on the other. I will then move on to describe how the critique of 
standardisation has lead postmodernism to not only imagine a different 
relationship to the diversity of urban dynamics they engaged with, but also 
led to a relatively paradoxical retreat from this relation. Postmodernism 
replaced this relation with an emphasis on architecture’s autonomy. From 
this standpoint, I argue that the recent debate around the development of 
parametric architecture and what is generally referred to in terms of non-
standard architecture displays a general disengagement from the urban 
problematic, and that it is why I think that Koolhaas’ work on the generic 
appears decisive to the possible reconceptualisation of architecture’s relation 
to the city. Paying attention to the models imagined by the radical 
movements that arose in the 1960s and 70s, I contend that the continuous 
engagement of architecture with the city has always been formulated in close 
relation to modernism. Arguing that it is to these continuities that Koolhaas’ 
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work on the generic city relates, I contend that his account nevertheless 
points towards another model.  
   
1. Standard Urbanism 
 
Following the great divide that Alfred North Whitehead identified in terms of 
the bifurcation of nature, Modern architecture was built namely on the strong 
separation it aimed at securing between nature and the environment built by 
humans (culture).60 But it has even more decisively grounded its programme 
on the idea that it was possible to identify humankind’s universal and 
standard needs, and that architecture should build houses and cities that 
would correspond to these general and universal measures. The standards to 
which Modern architecture referred were not only statistical averages, but 
also ideal proportions determined by what they understood to be natural 
human standards. Contending that it was possible to conceive of human 
nature in standard terms, Modern architecture considered that it had found 
in Man the principle according to which architecture could, in following 
simple principles and an elementary grammar, ameliorate humanity’s 
conditions of existence. Industrial means of production did not provide these 
measures themselves, but they were seen to implement the means according 
to which the universal could become reproducible. It according to this 
general idea that Modernist architects imagined the city of tomorrow. Divided 
according to basic functions, organising fluid means of circulation between 
them, this city was not only meant to provide better conditions of existence, 
but to also propel humanity into industrial and cultural progress. According 
to them, the disastrous consequences of uncontrolled and unplanned 
urbanisation was to be countered with rational plans to build cities that 
would harmoniously integrate every class of society. Their concerns for 
getting rid of the slums in which the working class was dramatically 
concentrating was never truly connected to any critique of industrialisation 
                                            
60 See Isabelle Stengers, Michael Chase & Bruno Latour. Thinking with Whitehead: A free and 
wild creation of concepts. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011; Alfred North 
Whitehead. The Concept of Nature (1920), Dover: Dover Publications Ltd., 2005; Bruno 
Latour. Op cit., [1991] 1993.   
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per se. For Le Corbusier, the chaotic and humanly disastrous situation 
prompted by the exponential developments of industrial cities during the 
nineteenth century was not the result of the industrial revolution, but were 
rather the dramatic results of both its miscomprehension and its 
mishandling. Following Sloterdijk, it could be argued that his architectural 
programme unfolded according to the need for architecture to understand 
what industrialisation was making more explicit and, at the same time, 
develop adequate instruments and techniques to counter its disastrous 
effects. And it is according to this reformist agenda that the profound 
political, ideological, social and cultural valorisation of standardisation that 
Modernist architects such as Le Corbusier and Walter Gropius argued for 
should be read.  
 
1.1 The cultural valorisation of standardisation 
 
For modernist architects such as Le Corbusier, the anonymous city hence 
appears to be a desirable model. Exemplified in his plans and descriptions of 
A Contemporary City (1925), the anonymous city can be built everywhere and 
for everyone.61 A Contemporary City, already anonymous in its name, is 
designed to accommodate three million inhabitants. But it is made further 
anonymous by its definition, which Le Corbusier proposes according to two 
different orders of arguments: the first refers to what he calls human 
standards, the second to history and statistics. On the one hand, Le 
Corbusier imagines this city to suit any individual. On the other hand, it 
explores history in order to identify constants and universals that can be 
corroborated by the statistical definition of average values. Following this, Le 
Corbusier wants to define a rigorous theoretical model according to which it 
would be possible to define fundamental principles for a modern urbanism.62 
There are the same anonymous rules that govern Ludwig Hilberseimer’s 
Grossstadtarchitektur (1928).63 Breaking with tradition, the harmonious 
                                            
61 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1925] 1987. 
62 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1925] 1987: 158.  
63 Ludwig Hilberseimer. Metropolis Architecture and Selected Essays, Edited by Richard 
Anderson and Pier Vittoro Aureli, New York: Columbia University GSAPP Sourcebook, 2012.  
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metropolis desired and designed by Modern architects is a universal model. 
Reproducible anywhere and for everyone, it is seen to provide a rational 
solution to the many problems posed by the uncontrolled and unplanned 
development of industrial cities. This commitment to universal standards is 
what drives their positive valuation of anonymity. For them the standard does 
not deprive individuals of their singular attributes, but rather it identifies 
elementary structures that could suit everyone. Easily reproducible, more 
simple and functional, the standard represents minimal conditions that, for 
most architects of the Modern Movement, do not represent a minimisation of 
existence, but a maximisation of possibilities. 
 
 
 
Ludwig Hilberseimer. Grossstadtarchitektur (1928) 
  
 This is visible namely in the way Walter Gropius valorises industrial 
production. The conference he gave in 1926 at the German Congress for 
Normalisation, “Normung und Wohnungsnot” (1926), develops precisely this 
argument.64 He starts by arguing that while architecture still builds as it did 
                                            
64 Walter Gropius. “Normung und Wohnungsnot” (1926), revised version edited in Walter 
Prigge. Ernst Neufert : Normierte Baukultur im 20 Jahrundert, Francfort Am Main, 1999. See 
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in Middle Ages, the current industrial model provides many examples of the 
positive consequences of rationalisation in the domain of utilitarian objects. 
The necessity to conceive of a standard programme for architecture derives 
for him from the fact that the industrial model proves able to produce 
objects of better quality at a better price and following procedures whose 
simplicity does not lead to similarity but entails great possibilities of 
diversification. In his work “The Housing Industry” (1924), Gropius argues 
that standardisation should not be applied to entire houses, but only to their 
component parts. These internationally standardised parts can then be 
assembled in different ways. They can be used to produce different types of 
houses. Standardisation hence does not lead to any identical repetition. It 
only homogenises the production of interchangeable component parts.65  
This articulation between standardisation and diversification is crucial to 
understanding why modernist architects do not consider homogenisation to 
be synonymous with alienation. While many critiques have since then focused 
on the way in which Modern standardisation could be seen to deprive 
individual of both their particular attributes and aspirations, architects such 
as Gropius and Le Corbusier actually consider that it supports individual and 
collective development. Standardisation builds common denominators. It 
does not prevent diversification but on the contrary builds new common 
grounds on which variety can flourish. The many examples Le Corbusier 
presents in Towards an Architecture (1923) — from the liner boat, the car, 
and the airplane on the one hand; to bridges, silos, and factories on the 
other — emphasise this industrial logic. The variations they display in 
volume, function, and form do not contradict their typological order. 
Differences only exist between different orders, between different functions: 
the car cannot be similar to the airplane, while the factory cannot be 
designed on the model of the bridge. But all bridges possess a common 
                                                                                                                                        
also Walter Prigge. “Moderne, Norme, Standard”, in Zeynep Mennan and Frédéric Migayrou 
(eds.). Architecture non-standard, Paris: Éditions du Centre Pompidou, 2003.  
65 Gropius argues: “The organization must therefore aim first of all at standardizing and 
mass-producing not entire houses, but only their component parts which can then be 
assembled into various types of houses, in the same way as in modern machine design 
certain internationally standardized parts are interchangeably used for different machines.” 
Walter Gropius. “The Housing Industry” (1924), in The Scope of Total Architecture, translated 
from the German by Roger Banham, New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1980: 47.   
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structure. They share formal similarities that are neither symbolic or 
cosmetic but that are fully consistent with the function they perform. 
Homogenisation cannot be a problem since it only corresponds to the 
accurate correspondence between form and function, and does not prevent 
diversification. Diversification exists between entities that have a different 
function, but not between form and function. This is why the homogenisation 
of all forms that correspond to a similar function appears to them to not be a 
problem, but appear rather as progress on both levels. Industrial production 
is not only valorised for providing new building techniques. For both Le 
Corbusier and Gropius, standardisation appears to be a vector of civilisation. 
According to them, standardisation is cultural progress. Gropius argues that 
type does not restrict the development of culture, but on the contrary 
conditions it. Far from entailing violence inflicted to the individual, 
standardisation elevates the individual subject beyond private interests. In 
his 1926 conference, Gropius clearly argues against the idea that 
standardisation limits individual expression.66 According to Gropius, 
alienation does not belong to type but to the submission of collective 
organisation to particular interests. Alienation does not belong to the 
homogenisation and standardisation prompted by industrialisation, but on 
the contrary to particular interests and subjective preferences. “The typical 
carries the best”, Gropius continues. “It separates the elementary, the supra-
individual, from the subjective…” The typical, the elementary, the standard, 
are all synonyms of individual elevation. Through them, the individual is 
elevated to the supra-individual, to the collective and universal condition in 
which he participates. The link with the industrial revolution is again attested 
by Gropius when he finishes by saying that, very much as with the clothes we 
wear, repetition of the same elements does not only produce calm and 
harmony, but is a vector of cultural development: “The type has always been 
                                            
66 Gropius argues in this conference that: “the hypothesis according to which the 
industrialisation of architecture entails a violence inflicted to the individual and the defacing 
of the constructive form of the building is totally wrong. It is only the result of the schematic 
and misconceived application of types that still conserve a subjective character, or that are 
the product of secondary economical interests of isolated groups.” Walter Gropius. Op cit., 
1926. I refer here to the French translation, as reported in Walter Prigge’s artice. See Walter 
Prigge. Op cit., 2003: 50.  
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inscribed within the civilisational order of the social. (…) Who buys a car 
today would not think to ask for it being made-to-measure…”.67  
 Standardisation clearly appears to modernist architects to be a 
synonym of cultural elevation. The standard points towards something that is 
beyond subjectivity, something that is beyond individual interests, 
articulating its existence to the standard needs and measures that are 
considered to be universal. Industrial standardisation can be seen to mediate 
the relation between the individual and the universal. Modernist projects 
always consider the collective from the perspective of the individual. This is 
why for them houses are so important; this explains why the mass 
construction of houses in series appears so determinant. They constitute the 
elementary units of the anonymous city. One could argue that for both Le 
Corbusier and Gropius, the progress of humanity starts at home. It starts at 
this nuclear and individual level which, insisting on standards rather than on 
particularities, already manifests its collective and universal dimension. For 
these architects, standardisation is hence not only a question of building 
techniques. While they emphasise technical details, it is only to the extent 
that for them, these techniques, this possible rationalisation of the art of 
building, corresponds to a progressive programme for humanity. 
Standardisation is a humanist programme.  
 
1.2 Architecture and revolution 
 
One must keep in mind that for architects such as Le Corbusier and Gropius, 
formal simplification is only the translation of industry’s solution to the 
general problem of mass production. This problem is at the heart of Modern 
architecture. It is in fact primarily social and political, and specifically 
concerns the question of housing the masses that were concentrating in the 
cities where most industries and factories were located. Although Le 
Corbusier seems the perfect promoter of the kind of abstract universalism 
for which Modern architecture has primarily been criticised, it is impossible 
to understand his project without acknowledging the specific relation it 
                                            
67 Idem.  
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entertains with both  the industrial revolution and the question of social and 
political revolution.  
  For Le Corbusier standardisation represents for architecture a social 
and political programme. Fascinated by the industrial revolution, Le 
Corbusier nevertheless also considers its more dramatic consequences. The 
Athens Charter (1943) draws largely on these problems.68 From congestion to 
bad hygiene conditions, from pollution to the absence of natural light and 
from lack of decent housing space to the critique of the way industrial cities 
are organised more generally, the problems he references are not very 
different from those denounced by Charles Engels in Manchester at the 
beginning of the 19th century.69 This however does not lead Le Corbusier to 
the same considerations. Contrary to the way Engels identified these 
problems with the development of industrial capitalism, Le Corbusier seems 
almost completely to dissociate the industrial revolution from any analysis of 
capitalist economy. According to him, the problem is not industrial 
development, but the revolutionary dimension it takes. Humanity was not 
prepared for these revolutionary changes; the transformations were too 
dramatic and too fast in coming. Society has dramatically changed. But 
architecture has not changed the way its builds and imagines the city. The 
consequence is that people live under conditions that do not correspond to 
their time. Well aware of the fact that this discrepancy threatens to trigger an 
important social revolution, Le Corbusier considers the standardisation of 
architecture to be the solution to at once accommodate those changes and 
avoid political revolution.  
 The last chapter of Towards an Architecture articulates this idea very 
clearly. While favourable to the industrial revolution, Le Corbusier criticises 
its negative consequences and fears a social revolution. He argues: “(…) in all 
domains of the industry, we have posed new problems and created tools and 
instruments capable of solving them; if we place this fact in front of past 
                                            
68 Le Corbusier. The Athens Charter (1943), trans. Eng. Anthony Erdley, New York:  Grossman 
Publishers, 1973. 
69 Charles Engels. The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), Trans. Florence 
Kelley, Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1887. 
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conditions, there is a revolution.”70 The question for architecture is to 
accommodate this revolution. It is to reconcile people with these 
transformations which, chaotically introduced, have deprived them of their 
former conditions without producing new ones. For Le Corbusier, 
architecture becomes the instrument according to which the technological 
and industrial revolution can avoid turning into a social and political one. 
Contrary to Haussman, Le Corbusier does not seek to stop or prevent the 
revolution. According to him, the main purpose of architecture is rather to 
provide the conditions according to which there would be no need for a 
social revolution. Le Corbusier is not politically conservative, but rather fully 
endorses Modern reformism. For him it is not architecture against revolution 
but architecture or revolution as the title of this last chapter of his book 
suggests.71 The industrial revolution seems to have unleashed forces that go 
beyond the scope of humans. “Human tools were always in the hand of man: 
today, (Le Corbusier argues) totally renewed and formidable, it momentarily 
escapes our grasp.”72 The technical transformations he praises seem beyond 
humans’ ability to incorporate and control them. This is what he calls the 
“acephalous mechanisation”, the “laisser-faire”.73 And this is what 
architecture has the duty to tackle. Not architecture as it were, concentrating 
on style and tradition, the architecture of palaces. But the newly formed 
industrial architecture, the architecture of engineers, the architecture of 
bridges and factories, the design of cars and airplanes. His praise for typical 
functions and standard forms has hence nothing to do with style. But rather 
everything to do with the profound task of domesticating these new forces, 
with the crucial task of bringing technical progress to the masses and 
preparing humans to acknowledge it.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
70 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1923] 2008: 229.  
71 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1923] 2008: 237, 243.  
72 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1923] 2008: 229.  
73 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1943] 1973.  
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1.3 The typological logic of standardisation 
 
This task bears entirely on the promises of industrial standardisation. From 
the individual to the collective, from the bedroom to entire cities, Modernist 
architecture imagines integrated models aiming at improving living 
standards. This integrated model appears clearly in the programme that 
defines the Bauhaus. Promoting a new form of industrial art, the Bauhaus 
largely invented what we know call design. From chairs and bedrooms to 
entire buildings and cities, it imagines strategies to transform the whole 
environment in which we live. It is possible to argue that, following the 
conceptual apparatus developed by Sloterdijk, the Bauhaus seeks to integrate 
both movements of explicitation and immunisation. While this goes for the 
entire project of the Bauhaus, it is particularly visible in the famous building 
Gropius designed to host the school in Dassau. Completed in 1926, the 
building can be read as a manifesto. The different components of the school 
are distributed hierarchically and separated in what however appears to be a 
unified structure. Huge floor plans with no partitions host the different 
workshops. Although it has suffered some practical modifications, the main 
facade was originally entirely made of glass, making it a large glass curtain 
seemingly floating around the structure. The administrative office is located 
in a bridge that does not only connect this part of the building to the more 
classical part that host the technical school, but also dominates the whole 
structure. On the other side of the building, a collective space is dedicated to 
public events. Opened on both sides, this part of the building is a place 
where everybody can meet, and leads to the studios where students live. 
These studios are individual rooms. All alike, they also all possess their own 
individual balcony. The entire building encapsulates the major principles 
defended by Gropius and the Bauhaus. Everything at its right place, designed 
according to its particular functions, and matching a specific typology. Yet 
these components are also integrated into the same unified structure, all 
connected by large, bright spaces enhancing both circulation and 
possibilities for interaction. From the large open plans where the workshops 
are, to the studios where the students live, individuals are made part of a 
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large collective to which they are integrated on the basis that they all share 
the same needs.  
 This harmonious principle of integration is also what defines Le 
Corbusier’s engagement with standardisation. Defining human standards to 
be the ultimate measure of architecture, his Modulor gives the general logic 
directly connecting the most detailed aspects of the Unité d’Habitation to the 
urban plans defining both A Contemporary City and The Radiant City (1922-
1925).74 The Modulor integrates both aspects: the individual and the 
collective. As a universal measure, it is seen to suit everyone. That is, anyone 
in particular, and everyone in general. The Modulor defines the basic 
structure and standard measure of the ideal house, but also specifies that it 
should be considered to be a machine. For Le Corbusier a house is not an 
object, but a housing machine. And it is in terms of a machine that, like cars, 
airplanes and factories, a house is reduced to its essential functionalities and 
proportions. It is essentially composed of five rooms – one for cooking and 
one for eating; one for working, one for washing and one for sleeping. Each 
room is defined according to the specific functions it is dedicated to, 
provided that there is enough space to move freely. Very much as with the 
Bauhaus building, the entire structure is at once divided into different and 
separated parts, and unified as a whole.75  Very much like the engineer 
defines a certain number of elementary technical elements and constraints to 
form the standard solution according to which it can be reproduced, Le 
Corbusier defines a certain number of living standards, from which he will 
derive the best-suited architecture. This becomes evident when reading his 
“Housing Manual”, published in Towards an Architecture. All the housing 
problems he identifies in The Athens Charter and that inform his grand 
architectural project are there: hygiene, congestion, lack of light, noise, 
pollution… But they are presented together with solutions made possible by 
industrial development.76 
                                            
74 Le Corbusier. The Modulor: A Harmonious Measure to the Human Scale, Universally 
Applicable to Architecture and Mechanics (1945), Basel & Boston: Birkhäuser, 2004.  
75 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1923] 2008: 89-90. 
76 Le Corbusier compiles a series of different requirements that inhabitants should ask for 
their home: “Ask for a bathroom in full sunlight, one of the biggest rooms of the flat, the 
former living room for example. The wall will be made of windows opening onto a terrace 
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 Very much like industrial production implies the possibility of 
formalising both the product and the process of production in ways that can 
be repeated, the architectural programme defended by Modern architects 
such as Le Corbusier and Gropius implies the possibility of defining both 
standard objects and standard procedures. Focusing on the Modulor, the 
logic of standardisation essentially functions through the absolute distinction 
of different types on the one hand, and the linear articulation of typological 
variations on the other. This double aspect of standardisation is what 
constitutes the possibility of considering planning in deterministic terms. The 
Modulor explicitly seeks to provide this measure that, at once essential and 
fundamental, would be at once standard and ideal.77 For Le Corbusier, the 
standard proceeds from the necessities of the series. Exemplified by the 
automobile industry, standardisation operates the synthesis between the 
necessities of serial production and the perfectibility of the relation between 
form and function. The great achievements of the automobile industry are 
compared to the perfection of the Parthenon, while they are both related to 
the harmonious and fundamental order that Le Corbusier ultimately identifies 
in human nature.78 The Modulor is ultimately very close to the Vitruvian Man. 
It is the standard measure of the Modern Man, its anonymous incarnation. 
And it is this standard measure, at once the ideal and the universal measure, 
that represents the essential and elementary unit according to which the 
entire city should be built and organised.  
                                                                                                                                        
where it will be possible to take sun baths. (…) Ask for a large living room instead of many 
private rooms. Ask for the vacuum. Buy only practical furniture and banish decorative 
furniture. Go to the old castles see the bad taste of the great kings. (…) Teach your children 
that the house is only habitable when light is abundant, when the floors and walls are clean. 
To keep your floors well, remove unuseful furniture and oriental rugs. (…) Ask your landlord 
to provide you your own car garage, with room enough to put a bike and a motorbike for 
each flat. Rent flats at least one time smaller that the ones you used to live in with your 
parents. Consider the economy of your actions, your orders and your thoughts." Le 
Corbusier. [1923] 2008: 96. 
77 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1945] 2004.   
78 Le Corbusier. [1923] 2008: 115. 
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Le Corbusier. The Modulor (1945) 
 
 The oscillation between the universal, the ideal, the standard, the 
average, and the typical, defines the hesitation that characterises modern 
standardisation and the modern typology. As was already the case in the 
work of Jean Nicolas-Louis Durand in the nineteenth century, standardisation 
essentially draws linear chains and series defined in terms of difference and 
identity. This appears clearly in the planning theories of Ernst Neufert and 
Alexander Klein. On the one hand, standardisation defines relations of 
similarity according to an ideal model that can be replicated identically. On 
the other hand, it defines incommensurable differences between different 
ideal types that are defined according to specific functions. As it has been 
explained before, Le Corbusier defined his plans for A Contemporary City 
according to two different orders of considerations: the first refers to what 
he calls human standards, the second to historical and statistical analysis. 
His conception therefore entails the articulation of two very different 
considerations of what standards are. On the one hand they are considered 
to be ideal and essential attributes, while on the other hand they are seen to 
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correspond to average behaviours.79 This oscillation appears even more 
clearly when comparing the two books written by Ernest Neufert in 1936 and 
1943. Both published in Germany while Nazis were in power, these two 
books pose important questions about the links and connections it is 
possible to make between modernism, standardisation and the Bauhaus on 
the one hand, and the role played by Nazi architecture in the Nazi party’s 
plans to create a cultural and spiritual order based on immemorial 
nationalism and racial fundamentalism. Neufert had been the student and 
assistant of Gropius at the Bauhaus. Between 1926 and 1934, he was an 
influential member of two schools that, close to the Bauhaus, were forced by 
the Nazis to shut down. The first book, known in English as Architects’ Data, 
was published in Germany soon afterwards.80 This book is both an anthology 
and a comprehensive manual of Modern architecture. Having since then been 
progressively revised and updated through almost forty versions and 
translated in many languages, it is required reading in architecture schools 
still today. Looking for norms that would be neither defined in absolute 
terms nor simply according to tradition, Neufert’s 1936 seminal book draws 
lists, sketches and diagrams that are essentially defined in average terms. 
Looking for an ultimate measure, the second book proposes very different 
conceptions. Closer to the ideal than to the standard in ways that do not 
seem so different from what Le Corbusier develops in the Modulor, 
Bauordnungslehre (1943) proposes to unify these average standards 
according to a unique ideal measure. This marks another threshold. 
Standardisation no longer allows the multiplicity of standards, but tends to 
consider a unique and absolute measure. While this book is largely out of 
print and difficult to access, what Neufert proposes in it appears even more 
problematic when considering that he had by that time been appointed by 
                                            
79 Walter Prigge notably argues that: "The theory of plans, from Alexander Klein to Ernst 
Neufert, analyzes new industrial modes of existence, defines in terms of average value the 
spatial needs of a typical and ordinary individual, and translates the vital space required by 
daily activities in typical housing schemes, that are now defined by the measuring of 
statistical averages.” Walter Prigge. Op cit., 2003: 48. 
80 Ernst Neufert, Peter Neufert, Bousmaha Baiche and Nicholas Walliman (eds.), Architects' 
Data (1936), fourth edition, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.   
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Albert Speer, Hitler’s official architect, to work on the standardisation of 
German industrial architecture.  
 This problematic relation between modernist ideas and the totalitarian 
project is not new. Many times analysed, quite explicitly drawn by Italian 
futurism in relation to Mussolini’s Fascist regimes, this relation has also 
tainted in turn many modernist conceptions. Le Corbusier appears here to be 
a very problematic figure. Although it cannot be said to the same extent as 
with Neufert, the difference between the active and experimental measuring 
of standard according to average values and regularities, and the definition 
of some universal and ideal model that could be seen to be simultaneously 
inclusive and fundamental is a constant hesitation in Le Corbusier’s work. In 
Towards an Architecture, the definition of human standards is still very much 
subjected to an analysis that, though not necessarily critical, entertains at 
least an analytical and descriptive relation with the conditions prompted by 
the industrial revolution. In The Modulor, however, Le Corbusier clearly 
relates this to the idea of some universal and ideal unifying value. This 
hesitation is in fact already present within Towards an Architecture, where Le 
Corbusier writes on the same page that: “We must aim at establishing 
standards to cope with the problem of perfection”; and that: “Standards are 
logical things, they depend on scrupulous studies and analytics; they bear on 
problems that are well posed. Experimentation fixes the standard 
definitively.” 81  
 Despite this oscillation, it is possible to argue that Modern 
standardisation connects more generally to modern rationalisation by 
providing at once reliable models and linear chains of reproduction. While 
the question of knowing how standards are fixed and established 
necessitates an analysis of the normative dimension they entail (I will address 
this in the second chapter), it must be said that what is important here is the 
way Modern standardisation provides a determined and linear schema 
according to which the production and reproduction in series is not only 
possible, but as we saw for the architects of the Modern movement, desirable 
and a source of cultural development. It is quite easy to understand the 
                                            
81 Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1923] 2008: 103, 105.  
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decisive elements that standardisation provides to urban planning. It gives 
planning a deterministic law, determined mechanically, with variation in scale 
alone. It gives a constant, and determines a linear articulation similar to 
Russian Matryoshka dolls — from the smallest part to the biggest, the 
causality is linear, and each element reproduces another on a larger scale. 
Planning can be entirely determined. Because standardisation implies 
mechanical and linear causation to elements that only decisively vary in scale, 
the plan becomes a predictive scenario. This predictive element is perhaps 
what Modern architects were the most confident about. It is the element that 
made their inductive approach compatible with a prescriptive attitude. The 
main problem is that standardisation is considered to provide a determined 
law according to which it was possible to understand the relation between 
the model and the situation, between the past, the present and the future in 
linear and progressive terms. In the end, both Le Corbusier and Gropius ask 
the same question: what will ensure this continuum between the basic 
proportions and needs of the human body, serial production, and the 
mathematical ideal they associate with the laws of nature? What will facilitate 
the process of building as a whole, from conception to construction? What 
will ensure the harmonious correspondence between furniture and houses, 
and between houses and entire cities? This unresolved question may in fact 
lead us to consider that, while all modernist architecture cannot be said to be 
ultimately Fascist, the question of standardisation posits a relation between 
the individual and the collective that is necessarily linear, mechanical and 
holist. In doing so, it could provide interesting instruments to political 
regimes that sought to have a total and organic hold on people.  
 
2. The Complex City 
 
This uneven connection certainly constitutes an important landmark in the 
critiques modernist architecture later received. Exemplified by Robert 
Venturi’s, most critiques mainly reject the machinist rationality endorsed by 
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modernist architecture.82 Although they mostly argue that the problem with 
modernist architecture lay in the way it had oversimplified form, it can also 
be argued that that the rejection of modernist architecture more implicitly 
followed the rejection of these dramatic connections between modernist 
purism and standardisation on the one hand, and the political projects of 
totalitarian regimes on the other.83 The problem does not only lie in actual 
and biographical connections, but may exist more profoundly in the way the 
logic of standardisation, valorised and promoted by modernist architects, 
unfolds according to mechanist ideas that, developed in the industry under 
the influence of Frederick Winslow Taylor, are also determinant in the actual 
organisation of totalitarian regimes. While not necessarily articulated 
explicitly by postmodernist and more contemporary architects, this relation 
seems to have played an important role in the growing celebration of chaos 
against order, in the constant opposition between local and individual 
diversity and global homogeneity. While the critical utopias imagined by the 
various radical groups that emerged in England and in Italy in the 1960s and 
70s shed new light on industrial logic, standardisation and modularity, it is in 
the postmodernist model of the Heteropolis that the opposition to the 
homogeneous, standardised and anonymous city imagined by modernism is 
made the most explicit. Emphasising diversity and complexity, this model 
acknowledges dynamics that not only challenge the desirability of 
standardisation, but also its possibility. Analysing these different models, the 
second section of this chapter looks at the way architecture and social theory 
started to consider cities in terms of complex systems. We will see that these 
perspectives lack what can be considered the great strengths of the models 
imagined by Archizoom and Constant. While they do show that we can only 
deal with cities in terms of complex systems, this does not mean that they 
are not subjected to systemic dynamics of convergence. Nevertheless, they 
can no longer be understood in standard terms. The originality of Koolhaas’ 
work on the generic city may be addressed along these lines, both in 
                                            
82 Venturi. Op cit., 1966.  
83 See notably Roger Griffin. Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under 
Mussolini and Hitler, London: Palgrave: 2007. 
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contradistinction and in continuity with modernist and postmodernist 
accounts. 
  
2.1 Complexity and Contradictions 
 
Postmodernism generally criticised modernist architecture for being bland, 
monumental and alienating. Contesting its programme of universal progress 
on the basis that the great diversity and complexity of nature, human life and 
cultural achievements could not be reduced to standard measures and 
mechanist models, postmodernism first corresponded in architecture to 
strategies valorising historical diversity, symbolic aspects and semantic 
ambiguity. Having been the first to speak overtly about postmodernism, 
Charles Jencks did not give the more profound political resonance this critical 
movement later took in philosophy and human sciences. Concentrating on 
semantic and stylistic questions, his reading of architecture can be see to 
have closely followed the conceptions developed by Venturi. Venturi’s 
critique was no more overtly political than Jencks’. Venturi’s call for giving 
more attention to the context, for accepting and working with complexity 
and contradictions can however be read according to an implicit political 
critique. Modernism wanted to build a new order and to conceive of an all-
encompassing rational order that would not only be more simple and better 
organised, but also more efficient, and ultimately more harmonious. It is 
precisely to this holist conception of rational and efficient order that Venturi 
opposes his own practice and conceptions. The simplicity praised by 
Modernist architects appears suspect to Venturi. Although he does not make 
any explicit links, it can be argued that it is against the association of 
standardisation and anonymity with alienation and totalitarian ghosts that, 
for him like for others later on, complexity, contradictions, diversity, 
ambiguity, appear to be all part of the same desirable prospect.  
 For Venturi the problem is clear: “Architects can no longer afford to be 
intimidated by the puritanically moral language of orthodox Modern 
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architecture”.84 Calling for “a non-straightforward architecture”, he argues 
that modern experience neither develops according to the standardisation of 
practices and production nor needs to be positively forced this way. 
According to him this was only the case for modernist architects who, 
obsessed with the future and with the universal could only see the present 
situation to be problematic, and the particular to be nothing more than some 
reminiscence of the past that should be overcome. Non straightforward 
architecture, on the contrary, respects the richness and complexity of 
modern experience. More attentive to the context, this conception of 
architecture chooses the particular instead of the universal, difference 
instead of standardisation, and singular elements rather than the overall 
series. In his foreword to Venturi’s book, Vincent Scully gives a sense of the 
transformation this implied at the time. What appears now historically 
contingent was in fact seen in highly necessary and deterministic terms by 
the Moderns. And when Venturi was writing, homogenisation still seemed not 
only to define the present, but also to belong to the future. Scully clearly 
positions Venturi against this when he argues that he “(…) is entirely at home 
with the particular and so offers the necessary opposition to the 
technological homogenizers who crowd our future.”85 Homogenisation, 
praised by Modernism, is the enemy. Mies von der Rohe, who critiques 
Venturi’s formal aspects, becomes his main adversary, and his famous 
doctrine “Less is more,” becomes the symbol of what should be refused. For 
him, in fact, “Less is a bore”:  
 
 “The doctrine ‘less is more’ bemoans complexity and justifies exclusion for 
expressive purposes. It does indeed permit the architect to be highly selective in 
determining what problems he wants to solve.” This forced simplicity, Venturi 
continues “(…) results in oversimplification. (…) Where simplicity cannot work, 
simpleness results. Blatant simplification means bland architecture. Less is a bore”.86  
 
                                            
84 Robert Venturi. Op cit., 1966: 22.  
85 See Vincent Scully, in Venturi. Op cit., 1966: 14.  
86 Venturi. Op cit., 1966: 24-25. 
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This bold statement encapsulates the main aspects of Venturi’s conception. 
Formal excess becomes something that should not only be studied but also 
valorised. Complexities, contradictions, are no longer regarded as what 
remains to be organised, as what remains to be subjected to simpler rules 
and principles, but should be accommodated, revealed, and eventually 
brought together without necessary looking for any form of unified 
resolution. This also structures the way Venturi understands architecture’s 
relation to the city. One of the first to set up research a studio and to embark 
with students on studying emerging urban conditions, Venturi occupies a 
decisive position in regards to the constitution of a descriptive turn in 
architecture.  
 
 
 
Robert Venturi, Denise Scott-Brown and Steven Izenour. “The Duck and the Decorated Shed”, 
in Learning from Las Vegas (1972) 
 
 Written together with Denise Scott-Brown and Steven Izenour, Venturi’s  
Learning from Las Vegas (1972) is a hallmark in the history of architecture’s 
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relation with the city.87 This book is certainly one of the best examples of 
what Sebastien Marot calls situated manifestos. Drawing on Le Corbusier’s 
famous lessons from Rome, Learning From Las Vegas explicitly relates to 
modernist architects’ obsession with the city. But while they generally 
referred to great historical examples to build theoretical ideals and standard 
icons, Learning from Las Vegas is more concerned with present and 
emerging conditions. More significantly, it looks at what seems to be the 
least iconic, most vernacular, most disregarded situation. Not only because it 
is new, but because it announces transformations that no longer seem to 
concern architects. At the time of Venturi’s work, Las Vegas was the best 
example of a city controlled by promoters and oriented towards the 
development of capitalism rather than planned by architects concerned with 
social and political issues. It announces a new form of urbanism: one where 
signs and cheap facades become content, one that is organised horizontally 
along one main commercial boulevard, one that is made for the car and for 
leisure, for entertainment and for temporary stay. It forms a landscape where 
infrastructures increasingly become architecture. And where architecture 
increasingly merges with communication. Simple structures that can be 
repeated, but that also proliferate in every direction and in many different 
ways. They are made to capture attention more than to accommodate 
anything more permanent. This analysis comes close to the way Sanford 
Kwinter and Daniela Fabricius defined the American city in their contribution 
to Mutations (2000).88 It is no coincidence that Venturi later worked with Ed 
Rusha and Stephen Shore, two conceptual artists and photographers who are 
obsessed with the documentation, description, and analysis of suburban 
space as it developed in the United States from the 1950 onwards. Looking at 
what appeared at the time to be an avant-garde model that would soon 
become a paradigmatic example, Learning From Las Vegas analyses 
transformations that have had a profound impact on the organisation of our 
urban environment since then. Exemplifying the transformations affecting 
the American City in relation to the development of the consumerist society, 
                                            
87 Venturi, Brown and Izenour. Op cit., 1977.  
88 Daniela Fabricius and Sanford Kwinter. “The American City” in Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 
2000.  
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it also prefigures what has then spread around the world, and notably in 
Asia. Focusing on the way shopping profoundly transformed our 
environment, how this phenomenon has almost entirely captured 
architectural imagination and contemporary culture, the second project lead 
by Koolhaas at the Harvard School of Design closely relates to what Learning 
from Las Vegas analysed thirty years before.89 While this account largely 
contributed to the development of what I call inductive architecture, and 
while it also represents an interesting landmark to understand both in terms 
of Koolhaas’ relation to modernist preoccupations and the originality of his 
contribution, I would nevertheless also argue that the attention Venturi paid 
to neglected and present situations never led him away from his main 
semiological focus. Interpreting architecture in linguistic terms, Venturi is 
also representative of the way postmodernism increasingly substituted 
linguistic, communicational and semiological considerations to the 
materialist, functionalist and engineering perspective adopted by modernism. 
And that while this perspective certainly matched many transformations that 
actually affected both architecture and the city, it also emphasised aspects 
that, in addition to contributing to dematerialise infrastructural dynamics, 
have also led to the obliteration of many social and political questions. 
Although it mainly reads Las Vegas’ organisation in semiological terms, 
Venturi’s book pays great attention to infrastructural dynamics. But the 
model he announces will soon more evidently obliterate this question.   
 
2.2 Diverse Diversity 
 
Dominated by the idea that architecture is communication, the conception 
that most postmodernist architects develop of the hybrid metropolis they live 
in appears largely determined by the notion of diversity. The postmodernist 
metropolis is essentially diverse. This model is notably informed by the 
explosive growth of multicultural cities and by the runaway inflation of cities 
beyond anyone’s control. But it also unfolds according to the heterogeneous 
architecture that architects develop to deal with this diversity. It is interesting 
                                            
89 Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2002.  
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to remark that, while Venturi already speaks in the 1960s about complexity, 
post-Modern architects speak more reductively in the 80s and 90s about 
variety, heterogeneity, and diversity. Charles Jencks argues that this 
corresponds to the development, in place of the old and more traditional 
cosmopolis (i.e. the integrated and harmonious models of Alexandria, Rome 
and even New York), of the contemporary Heteropolis. Exemplified by cities 
such as London and Los Angeles, this model is for Jencks the result of the 
increase in the variety of variety.90 The Heteropolis no longer supports any 
monosphere of inclusion; heterogeneity and diversity become its only 
defining characteristics.  
 This emphasis on diversity points to actual transformations. It notably 
emphasises the idea that, in times of contemporary economical, 
technological and cultural globalisation, major cities become increasingly 
diverse. Not only in terms of culture, but also in terms of population. Jencks’ 
Heteropolis is in that sense quite close to what Saskia Sassen defines as the 
Global City.91 Characterised by mass migration, high diversity in all domains, 
and by multiculturalism, Sassen’s global cities are however also characterised 
by huge economical inequalities, string movements of segregation, and 
powerful hierarchical structures. Usually financial centres of the global 
economy as much as they are cultural and informational centres, these cities 
combine diversity with its more dramatic and decisive counterpart: 
hierarchical stratification. This more political aspect of the variety Jencks 
talks about seem largely absent from those models that emphasise on 
diversity. The Heteropolis seems generally to present a superficial image that 
can only be enjoyed by those who are economically and culturally privileged. 
More than talking about the polycentred sprawl to which global urbanisation 
seems to be subjected, and far from acknowledging the complex dynamics 
that connect this movement to movements of generic convergence, the 
different images of the hybrid metropolis, generally more scattered and 
sketched than really modelled, seem generally only about difference and 
                                            
90 See notably Charles Jencks. Heteropolis – Los Angeles, the Riots and the strange Beauty of 
Hetero-Architecture, London: Saint Martins Press, 1993. 
91 Saskia Sassen. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, second edition, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001.  
 62 
eclectism. Difference, diversity, multiple access and eclecticism are promoted 
as a new lifestyle more than as a general condition. This is notably expressed 
by Jencks when, considering the buildings designed by Frank Gehry in Los 
Angeles in the 1990s, he argues that architecture’s role is to index and 
further this taste.92 Radical eclecticism, collage and enigmatic signifiers 
become the architectural counterpart to sociological, natural and economical 
diversity. While this tends to obliterate more decisive issues concerning this 
diversity, levelling the hierarchical differences and movements of segregation 
it supposes to the apparently neutral plane of aesthetic preferences and 
formal variations, it also largely disconnects architecture from its social and 
political responsibility to the city. Architecture increasingly focuses on the 
designed object, and on the singular building. As such the city increasingly 
becomes an image. Imbued with metaphors, it forms the cultural background 
from which the architect draws inspiration, while his plans mainly aim to 
modify the city skyline and to populate magazine covers. Flirting with 
caricature, this description does not seem far from what has been structuring 
contemporary discourses about architecture and the city. The model 
becomes increasingly metaphorical, mainly alluding to a situation that cannot 
be well-grasped. Architecture seems only able to intervene on the level of 
producing innovative forms and iconic buildings for major companies and 
institutions.  
 Far from representing any real breakthrough in the recent history of 
architecture’s relation to the city, the parametric jungle imagined by Patrick 
Schumacher only radicalises and pushes forward the logic already at play in 
the different models of the Heteropolis.93 In Schumacher’s city, individual 
preferences have become the centre of a process of selection that literally 
constitutes the urban condition. The parametric jungle is in fact only the 
subtitle of a text that Schumacher chose to entitle “My Kind of Town”, hence 
                                            
92 See Franck Gehry. Chiat/Day/Mojo office, Los Angeles, CA: 1989-1991. This building 
emphasises collage, producing an eclectic mix of diverse signs and shapes representing 
different cultural tastes and movements. See also Idem. Walt Disney concert hall, Los 
Angeles, CA: 1987-1998, which more evidently draw on Le Corbusier’s chapel in Ronchamp 
to play with the notion of enigmatic signifier. These buildings are notably described and 
commented in Charles Jencks. Op cit., 2002.  
93 Patrick Schumacher. “My Kind of Town: The Parametric Jungle” in Architecture Today, 
AT227, April 2012. 
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submitting the whole text and model to the idea of some personal 
preference. The whole text then unfolds as a giant metaphor, between the 
jungle and the Internet, between the idea that everything is communication 
to the idea that “the city is a complex text and a permanent broadcast”.94 
Although it does describe quite well the way ubiquitous media has recently 
transformed the urban condition, and although it does indeed address logics 
that are at the heart of contemporary global urbanisation, it also merely 
exacerbates and fantasises a situation that merely corresponds to the busy 
financial centres dominating the contemporary global economy. No longer 
only emphasising diversity but also constant change, Schumacher’s 
parametric jungle seems indeed to mirror the logics that define 
contemporary high frequency trading.95 I would argue that this mirroring 
relation is what constitutes the most problematic aspect of these models that 
concentrate on diversity and complexity on the level of the metaphor. Unable 
to take any critical distance from what they portray, they cannot be accused 
of being simply descriptive, for their incapacity to comment reflexively on the 
present transform them into pure deductive models. While the models 
imagined by the radical movements of the 1960s and 70s can be said to be 
sometimes even more emphatic than these contemporary metaphorical ones, 
it must also be argued that they possess analytic, critical, and reflexive 
qualities that largely surpass them.  
 
 
                                            
94 I refer here to the version available online on Patrick Schumacher’s personal website: 
http://www.patrikschumacher.com/Texts/My%20Kind%20of%20Town_The%20Parametric%20
Jungle.html, Last consulted 12/10/2013.  
95 Schumacher writes: “In my town the metropolitan condition that Georg Simmel 100 years 
ago first described as numbing sensory overload becomes productive and transmutes into 
intense information processing. What I am craving for is a place that offers the most dense 
communicative experience. What I need to feel alive and productive is an urban vitality based 
on a high density of diverse communicative offerings that allows me to be both randomly 
freewheeling and to become highly selective within a split second. This is only possible in a 
build environment that presents and orders myriad communicative opportunities within each 
single vista and where what is presented in the immediate visual field allows for inferences 
about what lies behind.” Schumacher. Op cit., 2012. For a presentation and critical account 
of high frequency trading, see Bogdan Dragos and Inigo Wilkins. “Destructive Destruction? 
An Ecological Study of High Frequency Trading, Mute magazine online publication, 22 
January 2013: 
http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/destructive-destruction-ecological-study-
high-frequency-trading.  
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2.3 Critical Modernism 
 
So far, this presentation has followed the opposition that usually structures 
the debate between Modern and postmodern architecture. Considering both 
movements more narrowly, however, it seems possible to identify more 
profound continuums. Both movements are redefined in the more proper and 
limited terms of modernism and postmodernism, while, following both 
Latour and Sloterdijk, this thesis focuses on modernity, and looks at the 
more profound dynamics that have affected architecture’s relation to the city. 
Grounding this history in the conceptions developed by modernist 
architecture, I have nevertheless argued that it also followed more ancient 
precedents. And that it should be read not only in relation to the 
standardisation of architecture and the production in series, but more 
generally in relation to the flexible although linear typologies on which they 
grounded the possibility to conceive, build, and plan the homogeneous 
metropolis of the future. Following Andrea Branzi’s descriptions, it is 
possible to argue that post-Modernism substituted this model with a model 
based on heterogenity and diversity: the hybrid metropolis.96 Branzi, former 
leader of one of the most significant movements in architecture in the 1960s 
and 70s, understands things differently. According to him the hybrid 
metropolis, the post-industrial metropolis, is not only more diverse, but also 
more homogeneous. Branzi’s position is very close to that of Koolhaas. 
According to him, what has massively changed is the relation that 
architecture entertains with the city. The project no longer unfolds in terms 
of long term and large-scale planning. It corresponds to what Branzi defines 
in terms of segmented thought.97 Projects are weak from the point of view of 
global transformation and of their inscription within unifying programmes, 
but they are strong within distinct and local segments, within circumscribed 
domains. The chaotic order of the city is no longer seen to be something to 
eliminate, some transitory state that has to be overcome, but is rather seen 
to be the reality with which architecture has to cope. The hybrid metropolis is 
                                            
96 Andrea Branzi. Learning from Milan: Design and the Second Modernity (1988), Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1989. 
97 Branzi. Op cit., [1988] 1989: 128.  
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hence far more complex. But this complexity, according to Branzi, can only 
be acknowledged once it is no longer merely identified with diversity. 
According to him the model and logic implies contradiction and unity,98 
diversity and homogeneity. Hybridation certainly challenges Modernist’s 
purist impulses, but it does not contradict the possibility of being articulated 
together with homogenising forces. Most definitions of the Heteropolis do in 
fact implicitly contend that this is effectively the case, for the way they 
celebrate diversity necessitates the neutralisation of more decisive and 
critical differences. Branzi’s conception of the hybrid metropolis already 
prefigures what he would later call the cold metropolis, and what Koolhaas 
call the generic city. The hybrid metropolis does not unfold according to 
unifying standards, but according to standards that allow variation.  
 
 
 
Archizoom. No Stop City (1968) 
 
                                            
98 Branzi. Op cit., [1988] 1989: 132. 
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 This more profoundly relates to what seems to have been central to 
most of the models imagined by the radical movements in the 1960s and the 
70s: the notion of variation, the logic of modularity. The ideas developed by 
Branzi as a way to define the contemporary cold metropolis are very close to 
those he developed at the same time with Archizoom, particularly when they 
imagined the model of the No Stop City.99 The model proposed by Archizoom 
is a radical version of the standard and homogeneous metropolis imagined 
by Modernism. Against Modernist mechanical rationalism, it pushes 
industrial logic to its extreme limit. Following Marxist principles, No Stop City 
materialises forces which, pushed to their extreme, will necessarily collapse 
and open to non capitalist and non industrial territories. Emancipation, for 
the members of Archizoom, follows the radical exhaustion of the industrial 
system. No Stop City imagines an architecture that would correspond to 
direct democracy, that would give rise to a social structure deprived of both 
demos and cratos. Without a centre, without a global image, No Stop City 
expands in every direction and does not follow rules other than those 
constantly redefined by its inhabitants. Contrary to modernist models, the 
city does however do unfold according to a definite image of human nature 
and human needs. No Stop City does not seek harmony, but rather looks for 
free and indeterminate associations. Anonymity reaches its maximum: Branzi 
writes that “it is a city without qualities, conceived for men without 
predefined qualities”.100 It assembles inexpressive containers, inside of which 
everything is possible.  
 This notably contrast with the determinist models imagined by 
modernist architecture. While modernist architects wanted to accommodate 
everyone, it was also always through the detailed definition of what would be 
the standard building, the standard elements that would suit the standard 
subject that it sought to define positively. The No Stop City, however, 
considers this only negatively, in terms of bland patterns and empty modular 
grids. Branzi makes connections with Rothko’s monochromes and Cy 
Twombly’s paintings, arguing that, as with these paintings, the No Stop City 
                                            
99 Branzi. Op cit., 2006.  
100 Branzi. Op cit., 2006: 149. 
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is like “(…) an infinite ocean (…) deprived of centre and of boundaries”.101 
This of course could be seen now to be a euphoric portrayal the way 
capitalism seeks to index the world: a generalised free market that does not 
know boundaries, and where money is a universal principle of equivalence 
according to which everything is possible. But it is especially interesting to 
remark that, while models like this were indeed imbued with utopian 
aspirations that could seem nowadays to quite distressfully portray the 
dystopian conditions that had become a reality, they already underline this 
critical relation to the present they were describing. Following what Sloterdijk 
argues about the models composing Constant’s New Babylon, I would argue 
that the great strength of these models is that they did not only speculate 
about future utopian times, but also reflexively and critically addressed 
dynamics that were actually already present.102 Branzi affirms for example 
that, unfolding according to the early developments of information 
technology, the No Stop City was also conceived to portray a metropolis that 
would “(…) directly correspond to the market, where distinctions in terms of 
locality and function would no longer be relevant”.103 This appears very close 
to the way Sloterdijk defines the contemporary capitalist planetarium.104 This 
ambivalent analytic relation, at once speculative, utopian, and critical, defines 
what I would like to call critical modernism. Whereas this ambivalence 
remains problematic, I follow Frederic Jameson in contending that it 
nevertheless can prove today to open new critical possibilities, possibilities 
that no longer critique in order to establish limits, or to mourn and be ironic, 
but that can elevate cynical reason and irony to interesting analytical 
territories. Providing that they remain be ethically committed, they may also 
articulate our relation to both the complex present and the uncertain future 
in interesting ways.  
 I would argue that Koolhaas’ model of the generic city largely indexes 
the way these critical utopias have become our present. During the course of 
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their actualisation they can however also be seen to have acquired much 
more dystopic attributes. This has certainly a lot to do with the criticisms 
Koolhaas receives. But before going into further detail, I would like to make a 
detour through contemporary sociology and philosophy. Focusing on Latour 
and the growing influence his philosophy has in the humanities and in 
architecture, I would like to ague that Koolhaas’ account has to be 
understood in relation to problems that this philosophy seems to neglect. In 
designing instruments that could help to make sense of the increasingly 
discrete and complex dynamics that shape our social environment, Latour 
has greatly participated in extending our capacities to understand and 
explain complex systems. However, he offers no possibility of taking a more 
general picture, or of addressing the dynamics of convergence that affect 
global urbanisation. Drawing on the differences it is possible to define 
between Latour and Sloterdijk’s framework, I would argue that Koolhaas’ 
work on the generic city makes proposals that contrast fundamentally with 
perspectives that increasingly dominate our theoretical landscape.  
 
2.4 Beyond Indefinite extension 
 
Latour’s empirical studies made a decisive distinction between former 
structural approaches and ethnographical description. Although his 
philosophy can be seen to be quite systematic, and while his studies also 
continuously build a more general framework, Actor-Network Theory mainly 
stands as an anti model. Latour has indeed repeatedly argued that the 
concept of network had no particular shape, that it was explicitly designed to 
register the shape of the assemblages under scrutiny. Flattening the social as 
much as it started by flattening the epistemological ground, Latour can be 
seen to have designed a system that would no longer presuppose of any 
particular social topography. It could hence be said that his move to 
ethnography corresponds to the claim that all models are always reductive. 
By implying specific topographical and conceptual emphasis, for Latour they 
always distort reality in ways that ethnography can avoid, precisely because it 
does not presume any geography, and because it does not privilege any 
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register of explanation. Ethnography simply follows the actor. It follows 
things that act; things that count, and things that make a difference and 
imply transformation that can be precisely described, and only then 
interpreted. Following what has been said about the models imagined by 
critical modernism, I would nevertheless contend that this assumption lack 
emphasis on the theoretical motives and orientation that lead any form of 
description.  
 Latour’s position implies a specific reading of complexity and 
continuity. Understanding complexity in terms of ecological relations, Latour 
has largely participated in supporting the idea that problems of complexity 
may be best understood in topological terms. Latour’s philosophical system 
greatly emphasise on space. His oeuvre contains important books and 
articles on urban dynamics and architecture.105  From networks and vectors 
to trajectories, chains of relations, and circulating references, most of his 
important concepts emphasise space. Paralleling Sloterdijk, he repeatedly 
argued that his work demands to “relocate the global”,106 hence suggesting 
that his entire work may be understood in geographical and spatial terms. 
Drawing on his book on Paris — Paris: Invisible City (1998) — I would argue 
that it is possible to read Latour’s work as one would explore a city, 
delineating and addressing the form and the limits of his theoretical system 
in geographical and spatial terms, and analysing the spatial dynamics that 
animate the direction of his arguments. I contend that it is because ANT 
greatly emphasises the discontinuities and heterogeneous elements on which 
any continuous ensemble depends that it constitutes a decisive starting point 
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to engage with the topological complexity of contemporary urban dynamics. 
But I would also argue that, by contending that any entity is ultimately 
nothing more that the ensemble of relations it entertains and manages to 
maintain with others, his system is also problematically indifferent to more 
general and generic dynamics of convergence. For all its horizontal and 
reversible descriptions, ANT ultimately produces the problem of defining 
boundaries, drawing definite lines, and isolating systemic functions. 
 Extending his description of Paris, Latour’s general argument makes 
the point that it is change and not conservation that is the law; and that 
continuity is only established on top of many discontinuities and 
transformations. The framework developed by Latour tends to explain 
continuity by the discontinuities it implies. Like any other city, Paris becomes 
in his view a giant body, where the invisible infrastructures feeding and 
managing the city suddenly become its organs. This already suggests a 
biological, technical and political understanding of urban dynamics, which 
replaces a holistic conception with multiple descriptions of situated and 
specific networks. Moving away from phenomenological understandings, he 
expands the description of urban dynamics beyond the human imaginary and 
deepens our understanding of the material and engineering dynamics that 
shape the urban environment. In fact, Latour’s account allows one to make 
sense of a more general and more profound transformation according to 
which the impact of new technologies not only adds another dimension to a 
pre-existing physical space but produces new forms of continuities between 
the physical and informational dimensions. This argument encapsulates the 
more general way in which Latour understands space. Paralleling Sloterdijk 
again, Latour distinguishes his own topological position from former 
Euclidean conceptions of space. According to Euclidean geometry, space was 
where objects and subjects resided. Defined in terms of extrinsic extension, 
space could still exist once emptied of all entities populating it. For both 
Sloterdijk and Latour however, space is only one — although may be the 
most significant — of the many connections made by objects and subjects. In 
this intrinsic conception of spatial extension, entities engender their space as 
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they move. If you take entities out, nothing is left.107 Following this general 
definition, his book about Paris dissolves structural and holistic conceptions 
in order to explore more relational, symmetrical and flat perspectives that 
contribute to understanding the city.108 Comparable to the attitude Latour 
adopted  towards classical sociology, this move away from contextual 
explanations – i.e. explaining diverse local phenomena by their direct causal 
relation to a more general context – and towards more situated and detailed 
accounts entails radical critiques of structuralist perspectives. Although his 
position may consist in deepening our understanding of discrete processes 
more than in registering the simple victory of interactionism over 
structuralism, his critique of panopticism seems nevertheless to drop entirely 
any possibility of understanding the structural dynamics at play in urban 
organisation. Proposing to replace the notion of panopticism with the 
concept of oligopticism, Latour contests that there exists in the city any 
central position from which it would be possible to either discipline or 
control the entire city. Latour argues that the city is actually made up of a 
series of discontinuous and scattered observing and controlling apparatuses 
that, concentrating on specific issues, remain separated. For Latour there is 
hence no general logic that can embrace every oligopticon and submit them 
to a totalising, structural power. 
 Although my argument about the generic does not consist in simply 
reaffirming the validity of structural explanations, it must nevertheless be 
argued that, contrary to Latour’s argument, the contemporary anonymous 
city produced by global urbanisation is not only marked by absolute 
discretisation but also, as Koolhaas argues, by strong movements of 
convergence that, despite not being totalising in the way the notion of 
context can be mobilised, are nevertheless more continuous and more 
structural than what Latour’s position allows us to acknowledge. This actually 
marks an important difference with what Sloterdijk argues. Sloterdijk’s 
spherology understands continuity both in terms of topological extension, 
and in terms of bounded systems. Although Sloterdijk parallels Latour when 
                                            
107 Latour. Op cit., 2009.  
108 Bruno Latour & Émile Hermant. Op cit., 1998. 
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arguing that the contemporary city can no longer be addressed in terms of a 
superstructure but rather as something that circulates, one could say a 
principle of association, he nevertheless argues that it does hold things 
together.109 This question is a constant preoccupation for Sloterdijk.110 
According to Sloterdijk, the contemporary city is a meta-collector of 
atomised immunological islands. Like Latour, Sloterdijk does not see this 
meta-collector to be an overall and all-encompassing structure. Neither does 
he see it as a totalising context. The notion of spheres nevertheless suggests 
that the important question for him is one of compatibility, that the question 
bears on those partition walls that do not only separate and distinguish these 
different spheres, but also constitute points of contact, points of exchange, 
communication, and compatibility. This question appears central to the 
distinction he makes between the Ancient Ecumene — founded on 
metaphysical and then religious universalism — and the second ecumene — 
the contemporary ecumene founded on the generalisation of the market and 
commercial relations. Sloterdijk argues that:  
 
 "(...) The Second ecumene will not be able to proclaim “the unity of mankind" 
— to use for a moment the language of the eighteenth century — in the name of a 
common physis, but only on the basis of a common situation. The situation can only 
be defined from an ecological and immunological point of view.”111 
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I contend that this problem constitute one of the most pressing questions in 
the Anthropocene era. What is this ecological and immunological common? 
How can it be built? What is its relation with the continuous process of 
explicitation? How can immunological structures cope with explicitation in 
ways that no longer merely counter, suppress or tend to ignore it? These are 
the questions that underline the importance that is given here to the concept 
of the generic. Following Laruelle’s suggestion that it may represent a new 
form of universal, I contend that the generic can constitute a decisive 
conceptual instrument in order to not only define the common 
immunological and ecological situation Sloterdijk speaks of, but also more 
fully to engage in processes of explicitation.  
 Sloterdijk’s description of the contemporary city unfolds according to 
what he calls The Foam City. Following his description of an historical 
movement going from the most simple and primitive spheres (i.e. the 
bubbles constituted by the womb, by the family, the house, the 
village…etc.),112 to the gigantic and all encompassing globes imagined by 
metaphysicians, monotheisms, and terrestrial globalisation,113 and finally the 
multiple, fragmented and dispersed foam structures in which we now live 
and which could be seen to perfectly describe the situation prompted by the 
conceptual definition of the Anthropocene,114 the contemporary city is for 
Sloterdijk The Foam City. His general description is similar to what the 
members of the research group Multiplicity argue about the geography of 
contemporary urban society in Europe: that it is characterised by a 
miniaturisation of subsystems and social groups, and by a broadening of the 
urban macro system.115 Very much like Koolhaas’ Generic City, the Foam City 
tries to captures the morphology and the logic — one could say the dynamic 
geography — of contemporary urban dynamics. The fact that the term “city” 
is still used in both cases seems again quite important here, for it explains 
why the question of articulating the multiple, the fragmented and the 
discontinuous with convergence, agglomeration and continuity is still largely 
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present in his texts. Although it does very much emphasise pluralism, 
individualism, fragmentation, and isolation, his model also argues that 
complexity cannot only be seen this way, and that it is necessary to address 
what kind of morphological and structural continuities it produces. Sloterdijk 
speaks about acephality — which does not only address, as in Koolhaas’ text, 
the destitution of centrality, but also the destitution of centralised authority 
— and about asynodism. The latter term derives from the Hellenistic and 
ecclesiastic term synode, which used to designated a local or special council 
formally convened to discuss ecclesiastical affairs. The notion does not only 
refer to the atomised and fragmented character of the contemporary city, but 
to what makes it anonymous and politically deprived of proper assemblies.116 
Contrary to Latour, Sloterdijk’s position is counterbalanced by the idea that 
these spatial multiplicities are nevertheless subjected to strong movements 
of agglomeration: "The urban macro-foam can only be understood according 
to its spatial complexion (…) when viewed as a meta-collector gathering 
gathering places and non-gathering places."117 For Sloterdijk, the relations 
that specific locations in the foam entertain with other are, like relations 
between bubbles, questions of contact and partitions: questions of walls and 
separation but also questions of porosity and permeability. “By precaution, 
the metaphor of foam draws attention to the fact that there is no private 
ownership of means of isolation - it has at least a common partition wall with 
the adjacent world cell,” Sloterdijk says.118 
 While it could be argued that Sloterdijk ultimately does not say much 
about this meta-collecting system — we do not even know whether these 
meta-collectors are plural or singular… — he does at least allows a move 
away from fragmentary, localised and object-oriented perspectives that, from 
parametric architecture to urban studies, and from sociology to political 
theory and philosophy, seem to have become dominant. The topological 
singularity of the present and future anonymous city, this city without 
qualities, is too often addressed according to the sole notions of movement 
and communication. Stuck on this very general level, most discourses and 
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analyses regularly appear in connection to what Peter Sloterdijk calls the 
romanticism of decentralisation and dematerialisation.119 While they try to 
capture the nature of the transformations implied by the development of 
communication and information technologies, and to understand the general 
atomisation that seems to affect the urban macrocosm as it becomes global, 
all of these accounts have in common their neglecting to address more 
general and generic features that are in fact ungraspable through direct 
observation. This simple but bold contention means that, far from 
condemning models to be all encompassing, reductive and problematically 
instrumental, models have to be developed in different ways. We need to 
revisit the question of models. Not the old deterministic models imposing 
their harmonious and well-integrated views onto realities that were always 
more complex, but models that truly address complexity that, in many ways, 
has long escaped the sole domain of phenomenological observation.  
 
3. The Generic City 
 
At once close to these accounts and radically different, Koolhaas’ work on 
the generic city provides decisive contributions to understanding the urban 
mutations prompted by contemporary globalisation. Not seen as purely 
desirable as it was for modernist advocates of standardisation, the 
anonymous city is for Koolhaas rather a condition with which architecture has 
to deal. The product of modernist architecture, the generic city appears in 
Koolhaas’ descriptions as the product of relentless modernity. I have already 
argued that the emphasis postmodernism put on particularities and diversity 
may have in fact only corresponded to a more profound political and 
economical transformation according to which personal and local differences 
were no longer integrated into the standard formulation of their universal 
dimension, but rather systematically articulated with a principle of general 
equivalence according to which they could be economically evaluated and 
exchanged. From this standpoint, Koolhaas’ work on the generic city cannot 
only appear to celebrate the dystopian actualisation of the models imagined 
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by critical modernism. Neither can it be reduced to the celebration of a global 
movement of standardisation. More interestingly, perhaps, it also does not 
correspond to more ethnographical perspectives which, contending that the 
global is also always local and that we can never address more than 
particular connections between discrete localities, condemn more general 
and structural accounts. Although Koolhaas’ text cannot be said to be 
structuralist in the traditional sense of the term, its account of generic 
dynamics that do not supersede but nevertheless largely determine the 
proliferation of differences and discrete dynamics to which global 
urbanisation is subjected, suggest ways in which we can understand the way 
extensive continuities are always also subjected to more systematic 
operations.  
 
3.1 Homogeneous heterogeneity 
 
First published as an open conclusion to his seminal book S,M,L,XL (1995), 
Koolhaas’ text on The Generic City starts by asking what can be theorised 
from the fact that contemporary cities seem everywhere and increasingly all 
the same:  
 
  “Is the contemporary city like the contemporary airport – ‘all the same’ 
Is it possible to theorize this convergence? And if so, to what ultimate configuration 
is it aspiring? Convergence is possible only at the price of shedding identity. That is 
usually seen as a loss. But at the scale at which it occurs, it must mean something. 
What are the disadvantages of identity, and conversely, what are the advantages of 
blankness? What if this seemingly accidental – and usually regretted – 
homogenization were an intentional process, a conscious movement away from 
difference toward similarity? What if we are witnessing a global liberation 
movement: ‘down with character!’ What is left after identity is stripped? The 
Generic?”120    
 
modernist advocates of standardisation argued that what was visible and 
already at work in industrial production should be seen to provide interesting 
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tools according to which architecture could engage in the production of a 
more rational environment. Koolhaas’ remarks show he is concerned with 
similar questions, but that their scope and the reasons why he is asking them 
have profoundly changed. In place of the heroic register that commanded 
Gropius’ remarks on the positive values of standardisation, Koolhaas uses a 
more dramatic register. The question is not about translating in architectural 
terms the principles at work in the industry in order to precipitate an urban 
order that does not yet exist. But it is rather about what to do with the fact 
that the urban condition seems indeed condemned to convergence. Is the 
contemporary city condemned to be the same everywhere? Does 
globalisation indeed prompt the formation of one single city that would 
swallow a planet indexed by international airports? And if these common 
arguments are right, what can be done? What can be done not in order to 
avoid that movement or to prevent and confront it, but rather to cope with it, 
to understand its qualities, given the fact that, as Koolhaas argued in 
previous texts, this condition largely escapes the scope of any planning 
schema.  
 Koolhaas’ remarks show that he takes a very different perspective from 
Latour’s discrete accounts. Much closer to Sloterdijk, Koolhaas seems still 
concerned with the possibility of generalisation, with the possibility of 
making general assumptions, all at once extrapolating things that are visible 
in concrete and situated locations, and identifying more general logics. But 
his position should not merely be associated with these either tired or 
emphatic comments repeatedly made about global homogenisation. 
Although his text on the generic city starts with similar interrogations, it is 
also moved by more profound questions about the relations between 
architecture and the city, between planning and contingency, and between 
difference and repetition. About planning, this text follows what Koolhaas 
argued before in both “Bigness, or The Problem of Large” (1994) and “What 
Ever Happened to Urbanism?” (1994). In these texts, Koolhaas argued that it 
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was not diversity that dismissed the Modernist planning trope, but rather 
large-scale complexity and indeterminacy.121  
 This is the main difference between Le Corbusier and Rem Koolhaas. 
Although Koolhaas tackles the same questions — questions concerning 
inductive strategies, the relation between architecture and the urban context, 
questions concerning urbanism and urban organisation in their political and 
social dimension more than architecture in terms of construction —, his 
perspective has nothing to do with modernist linear and deterministic 
doctrines. His problem is less to judge the convergence he is questioning 
than to understand that the scale at which it happens must mean something. 
This pragmatism largely structures Koolhaas’ approach. Contrary to the 
strategies that have dominated the way architecture tried to cope with the 
increasing pluralism and complexity characterising contemporary cities, 
essentially through hybrid collage and enigmatic signification, Charles Jencks 
indeed argues that Koolhaas develops an attitude that tends to accommodate 
various requirements without making any comments.122 In that sense, he 
develops an attitude towards architecture that, though it contradicts the 
deductive logic present in Le Corbusier and Gropius’ accounts, does not 
follow the more generative perspective adopted by most of his 
contemporaries. His method is inductive. From the description of actual 
conditions to hypothetical scenarios concerning future developments, and 
from his theoretical work to his design practice, induction seems indeed to 
govern Koolhaas’ pragmatic approach.  
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Gerhard Richter. Atlas #117 (1968) 
 
Following this, it must be agued that Koolhaas’ work about the generic is not 
determined by ideological motives, but rather by analytical ones. This may 
explain why his attitude often seems paradoxical. While those who read his 
texts as valorising the generic consider that there is an opposition between 
his claims about the generic and his contention that the contemporary city is 
also one of exacerbated differences, it seems that for Koolhaas these 
dynamics exist together. For him, it is precisely this articulation that we must 
understand. Pluralism surely goes against identity. But what appears more 
interesting to Koolhaas is the way identity does not only give way to the 
proliferation of differences and to more diversity, but to processes of 
convergence that constitute a new form of homogenisation. The problem of 
convergence appears in Koolhaas’ texts to escape both modernist 
homogenisation and postmodern differentiation. It considers this problem 
according to new coordinates. Jencks presents this position in paradoxical 
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terms. Arguing that the question of repetition versus differentiation has 
played an important role in debates surrounding global urbanisation, Jencks 
understands Koolhaas to stand at either ends of the argument, at their 
extremes.123 According to Koolhaas the global environment becomes at once 
more the same and more diverse. This curious position defines Koolhaas’ 
conception of the generic. According to him the generic does not merely 
correspond to the linear homogenisation sought by Modernist architects. The 
generic does not unfold as the standard does. Not referring to fixed series 
and mechanically reproducible objects, the generic rather concerns moving 
diagrams, allowing many different and heterogeneous parameters to unfold 
according to common and polyvalent logics. It has to do with similarity and 
repetition rather than with identity and reproduction. Very much in line with 
what Branzi argued in 1988 with regards to the cold metropolis, Koolhaas’ 
take on the generic aims to understand homogenisation and heterogeneity at 
the same time.124 Koolhaas defines the generic city as being “(…) the 
apotheosis of the multiple-choice concept: all boxes crossed, an anthology 
of all the options.”125 Postmodernism remained locked in ironic celebration of 
differences and capabilities at the same it transformed into variations, Branzi 
attempted tried to question this very transformation. Andrea Branzi remarked 
that differences, despite proliferating, were less and less fundamental, 
becoming mere variations ultimately designating the same reality. For him 
the great diversity postmodernism was so keen to embrace was already, by 
the end of the 1980s: “(…) only the formal sign – produced by diversified 
series, semiological combinatories and variations – of the system’s profound 
unity.”126 Before Rem Koolhaas started talking about the Generic City, Andrea 
Branzi had already argued that the proliferation of differences and 
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exceptions could not help but produce generic outcomes.127 From this 
standpoint, Branzi considered the proximity between the contemporary 
metropolis he observed and the homogeneous metropolis imagined by the 
Moderns. According to him this production of generic outcomes eventually 
led to what he called “the [contemporary] cold metropolis” “(…) becoming 
again some kind of homogeneous metropolis, a unique grey sound, a vast 
neutral rumor.”128 Far from merely celebrating the non-historical and 
decentred city produced by the consumerist society and far from being 
paradoxical and provocative for the mere sake of it, Rem Koolhaas’ 
conceptualisation of the Generic City follows the need to understand this 
massive transformation according to which the heterogeneous could not 
longer be dialectally opposed to homogeneity.  
 Breaking with the usually negative definitions given to this situation, 
Rem Koolhaas was amongst the first to engage in understanding the 
profound reversal it imposed upon the way we conceived of urban 
organisation.129 For Koolhaas these generic outcomes, these processes of 
convergence, and this new form of homogenisation and repetition are seen 
positively. Talking about Maxim Gorki’s visit to Cosney Island in the 
beginning of the 20th century, Koolhaas notably argues that, contrary to what 
was the case at the time, it is variety that increasingly becomes normal, 
whereas repetition becomes on the contrary more interesting, even possibly 
daring, exhilarating.130 Whereas for modernism homogeneity corresponded 
to the project of harmoniously articulating differences by forcing it to 
correspond to some standard and linear continuum, contemporary urban 
dynamics do not cease to produce differences to which the system seems 
ultimately indifferent. This system is increasingly immanent to the city, for 
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contemporary urban dynamics are nothing else than the spatial and 
conditional unfolding and indexation of all other dynamics — from social and 
economical dynamics, to existential, physical, geological, and cultural 
dynamics. The contemporary metropolis hence substitutes systematic 
homogeneity – the generic – to the holistic homogeneity sought by 
modernism. Homogeneity becomes more operational. It increasingly 
increases indexation at the expense of representational and symbolical 
dimensions.131 Producing equivalence rather than identity, the generic allows 
homogeneity to nevertheless remain heterogeneous. This may be what 
Koolhaas keenly understood when deciding to talk about convergence rather 
than homogeneity. The generic does not work against differentiation, but 
rather determines it. It is the non-synthetic element that determines, 
discovers and goes through dialectics between difference and identity. This is 
why Koolhaas considers The City Of Exacerbated Differences (COED©) and 
the Generic City to be part of the same model. And this is why Branzi can 
speak about the contemporary metropolis in terms of “a grand ensemble 
where all things are different and where everything looks the same”.132  
  
3.2 Junkspace 
 
It could seem that it is only in “Junkspace” (2002) that this superposition is 
really addressed by Koolhaas.133 Contrary to Koolhaas’ work and contrary to 
what Toni Negri contends, Junkspace defines more localised and more 
circumscribed dynamics than the generic city does. This is what modern 
explicitation discovers. Latour argues that we must replace what modernity 
appears to be in theory (i.e. modernisation), the progressive purification of 
separated and homogeneous domains, with what modernity has been in 
practice: a constant process of hybridation, a continuous production of larger 
and more complex systems. I have already argued that this explanation could 
                                            
131 Charles Sanders Peirce. The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 
(1867–1893), Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel, eds., Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1992. 
132 Odile Fillion. La ville, entretien avec six architectes, Paris : Le Moniteur, 1994 : 19. 
133 Koolhaas. “Junkspace” (2002), in October, vol. 100, spring 2002: 175-190. 
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be articulated with the more general mechanism described by Sloterdijk 
between explicitation and immunisation; Koolhaas’ texts about the generic 
city and about junkspace entertains the same relation. The former deals with 
that which modern explicitation lays bear, while the second deals with the 
resulting hybrids. Modernist universalism is in fact the pure version, the 
theoretical misconstruction, of what was really at stake: the generic. Modern 
explicitation discovers generic truths; it discovers generic constraints. 
Junkspace thus is the product of the various processes of immunisation that 
Modernity produced to protect itself from modernity’s forces of explicitation.  
 Although this is certainly pure coincidence, Koolhaas’ definition of 
Junkspace perfectly matches the distinction made by Latour between 
modernity and modernisation: “Junkspace is what is left after modernization 
has run its course, or, more precisely, what coagulates while Modernization 
is in its progress, its fallout.”134 Koolhaas does not say that that Junkspace is 
the product of modernity, but indeed that of modernisation. Largely 
connected to Jean Baudrillard’s description of the commercial centre Parly 2, 
near Paris, in The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (1970)135, 
Koolhaas’s concept of Junkspace emphasises shopping’s predatory 
colonisation of almost every aspect of urban life — from cities’ historical 
centres to suburbs, streets, and increasingly indeed, railway stations, 
museums, hospitals, schools, airports and the Internet.136 “Junkspace seems 
an aberration, but it is the essence, the main thing…” Koolhaas says. “The 
product of an encounter between escalator and air-conditioning, conceived 
in an incubator of Sheetrock.”137 The unconscious of the Moderns, it is the 
“Hyperecology™” developed by the consumerist society: the engineering of 
maximum comfort and profit whose programme is in constant obsolescence 
— both always new and already outdated. Junkspace is this space that is 
always under construction. It replaces development by entropy, design by 
calculation, planning by permanent evolution. Koolhaas argues that 
“Junkspace” is the critical counterpart to “The Generic City”. And while this 
                                            
134 Koolhaas. Op cit., 2002: 175.  
135 Jean Baudrillard. The Consumer Society (1970), New York:  Sage publications, 1998.  
136 Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2001.  
137 Koolhaas. Op cit., 2002: 175.  
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seems to have lead Toni Negri to accord more importance to this text than to 
the generic city, this idea should not be seen in oppositional terms. Being the 
critical counterpart to “The Generic City” does not mean that the former 
would have simply praised dynamics that the latter sees as far more 
problematic. According to Negri, Junkspace represents the real outcome of 
the Generic City. It revelas wgar is hidden behind its more operational 
prerogatives: the collusion with capital and consumerism.138 Junkspace 
provides better insights on the morphology of the contemporary city; it 
paints a better picture of what the generic city is truly about. More 
representational, more substantial, it is however also more reductive. 
Koolhaas argues that “hotels are becoming the generic accommodation of 
the generic city, its most common building block.” Hotels turn increasingly 
into shopping malls and are “(…) the closest we have to urban existence, 
21st-century style.”139 The difference with what Koolhaas argues in Junkspace 
is that here, though shopping may be everything, it is not necessarily seen as 
the ultimate and inescapable condition.140  
 
                                            
138 Toni Negri. “On Rem Koolhaas”, in Radical Philosophy, # 154, March/April 2009: 48-50. 
139 Koolhaas. Op cit., 1994, in Idem. Op cit., 1995: 1260 
140 Koolhaas writes: “The only activity is shopping. But why not consider shopping as 
temporary, provisional? It awaits better times. It is our own fault – we didn’t think of 
anything better to do. The same spaces inundated with other programs – libraries, baths, 
universities – would be terrific; we would be awed by their grandeur.” Koolhaas. Idem. 
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Thomas Demand. Filiale (2012) 
 
 Though entirely contaminated by shopping, the generic city should not 
be necessarily confused with Junkspace. Koolhaas sees Junkspace as a space 
of disjunctive inclusion, the space whose production and evolution is dictated 
by escalation and the imminent logics of shopping. But the generic belongs 
to the space of connections. The generic is the lift itself; its programme, its 
trajectory. Junkspace is sealed – held together like a bubble. It deploys whole 
confined environments. On the contrary, the generic is the space of 
procedures, the space of informational discrimination, stimulated by 
surrounding noise, looking for compatibilities and referents. Seen this way, 
generic space is both the envelope and the condition of Junkspace: the 
container, the lift, the corridors, the bridges and software… Generic space 
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does not need Junkspace. But Junkspace would instantly die without the 
generic. Junkspace is merely one programme; one that has pervaded 
modernity but one single programme nevertheless, while the generic should 
rather be seen to be the whole operating system. Junkspace explores the 
actual morphology of the contemporary generic city, but it cannot be seen to 
correspond to the processes of explicitation from which it derives.  
 
3.3 Generic operations 
 
Following Sanford Kwinter, I argue that the generic is rather like a 
mathematical DNA which, able to jump over the species barrier, distributes 
elements in relative indifference to their specific and singular qualities. The 
generic city hence develops underneath the more evident products of 
Junkspace. While Junkspace functions through a logic of accumulation, the 
generic seems rather to unfold according to a logic of subtraction. If 
Junkspace is what is left after Modernisation has run its course, the generic is 
what is left once Junkspace is stripped. This follows Koolhaas’ introductory 
remarks according to which the generic is what appears once identities are 
subtracted.   
 This subtractive definition of the generic comes close to the 
conceptions developed by Francois Laruelle.141 Laruelle defines the generic 
according to two different orders of manifestation. On the one hand, it is 
given through the model provided in algebraic knowledge. On the other 
hand, it is defined through the commercial logic in which it intervenes.  In 
the algebraic model of knowledge, it corresponds to the acquisition of a 
supplement of universal properties through subtraction and indetermination. 
Generic formalisation, in algebraic terms, is given by subtraction and 
indetermination. It is more general, more universal than the particular 
occurrences from which it was abstracted and that it indexes, but it is also 
less specific, less determined. In the commercial model, the generic qualifies 
an object that enters the common circuit through a marking down or a 
                                            
141 Laruelle. Op cit., 2010; Idem. Op cit., 2011.  
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downgrading.142  Although it does not escape the capitalist structure of the 
economy to which it is bound and in which it intervenes, this commercial 
definition of the generic shows that it is nevertheless the contrary of 
branding. Articulating its mathematical and commercial definitions, the 
generic could even be said to be the opposite of what Pierre Bourdieu 
identified as the profound generative motive of capitalism: distinction.143 
Bourdieu defined distinction according to the radicalisation of minimal 
differences. According to him, this term can be seen to designate the 
procedures and actions through which some people distinguish themselves 
from others, according to which one product is valorised over others, and, 
ultimately, according to which capitalism grows and develops. The logic of 
capitalism is not only “always more”. But more precisely: “always different”, 
“always slightly but nevertheless decisively different”. According to this 
definition, the generic is a potential definition of the positivity of the 
contemporary anonymous city. It is that which cannot be capitalised upon, 
that which cannot be differentiated because it is precisely, according to 
Laruelle, indifferent to difference.144  
 The generic entertains an ambivalent relation to the capitalist structure 
in which it intervenes. Effective as a solvent of differences, the generic is 
nevertheless also the vector through which capitalist equivalence expands. 
Although I have insisted on the positive qualities Koolhaas identifies in the 
generic city, his description and his model still very much relate to the way 
global capitalism indexes the planet, and to the way it spatially expands. 
                                            
142 Francois Laruelle writes: “In the algebraic model of knowledge, the generic is the 
acquisition of a supplement of universal properties (those of demonstration and 
manifestation) through a subtraction and an indetermination, a formalization of givens. In 
the commercial model of prescription medicine or clothes, generic universality is obtained 
through a mark down or downgrade and the loss of the proper or original name under which 
the product has been commercialized for the first time, a loss which is equivalent to an 
inferior form of formalization that plunges these products into the common circuit. There is, 
however, a difference between these two regimes of the generic. That which is scientific is 
already beyond-All or beyond-philosophy and only attains its generic regime through a 
subtraction that is a supplement of paradigmatic (extatico-vertical) properties, whereas the 
commercial or commodity sphere is philosophical from the start and only attains its generic 
value through the abasement of its philosophical and global quality.” Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 
239.  
143 Pierre Bourdieu. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (1979), trans. Eng. 
Richard Nice, New York: Routledge, 1984.  
144 Laruelle. Op cit., 2010: 72.  
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Generalising the condition displayed by Singapore, Koolhaas’ model also 
clearly portrays the spatial dynamic of contemporary capitalism, that is, an 
urban substance developing according to present abilities and present needs. 
It is a condition which, subjected to constant economic valuation, is in 
constant flux. The generic could be described as the total sum, the general 
logic, that underpins the expansion and proliferation of what Keller 
Easterling calls spatial products.145 For Easterling, these spatial products 
index contemporary capitalism through marketing and scheduling protocols 
that supposedly avoid the political, historical, physical and cultural 
inconveniences of location. But unlike Keller Easterling’s spatial products, the 
generic does not define the mutable abilities of some entities which, like 
chameleons, would be capable of adapting to and entering any situation. It 
rather determines topological continuums produced out of a series of 
mutations. The generic is that which constant.  
 The generic therefore contrasts with the standard in that it is never the 
attribute of any typical model. It is never completely represented by any 
actual entity, but rather it emerges out of encounters and transformations 
like a common rule that can be deduced from variety. Although the generic 
can be more explicitly visible in some objects and situations than in others, it 
always remains an abstraction: its quality is possessing precisely no qualities. 
Paraphrasing Francois Laruelle, the force of the generic is the force of one 
space entering other, foreign spaces. Defining its operationality in the field 
of science, Laruelle argues that the generic defines an “(…) interdisciplinary 
force of intervention (which, like generic medicine), is defined by a force of 
marking down or ‘downgrading’, in general of subtraction through which any 
product whatsoever is forced to enter into a circuit to which it is foreign.”146 
Unlike the general, the generic is not the distilled essence of a group of 
particulars, but rather the profile formed by a great mound of them. The 
generic is not on top of the objects it is generated from, but shares the same 
ground, passing from one locality to another without losing its multiple 
                                            
145 Easterling. Op cit., 2005: 1.  
146 Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 240.  
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“suitability”.147 Implying at once the downgrading of singularity and the 
subtractive gaining of universality, the generic defines an interdisciplinary 
force of intervention rather than any general collection of attributes. The 
generic is no average. Rather it is what Laruelle calls the Mid-place, which 
neither founds nor envelops other objects, but defines the capacity to 
intervene in another field, group or discipline without being homogeneous. 
Considering its very equivocal relationship with the market structure of 
competition and equivalence – and namely with the general principle of 
translation or money –, Laruelle even radicalises this principle of repetition, 
linking the generic with the functioning of idempotent operations. While 
mathematics and computing generally reserve the term to define operations 
with the same effect regardless of repetition, Laruelle makes idempotence 
the very attribute of the generic itself. Though not “destroying the market 
and capitalist structure of exchange and equivalence”, the generic, no longer 
seeking to produce difference, nevertheless transforms it.148 Through 
generalizing idempotence, Laruelle actually reveals both the generic’s 
controversial relation with capitalism and the profound metaphysical problem 
it underlines – namely the difference between the thing being represented 
and the thing in-itself. Because idempotence refers to operations that are 
indifferent to differences, the generic may indicate the moment where the 
thing represented (metaphysics) starts merging with the way it is represented 
(epistemology), but without organising their mutual collapse. “The force of 
the generic (Laruelle argues) is that of the Stranger who comes as a new type 
of universal.”149 
 
                                            
147 Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 239.  
148  “We shall suggest that genericity, without destroying the market and capitalist structure 
of exchange and equivalence which is necessary to it as the element in which it intervenes 
(…) no longer simply reproduces it even with differe(a)nce - Deleuze, Derrida – but 
contributes to transforming it through its operation which is of the order of idempotence 
(…)”. Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 242.  
149 Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 240.  
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Hans Eijkelboom. Paris, New York, Shanghai (2008) 
 
 Emphasising at the once the continuous problem that Koolhaas’ work 
on the generic posed in relation to Modern standardisation, and the 
differences that could be identified between the standard and the generic, 
this first chapter has argued that the concept of the generic could not only 
be used to define the logic that determine the contemporary expansion of 
the anonymous city, but also suggested ways in which it could be seen to 
escape the capitalist structure to which it was bound. I have shown that 
Koolhaas’ position cannot be seen as a simple reassessment of Modernist 
planning tropes. His work on the generic provided new epistemological 
footholds used to decipher the complex order of global urbanisation. At once 
underlining the profound historical dynamics that have shaped the 
contemporary anonymous city and the differences that can be identified 
between former models of the homogeneous city and the contemporary one, 
this chapter has explored the various theoretical models that have guided 
architecture’s relation to the modern city. (The second chapter focuses on 
the normative logics that have structured the relations exposed in this first 
chapter. While Koolhaas’ generic city provides a model through which it 
becomes possible to understand the dynamics shaping contemporary global 
urbanisation in ways that avoid standard models and claims about the 
unsystematic nature of complexity, the normative logic that it addresses and 
underlines remains to be explored. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE CONTINUUMS 
 
 
 
 
 
The first chapter focused on theoretical models of the city. It explored the 
differences between homogeneous models imagined by modernist architects, 
the models conceived by critical modernism and those described by 
postmodernist advocates. It also described the relations between architecture 
and the city. In addition, it dealt with the increasing acknowledgement of 
urban complexity in the face of architecture’s pretention to organise and 
enclose. This eventually led to a loss of interest in models, and led to the 
development of more metaphorical descriptions of the contemporary city. 
While exemplifying the descriptive turn prompted by post-Modernist critique, 
Rem Koolhaas’ work on the generic city may be seen to closely relate to 
Modernism. Koolhaas’ model of the generic city accounts at once for the 
increasing complexity and diversification of urban dynamics and for the 
profound processes of convergence that determine the organisation and 
development of global urbanisation. As such it can be seen as a decisive 
contribution to the understanding of the way architecture relates to 
modernity at large. The anonymous city appeared as modernity’s, 
corresponding to the continuous process of explicitation discussed by 
Sloterdijk, and to a reality that was never entirely understood by modernism. 
Following Sloterdijk, it can thus be argued that while modernism can be seen 
to entertain intense relations with the movement of explicitation, it also 
reduced explicitation to standardisation.  
 92 
 From this standpoint, I argued that Koolhaas’ work on the generic 
could open new perspectives on the relation between explicitation and 
immunisation. It has been argued that the anonymous city could not 
necessarily be said to be generic in itself, for unlike the standard the generic 
does not correspond to any model that it identically repeats. Contrary to the 
standard, the generic cannot be the rule and the model at the same time. It 
cannot be the logic agglomerating different entities while being their 
prototype. Generic operations produce the anonymous city, while the 
anonymous city conditioned the emergence of generic patterns and formats. 
It could be hence argued that, more than being a rational model implied by 
the many theoretical models related to it, the anonymous is a real 
abstraction. This follows the way Louis Althusser defined his empirical 
conception of capitalist rationality.150 Althusser defines real abstractions 
according to the abstract identification of invariant structures. Largely 
structuring his take on empiricism, this concept explains the real inscription, 
the real embedding and embodiment of these abstractions that inductive 
reasoning constructs. Although I cannot discuss here the complex and deep 
implications that this concept has in the work of Althusser, I argue that this 
broad definition indicates in which it is possible to understand that the 
anonymous city cannot only be understood in terms of knowledge and 
theoretical models. This concept stresses that it also constitutes an 
operational model; one that has profound consequences on the organisation 
of our environment and that shapes cities we know and experience in ways 
that exceed their singular aspects. Drawing on Michel Foucault, I further 
argue that these real abstractions are only real because they actually embody 
rational logics that are also operational ones. That, like Foucault more 
generally argues, procedures of knowledge always relate to practices of 
power, and the capacity of knowing something always relates to the capacity 
for manipulating it.151 Following Foucault, this second chapter unfolds 
according to the idea that the anonymous city is not the product of two 
                                            
150 Louis Althusser and al. Reading Capital (1965), trans. Eng. Ben Brewster, New Left Books, 
1970. 
151 See notably the introduction to Security, Territory, Population (1978-1979). Foucault. Op 
cit., [2004] 2009.  
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different continuums that would only at times intersect, but rather the 
product of one unique and immanent continuum of relations between 
epistemological rationalities (i.e. that which has been explored in the first 
chapter) and normative practices. It is on this question of norms and 
normativity that this second chapter focuses. The chapter seeks to make 
these relations more explicit, and to explore the normative logics that 
underpin the different models imagined by architecture as a means of coping 
with the complexity of urban dynamics. This chapter pays particular attention 
to the question of modularity, arguing that the relation between the 
production of immune structures and explicitation poses questions about the 
way architecture is able to relate to change. It starts by exposing Foucault’s 
understanding of normalisation.152 Focusing on his work and remarks about 
architecture will help to make several more distinctions between Modernism 
and modernity. I will then propose another level of understanding the models 
that have been explored in the first chapter, and finally will specify what 
distinctions can be made between standardisation and generic operations.   
 
1. Normalisation 
 
Despite the claim that the complexity of contemporary urban dynamics sheds 
normative schemes, it must be argued that we are actually not only 
witnessing a normative inflation in all domains but also and more 
profoundly, a transformation of the functioning and status of norms. 
Although economic deregulation seems to have become the ubiquitous 
principle according to which everything is measured, it must also be 
remembered that it is only through the proliferation of numerous protocols 
and regulations that this deregulation is achieved. This largely structures the 
contemporary economic system, but it also increasingly expands to many 
other domains, and to architecture more particularly. Arguments about both 
the complexity of urban dynamics and the forms produced by contemporary 
parametric architecture cannot alone decently support the idea that we would 
have escaped normative times that only belong to modernism and urban 
                                            
152 This presentation draws on the above-mentioned series of lectures. See Foucault. Idem.  
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planning. Paradoxically praised by most of parametric architects, Gilles 
Deleuze has shown clearly that what could be seen as liberation from the 
former disciplinary structures notably identified by Foucault, corresponded 
better to the advent of a new type of normative rationality and 
mechanisms.153 Following this argument, I argue that the logic Deleuze 
identifies in terms of control in fact goes much further back. And that, 
already analysed by Foucault as functioning alongside disciplinary 
mechanisms, this logic entertains a relation with the generic that is not 
absolutely coextensive.  
 
1.1 The urban milieu 
 
While Michel Foucault is generally best known for his analysis of the 
disciplinary structure of Modern power and Modern institutions, his later 
work on the question of normalisation has received less attention. This body  
of work sheds new light on his whole enterprise.154 In it, he challenges the 
idea that Modern power is centred on practices of discipline. Digging deeper 
in the relations between rationality and normative procedures and 
technologies, Foucault notably argues in these texts and lectures that 
modernity may have also been, and may be more profoundly, about the 
increasing development of what he calls apparatuses of security. While 
Deleuze’s famous text on the societies of control marks strong historical 
distinctions that would seem to go sequentially from sovereignty to 
discipline, and then from discipline to control only after the second world 
war, Foucault’s accounts of the formation of apparatuses of security from the 
middle of 18th century suggests that in fact the development of these 
techniques of control started much earlier. No longer centred on the 
institutions to which the development of the Modern State has been so 
closely related, Foucault’s work on the problem of normalisation moves away 
from his previous focus on discipline. The main object is no longer the 
prison, the architectural model of panoptic power, but the modern city. 
                                            
153 Deleuze. Op cit., [1990] 1992.  
154 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009. 
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Completing the analysis he made before, Michel Foucault argues that, in fact, 
the development of modern power is bound not only to the development of 
disciplinary techniques such as those that appear with the invention of the 
prison, but also and perhaps more profoundly to the development of 
apparatuses of security such as those that appear in order to deal with 
epidemics and the organisation of commerce in the modern city.155 Analysing 
the development of liberal forms of government, Foucault argues that it is 
actually the city which, in the political literature of the 18th century, becomes 
the model according to which relations between power and space are 
understood:   
 
  “There is an entire series of utopias or projects for governing territory 
that developed on the premise that a state is like a large city; the capital is like its 
main square; the roads are like its streets. (…) The model of the city became the 
matrix for the regulations that apply to a whole state.”156 
 
No longer corresponding to this autonomous administrative unit cloistered 
behind surrounding walls, the modern city develops as an increasingly open 
space, and poses problems that seem at once more variable and more 
natural than before. Epidemics, social uprisings, and commercial exchange 
become new problems that can no longer be simply administered, but that 
must rather be controlled, encouraged, constrained, directed rather than 
imposed. Foucault identifies three distinct problems: 1. The relation between 
power and space, which he analyses in the question of the morphological 
organisation of modern cities; 2. The relation between power and event, 
which he analyses in the problem of food shortage; 3. The relation between 
power and normalisation, which he analyses in the problem of epidemics. 
Foucault’s key point is that these problems all appear bound to a new 
understanding of space. The modern city displays different spatial conditions 
than the prison did. More open, it develops as a space of circulation rather 
than a space of enclosure. It does not contain, but rather agglomerates and 
                                            
155 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 24-36.  
156 Michel Foucault. Op cit., 2002: 351.  
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accommodates. Following Peter Sloterdijk the modern city invents a very 
different envelope. No longer the inclusive sphere of metaphysical, religious, 
or disciplinary integration, it develops as an open environment defined by the 
density more than by the nature of the elements it assembles together.157 
Modern cities invent a totally different space. Urban space already develops 
in ways that no longer fit this extended and external space abstractly 
formalised by Euclidean geometry and administered by sovereign decisions. 
It becomes thicker, stratified, subjected to multiple variables, both historical 
and natural, both political and technological. It becomes this material 
environment in which the biological dimension of human existence becomes 
more explicit. 
 The hypothesis proposed by Foucault is that the modern city carries an 
understanding of space which, long before the notion of milieu starts to be 
properly conceptualised by biology and that the strong distinction Modernity 
made between Nature and Society starts to be questioned, is already bound 
to the technical scheme of this more relational and dynamic notion. The 
modern city is hence the site where the technical scheme that corresponds to 
the notion of milieu emerges even before the notion is properly 
conceptualised. Foucault is well aware of the fact that architects and the first 
town planners of the eighteenth century did not actually employ the notion 
of milieu. But he nevertheless argues that:  
 
   “(…) if the notion does not exist, I would say that the technical schema 
of this notion of milieu, the kind of —how to put it?— pragmatic structure which 
marks it out in advance is present in the way in which the town planners try to 
reflect and modify urban space.”158 
 
According to Foucault, it is principally the town planners who, in the 
eighteenth century, invented what he calls the apparatuses of security. It is in 
the modern city that these apparatuses that mark the development of 
modern power emerge. “The apparatuses of security work, fabricate, 
                                            
157 See notably the chapter entitled “The Foam City”, in Sloterdijk. Op cit., [2003] 2005: 535-
595.  
158 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 21.  
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organize, and plan a milieu even before the notion was formed and 
isolated.”159 The conception of space that follows unfolds according to four 
main ideas:  
 
1. The milieu is a space of circulation. It is where things circulate. 
  
2. The milieu is an assemblage, an agglomeration of both natural 
and artificial givens. This is crucial, for the milieu hence designates 
a materiality that is all at once natural and technical, at once made 
of rivers, forests, mountains and open fields, and made of houses, 
roads, individuals and living entities. Foucault talks about a period 
when there were no railways, no electricity, no automobile, no 
airplanes, no computers and no Internet. But the conception of 
space he addresses with the notion of milieu already prefigures 
those developments.   
 
3. The milieu implies that these many entities form dynamic 
assemblages entertaining mutual relations of cause and effect. It 
implies, also a long time before the notion is really conceptualised, 
feedback. The milieu is hence essentially relational, that in which a 
series of variable elements unfolds.160 
 
4. The milieu is this complex environment through which one 
cannot really affect individual entities, but rather entire 
populations:  
 
“Finally, the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of 
affecting individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary 
actions — which would be the case of sovereignty — and instead of 
affecting them as a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of 
performances — as in discipline — one tries to affect, precisely, a 
                                            
159 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 36. 
160 Foucault says: “The space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold is, I think, 
roughly what one can call the milieu”, Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 36-39. 
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population. I mean a multiplicity of individuals who fundamentally and 
essentially only exist as biologically bound to the materiality within 
which they live”161 
  
Long before the notion of milieu is really conceptualised in the context of 
natural sciences at the beginning of the twentieth century by Jakob von 
Uexküll in Germany and Georges Canguilhem in France, Foucault identifies in 
urban problems the emergence of such a dynamic understanding of space. 
Starting to talk about apparatuses of security in contra-distinction to 
disciplinary mechanisms, Foucault argues that it is indeed around problems 
posed by modern cities that new techniques of government emerge together 
with a new understanding of space. Although it cannot be said that the 
topological transformation we are now witnessing dates in fact from the 
eighteenth century, it may be argued that some related and embryological 
transformations were already present in this practical understanding of the 
city in terms of an urban milieu. And although this conception alone cannot 
explain the difference that can be identified between the normativity implied 
by Modern standardisation and that implied by generic operations, it must be 
said that the distinction to which it points between discipline and control 
mechanisms prefigures in many ways the distinction we can identify between 
the standard and the generic. 
 
                                            
161 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 38.  
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 This distinction can only be made once this distinction between 
discipline and control is replaced in the more general perspective brought 
about by the notion of milieu. Once Foucault introduces the hypothesis that 
it is the development of this notion that allows us to characterise the 
development of modern biopolitics, the question of discipline becomes a 
more regional disposition, concerning more specific circumstances, more 
particular situations, than is somehow included in the more general logic at 
stake in the open milieu that the modern city represents. I have already 
argued that, for Rem Koolhaas, the major question concerned the relations 
between architecture (seen in terms of enclosure) and urbanism (seen to be 
able to accommodate change and uncertainties). And while it seems quite 
easy to superpose these arguments, it becomes particularly interesting to 
remark that it is precisely at the moment when architecture meets urbanism, 
that it is precisely at the moment when architecture is brought up to the 
large scale of urban organisation, that, according to Foucault, architecture 
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really becomes political.162 Returning to this quite radical argument in an 
interview with Paul Rabinow, Foucault explains that he did not mean that 
architecture had not been political before, but that it is in the eighteenth 
century that “(…) one sees the development of reflection upon architecture as 
a function of the aims and techniques of the government of societies.”163 And 
it only then, Foucault continues, that “(…) every discussion on politics as the 
art of government of men necessarily includes a chapter or a series of 
chapters on urbanism, on collective facilities, on hygiene, and on private 
architecture”.164 This is closely linked to the first chapter’s argument. It may 
in fact be argued that, when saying this, Foucault does in fact already identify 
the movement following which the traditional definition of architecture — i.e. 
in terms of isolated buildings, in terms of monuments, in terms of 
representation and symbolism — starts merging with urbanism and town 
planning, the actual organisation of a given territory and the materialisation 
of social relations. Thus Foucault does not mean that architecture was not 
political before. He does not mean that the pyramids in Egypt, the Parthenon 
in Greece, or the Pantheon and the Coliseum in Rome were not powerful 
political instruments or did not invest political relations. Rather, he 
underlines the inversion that turns the city into the primary problem for both 
politics and architecture.  
 
1.2 Natural and social norms 
 
While architecture seems today driven by a particular emphasis on organic 
forms and biological dynamics, it seems even more important to address 
architecture’s normative relation to the city: the difference between natural 
and social norms. Foucault contends that the political problem posed by 
modernity as far as architecture is concerned lies in the articulation and 
accommodation of the relations populations entertain with their milieu. The 
                                            
162 Foucault. “Questions à Michel Foucault sur la géographie”, in Hérodote, N°1, January-
March 1976, pp. 71-85. Reproduced in Michel Foucault. Dits et Écrits, Vol. 2, 1976-1988, 
Paris: Gallimard, 2001.  
163 Foucault. Op cit., 2002: 350.  
164 Idem.  
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political dimension of architecture results from its ability to provide 
normative solutions to the stabilisation of these relations that on the one 
hand concern a multiplicity of individuals who are seen to only exist 
collectively and are biologically bound to the materiality within which they 
live,165 and, on the other hand, deals with an open environment considered 
both natural and manageable. And this is why the difference between natural 
and social norms becomes as important as the question of their articulation.  
 We have seen that the opposition between Modern architecture and 
contemporary biomorphic practices is actually bound to an opposition 
between the organic and the mechanic. While Modern architecture unfolded 
according to mechanic causation and linear standard continuums, 
contemporary algorithmic practices seem rather to unfold in analogy to what 
is understood in terms of biological proliferation, spontaneous organisation, 
and organic complexity. Although this movement is generally considered to 
be a move away from norms that are associated with the Modern mechanist 
paradigm and prescriptive relation to urban space, it must be argued that it 
only develops according to a new normative scheme. It is useful here to focus 
more closely on the work of Georges Canguilhem. Not only because 
Foucault’s work on normalisation directly follows the hypothesis according to 
which, for Canguilhem, his former professor, the history of modernity and 
industrialisation could be read in terms of a history of both rationalisation 
and normalisation, but also because Canguilhem relentlessly posed the 
problem of this relation between biological and social norms. Having done 
so, he provides us with interesting arguments to challenge the assumption 
that contemporary parametric practices would escape the problem of 
normalisation. He invites us to enter more speculative territories in which 
change, randomness and unpredictability reign.  
 The starting point for Canguilhem is that all living entities tend to 
establish normal relations with the milieu in which they live: “The living and 
the milieu are not normal when taken separately, but it is their relation that 
                                            
165 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 38.  
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makes both of them normal.”166 Canguilhem thus starts to understand that 
the normal never actually corresponds in fact to an absolute or ideal state, 
but rather to a variable distinction between the normal and the pathological. 
Medicine especially works this way. Because it cannot rely on ideal states 
except in relation to given conditions, medicine is for Canguilhem one of the 
first sciences to work with norms and normalisation. According to him, it is 
with medicine, and moreover with the reform of the hospital that followed 
the French revolution that one may observe the starting point of 
normalisation. Connecting this development with both modern 
rationalisation and industrial mechanisation, Canguilhem argues that 
normalisation cannot however be seen according to the extension of 
biological normality to the constitution of social norms. This is what is 
delicate to articulate in his work, for it seems that while medicine would 
display an example of the way the normal can be extended to the norm, 
normalisation corresponds for him on the contrary to the extension of the 
norm to the normal. What is biologically normal has hence for Canguilhem 
nothing to do with what could be established to be socially normal. While 
they are articulated, for him both domains are in fact incommensurable. For 
Canguilhem, biological normativity is irreducible to social normalisation. 
Biological norms cannot be reduced to social norms. The first only express 
the tendency of all living entities to establish normal relations with the milieu 
in which they deploy. The second depend on conventions. They are the 
results of compromises, of political conflict and negotiations.  
 Although this argument seems to entail that social norms would be 
external, imposed from the exterior to biological entities responding to 
internal norms, it also interestingly implies that, while there is no such thing 
as an isolated form of life, there is also no such thing as isolated norms. This 
is why Canguilhem is actually very careful about the biological legitimacy that 
                                            
166 “In other words, the normal and the pathological only concern relations between the living 
and the milieu. It is because living entities are never isolated that there is no life without 
norms. The thing is that they do not only deploy according to specific normative 
determinations and power – puissance – but that they do so in already normalised 
environments. This reciprocal relation is very important to Canguilhem, for it is this relation 
that allows him to both argue that social norms are irreducible to biological normativity, and 
that they are nevertheless interrelated.” Georges Canguilhem. The Normal and the 
Pathological (1946), trans. Eng. Caroline R. Fawcett, London: Zone books, 1991: 80.  
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is given to certain social norms. At the time, he is particularly attentive to the 
essential connection that fascism makes between the natural and the social 
order. For Canguilhem however, this essentialism is only a special aspect of a 
more universal phenomenon of rationalisation. According to his own words, 
fascist techniques are only “(…) a special aspect of a universal phenomenon: 
that of the rationalisation of the adapting techniques of the relationship 
between humans and the environment.”167 This argument, central to this 
thesis, is clearly articulated for Canguilhem with fascism. I have already 
argued how this articulation could have been made more or less loosely. But 
in Canguilhem’s work the relation is clear. It is however not direct, for the 
passage from the general phenomenon of rationalisation to the actual 
formation of fascist conceptions seems to entail a certain threshold: the 
point where an essential and direct connection is made between biological 
normativity and social norms. We have seen in the first chapter the role 
played by this threshold in relation to standardisation. The difference 
between Neufert’s two books can be indeed seen to follow this distinction: 
the first book considers social norms almost as the natural sciences would 
do. And while it problematically naturalises conceptions that are more 
connected to social standards than to biological and universal ones, it does 
not make the dramatic step further that the second book does: trying to 
identify in the multiplicity of these social standards, the idea of some 
universal and unique measure from which these standards could in turn be 
considered in essentialist terms. Canguilhem’s account however does not 
necessarily require this threshold to be passed in order to criticise the 
rationality at stake in Modern standardisation. Although he valorises 
technique as what distinguishes between biological normativity and the way 
humans tend to transform their environment, the rationalisation to which 
modernity has subjected it is identified by Canguilhem as a danger. 
Canguilhem does not explicitly speak about modernist architecture, but his 
arguments can very well be addressed against it. He sees this rationalisation 
unfolding according to a general mechanisation of the living which, “(…) 
                                            
167 This unpublished course has been consulted at the Archives Canguilhem, conserved at 
the CAPHES. Georges Canguilhem. “Philosophie et biologie” (1946-48 ; GC 12.1.8), Feuillet 
6. I would like to thank Ferhat Taylan for indicating this source to me.  
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(depreciating) Man to the point of only seeing in him a material that can be 
used and informed according to appropriate techniques aiming at better 
economical efficiency and leading to the simplification of politics”, can 
eventually lead to fascism.  
 The contemporary critique of Modern standardisation largely follows 
this line of argument. Zeynep Mennan for example argues that the non-
standard primarily unfolds according to the redemption of organic 
complexity against the standardisation imposed by modernism. According to 
this perspective, Modern architecture is accused to have confused the 
rationalisation of the techniques of environmental adaptation168 with 
industrial progress, hence valorising standardisation on the basis of a 
reductive mechanical conception of human nature. Mennan explains the 
relation between modern standardisation and the mechanist paradigm by the 
formal covering of all norms — from art to social relations and from economy 
to politics — according to the normativity given by industrial mass 
production.169 And it is in those terms indeed that both Le Corbusier and 
Gropius’ conceptions can be read. The question whether one would oppose 
to this standard and mechanistic reductionism the complexity of biological 
dynamics remains however much more debatable. While Canguilhem indeed 
argues that biological normativity is irreducible to any form of rational 
standardisation, he does still speak about normativity. He hence does not 
oppose complexity to normativity the way many advocates of the new 
algorithmic and parametric turn oppose their formal innovations to the 
former rigidity of norms imposed by Euclidean space. The question of 
normalisation cannot be opposed to change and unpredictability the way 
standardisation can be opposed to complexity. I think this is precisely what 
Koolhaas does not do when talking about the generic. Not only because he 
emphasises architecture’s relation to the city in ways that involve more 
general political, economical and cultural dynamics, but also because the 
generic precisely points towards a normative transformation that cannot be 
                                            
168 I use here again this formulation that I do not find specific enough only to render more 
readable the difficult translation of the French expression: “rationalisation des techniques 
d’aménagement des rapports entre les hommes et leur milieu d’existence”.  
169 Mennan and Migayrou. Op cit., 2003.  
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overlooked. But before coming back to this question through the lens of 
modularity, we must continue our theoretical detour through Canguilhem 
and Foucault’s work about modern rationalisation and procedures of 
normalisation.  
 
1.3 Normation and Normalisation 
 
Although they are closely connected, the conceptions developed by 
Canguilhem on the one hand, and by Foucault on the other, differ quite 
significantly when Foucault starts to introduce a distinction between what he 
calls normation, and what he continues to call normalisation. While 
Canguilhem is more concerned with the difference between biological 
normativity and social normalisation, Foucault more generally understands 
biological questions to inform, through practical recourse to the notion of 
milieu, distinctions on the level of what he sees to be more hybrid processes 
of normalisation. The strong opposition that Canguilhem maintains between 
social and natural norms leads him to understand that normalisation 
corresponds in fact to the extension of the norm to the normal. Contrary to 
biological normativity, which, according to Canguilhem, appears quite 
autonomous and immanent, social normalisation is understood to be 
external, imposed on a reality with which it does not have any necessary 
relation, but that it nevertheless contributes to modify and produce. Contrary 
to biological normativity, the social norm is first established conventionally, 
while normalisation is then the movement according to which the norm 
becomes the normal. Normalisation is that by which the norm is at once 
extended and exhibited. It is that which multiplies the rule at the same time 
as it indicates it. More than in medicine, it is in Taylorism and the 
organisation of work and production that Canguilhem sees this normalisation 
working. Connected to industrial mechanisation, normalisation is hence 
related to the more general movement of rationalisation to which 
architecture has been shown to be particularly related. For Foucault, this 
general process of normalisation mobilises biological questions in ways that 
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however demand distinction between different modalities.170 While the 
hypothesis made by Canguilhem encompasses the question of discipline, for 
Foucault normalisation corresponds to something other than discipline. 
Normalisation does not function according to any definitive definition of the 
normal but according to statistical definitions, according to instruments and 
techniques that become able to penetrate the variable relation between an 
entire population and the environment. Normalisation becomes an open 
ended technology according to which the difference between the normal and 
the pathological is constantly corrected. For Foucault, normalisation does not 
correspond to the extension of the norm to the normal but rather to the 
contrary, the instituting of the norm from the normal. While for Canguilhem 
normalisation meant the extension of the norm to what is considered to be 
normal, Foucault argues that it is in fact from the analysis of the normal that 
normalisation works.171 
 From this standpoint, it is possible to argue that what modernist 
architects define in terms of standardisation corresponds to what Foucault 
calls normation in contradistinction to what he calls normalisation. Much 
closer to his previous analysis of discipline, normation seeks to be 
exhaustive. Working on finite series and within enclosed spaces, normation 
privileges the model over the normal. Foucault does not contradict 
Canguilhem’s definition of normalisation, but attributes it to normation. In 
                                            
170 This idea is in fact already present in The Order of Things when, identifying the three 
models according to which human sciences developed — i.e. biology, economy and 
linguistics —, Foucault argues that: “It is upon the projected surface of biology that man 
appears as a being possessing functions – receiving stimuli (physiological ones, but also 
social, interhuman, and cultural ones), reacting to them, adapting himself, evolving, 
submitting to the demands of an environment, coming to terms with the modifications it 
imposes, seeking to erase imbalances, acting in accordance with regularities, having, in 
short, conditions of existence and the possibility of finding average norms of adjustment 
which permit him to perform his functions.” Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology 
of the Human Sciences (1966), Pantheon Books, 1970: 389. 
171 Foucault describes this in the opening lectures of the series Security, Territory and 
Population: “We have then a system that is, I believe, exactly the opposite of what we have 
seen with the disciplines. In the disciplines one started from a norm, and it was in relation to 
the training carried out with the reference to the norm that the normal could be 
distinguished from the abnormal. Here instead, we have a plotting of the normal and the 
abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the operation of normalization consists in 
establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality and in acting to 
bring the most unfavourable in line with the most favourable. So we have here something 
that starts from the normal and makes use of certain distributions considered to be, if you 
like, more normal than the others. These distributions will serve as the norm. The norm is an 
interplay of differential normalities.” Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 63.  
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this case, the abnormal is, following Canguilhem’s definition, “logically 
second but existentially first”172 in relation to the normal: the abnormal 
cannot be defined before the norm is defined and the normal produced, but 
it is the reason why this norm is established in the first place. This is why the 
couple normation-discipline works especially in delimited spaces and 
according to specific purposes: education at school, production in the 
factory, cure in the hospital, punishment and correction in the prison… 
modernist conceptions of architecture’s relation to the anonymous city can 
hence be described to unfold according to the idea that standardisation can 
replace the chaotic organisation of the actual city. This is clearly visible in Le 
Corbusier’s urban plans. Producing machines for ameliorating human 
conditions of existence, architecture unfolds for him precisely according to 
norms — in his case both human standards and building standards — that 
could respond to abnormal situations that those norms were logically 
necessary in order to identify.173 This is also why Le Corbusier never truly 
thought about the way the city could be governed. According to him, the city 
was to be produced, entirely deduced from the plan, but not to be governed. 
Asking this question would have meant accepting the actual city, and trying 
to improve different aspects by working on existing parameters. For Le 
Corbusier, this improvement could only be achieved by the imagination and 
construction of a completely different city. The standard indeed imposes its 
own reality. Like normation and discipline for Foucault, it implies that a 
model be first imagined, then implemented.  
 
                                            
172 Canguilhem. Op cit., [1946] 1991: 180. 
173 This is very clear in The Athens Charter, and also determines the idea that industrial 
standardisation is for him both the solution and the only way to correctly pose the problem.  
 108 
 
Le Corbusier. L’unité d’habitation (1938) 
 
 According to Foucault, normalisation works the opposite way. 
Emerging with the modern city, normalisation develops in the first place 
precisely by working upon and with its contingent dynamics. It thus starts 
with the question of government rather than that of planning, by accepting 
to work from existent parameters rather by imposing an all-encompassing 
model. This leads to the second aspect of technologies of normalisation, that 
is, the fact that they are bound to the problem of circulation. The urban 
milieu opens onto the question of something it cannot completely delineate, 
something that the milieu cannot prevent, something that nevertheless 
always flows and circulates. What is to be done with such a force? The 
question bears on variable phenomena. Things can be sorted, regulated, 
managed, and encouraged, but not completely and absolutely produced and 
prevented. This is the third aspect of normalisation, the fact that it is neither 
about prohibition nor about prescription, but about limitation, about setting 
up certain limits.174 Following this definition, it becomes possible to 
distinguish between two different technologies: on the one hand the 
technology of discipline and normation;175 on the other hand the technology 
of control and normalisation. This opposition allows us to identify a 
fundamental trait of the technologies of normalisation. Discipline is primarily 
concerned with normation, that is, with prescriptions bearing on the totality 
                                            
174 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009. See notably the lecture of the 25th of January 1978.  
175 Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 57.  
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of the reality considered, and with all its dimensions and details, and which 
aims at reproducing, according to laws of linear and identical repetition, the 
norm in homogeneous way. Normalisation functions according to procedures 
of control, evaluating the minimum level where intervention is both 
necessary and sufficient.176 Normalisation does not act directly on the 
population, but indirectly, modifying the parameters the population depends 
on, bearing on its material conditions of existence. What is interesting in 
what Foucault argues is that it shows how it is actually the increasing 
naturalisation of the city according to the couple population/milieu that 
allowed normalisation to spread and develop.177  
 This naturalisation appears in different ways. First, the population is 
biologically and materially bound to the milieu is which it lives and that it 
hence depends on a series of different variables. Second, the population is 
made of numerous individuals that have all their subjective preferences and 
that these are always motivated by desire. Third, the phenomena resulting 
from these interactions between the population and the milieu, variable and 
subjected to subjective differentiation, are nevertheless quite regular. These 
phenomena also display certain constants. Therefore, they are not entirely 
variable but also quite recurrent and can be analysed, modified and, if not 
absolutely predicted, at least expected. Giulio Argan, for example, discussed 
the security measures of capitalist society in reference to the statistical 
frameworks developed in the context of the International Congress of 
Modern Architecture (CIAM), which delimited zones of tolerance around 
                                            
176 For Foucault this is a central point: “(…) here I think we come to the central point of all 
this — all these mechanisms, unlike those of law and discipline, do not tend to convey the 
exercise of a will over others in the most homogeneous, continuous and exhaustive way 
possible. It is a matter rather of revealing a level of the necessary and sufficient action of 
those who govern. This pertinent level of government action is not the actual totality of the 
subjects in every single detail, but the population with its specific phenomena and 
processes.” Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 66. 
177 Here again is the question of the articulation between biological and social norms. But 
according to Foucault, this does not work in the form of identity, where social norms are 
modelled according to natural order, but it is rather the functioning of normalisation that 
interplays with these two articulated dimensions: “So you can see that a completely different 
technique is emerging that is not getting subjects to obey the sovereign’s will, but having a 
hold on things that seem far removed from the population, but which, through calculation, 
analysis and reflection, one knows can really have an effect on it. I think this is a very 
important mutation in the organization and rationalization of methods of power takes place 
with reference to this penetrable naturalness of population.” Foucault. Op cit., [2004] 2009: 
72.  
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average values. However, the plans and ideas developed and promoted by Le 
Corbusier in his texts on the Modulor and l’Unité d’habitation seem much 
more bound to what Foucault calls procedures of normation. Defining 
standard models, Le Corbusier’s plans are able to replicate this order in 
linear and deterministic terms. This logic is still largely visible in the way 
standardisation is promoted by Modern architecture. The general orientation, 
however, is given by the idea that architecture is an instrument that can 
correct pathological situations and orientate them towards the normal. 
Following this, Walter Prigge argues that Modern standardisation hence 
works according to typologies that are very different from those that 
traditionally governed architecture. Walter Prigge writes that “in the city of 
Middle Ages, local prescriptions, formal/structural (Gestaltungvorschriften) 
functioned like “laws”, normative rules set by Law.”178 According to him, the 
technical founding principle of modern typology consists on the contrary in 
unifying the measures of plans and building elements that are juridically 
formalised but only according to average values resulting from negotiations 
between the State and the industry. Prigge hence reads the Modern typology 
in terms of normalisation rather than in terms of normation.179 Although 
Prigge’s account seems to oscillate between what can be said to belong to 
the couple normation-discipline and what relates to normalisation and 
control, his description of the normalising functioning of modern typologies 
is perfectly consistent with Foucault. Beyond the strict standardisation at 
work in many models imagined by Modern architecture, Walter Prigge also 
identifies a more implicit continuum according to which standardisation 
unfolds. Foucault describes this continuum in terms of normalisation, which 
                                            
178 Prigge. Op cit., 2003: 49.  
179 "The diagrams of these structural typologies are instruments that generate typical forms 
as if they were happening "by themselves": they do not contain, legally speaking, formal 
requirements but theoretical rules helping to analyse the project in terms of types of 
modular buildings, through which the self-production of forms can be flexibly controlled. 
These rules, applicable regardless of regional perspectives in every place and in the same 
way, are thus economically efficient. This structural typology is not a standard "repressive" — 
i.e. normative — which sets the laws and prohibitions, but is instead "productive." The 
modern tyopology is hence a “normalising” norm, that works by the production of variations, 
and thus by the spread and deviation from the normal average (...) The structural typology of 
habitat is a device of social normalisation: it is the modern form of the norm, through which 
architecture bends indivudals’ daily typical activities in space to a statistical average, and 
thus normalises them.” Prigge. Op cit., 2003: 49.  
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ultimately contradicts the logic of standardisation that tries to contain this 
continuum in terms of normation. Following this distinction, it can be argued 
that the generic always worked beneath standardisation, and that 
standardisation was only a particular instance of the generic; one that 
reduced it to universal and standard values, and whose operational logic was 
only mechanical. It tended to unfold according to disciplinary mechanisms 
and a logic of normation, though more subtle mechanisms of adjustment and 
modulation were already at play. But while the distinction between normation 
and normalisation can be a good starting point to define the difference 
between the standard and the generic (especially in relation to the normative 
question), I will however argue that generic normativity may not be entirely 
reducible to this logic of normalisation.  
 
2. Norms and complexity 
 
This genealogical discussion appears particularly helpful when considering 
the functioning of norms in relation to the complexity of contemporary urban 
dynamics. I propose that while Le Corbusier’s standard does in fact 
correspond to a technology of normation and discipline which, from a 
definite model, works by identical repetition and linear prescription, Rem 
Koolhaas’ theorisation of the generic may in fact much better correspond to 
later results of modernity which, working through normalisation and control, 
produced a new form of anonymous city. This theoretical detour through 
Foucault’s analysis of modern power and normalisation can indeed help us to 
analyse more precisely the relation between the rational logic at play in the 
different urban models that have already been discussed, and normative 
questions. In normative terms, that is, according to the problem posed by 
architecture’s relation to normative proposals, it seems that the main 
question bears on the question of change and, more precisely, on the 
question of modularity.  If the problem posed by Koolhaas around the 
question of the generic concerns the problematic relation between 
architecture’s forces of enclosure and the relative unpredictability of urban 
dynamics, then the main question to ask is how architecture previously 
 112 
conceived the relation between structure and change. It is from this point of 
view that I intend to show that the generic can help us to understand that far 
from merely unfolding diversity, difference, and relatively undecipherable 
discrete dynamics, complexity also produces invariants, constants, and relies 
on more generic structures. It will be shown that, in turn, these generic 
structures can be defined in ways that do not only correspond to the 
mechanisms of control identified by Deleuze, but also provide a new 
topological platform that helps us to navigate more accurately through 
complexity.  
 
2.1 Modularity 
 
Considering both Neufert’s work on Modern typologies and Le Corbusier’s 
conception of the Modulor, it seems possible to define the Modernist 
conception of modularity according to three main characteristics.180 The first 
involves structural polyvalence. The definition of standard measures relates 
for modernist architects to the capacity for accommodating differences in 
ways that should no longer be expressed as private interests and singular 
preferences. The entire valorisation of the standard follows this definition of 
an anonymous house, of an anonymous building and, ultimately, of an 
anonymous city in terms of its capacity to suit everyone. I have already 
argued that this capacity entailed for modernist architect the possibility of 
defining everyone’s needs. Nobody in particular, but rather the standard 
Man, humanity understood universally, according to the standard needs that 
architecture proposes to fulfil. I suggest this remains an important argument 
for the way this thesis seeks to engage with the notion of the generic. 
Although it no longer seeks either universality or a fortiori the idea that this 
universality could be defined in standard terms, this idea of determining 
minimal structural conditions rather than singular objects and expressions is 
what remains central to the way I understand architecture’s relation to the 
urban environment. The second characteristic defining the modernist 
conception of modularity is given by its inherent functionalism: the idea that 
                                            
180 See Ernst Neufert and al. Op cit., [1936] 2012; Le Corbusier. Op cit., [1945] 2004. 
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this polyvalence does not unfold out openly, but rather is folded up 
hierarchically. The typological rationalisation proposed by Neufert defines 
strict boundaries between different types. And while Gropius seems keen to 
define elements that, while performing definite functions, can also be used 
for different purposes, this does not escape the strict functional division that, 
for example, determined the the Bauhaus school design. While this functional 
hierarchy does allow space for possible permutations, the linear logic of 
standardisation remains dependent on the strict differences that are made 
between different types of objects and functions. This is also clearly present 
in Le Corbusier’s urban plans, whose standard and harmonious unity 
depends on the strict spatial divisions that are made between the different 
elementary functions that compose the anonymous city: from the function of 
circulation to the function of habitation, from the function of production to 
that of administration and that of leisure, every function occupies a different 
segment of the entire plan. This functional division is what allows us to 
understand the third and perhaps principal characteristic of standardisation: 
the idea that modularity is essentially seen in terms of deterministic 
combinations, in relation to a fixed set of programmed possibilities. The first 
chapter developed this idea. But here the rational logic of planning involved 
in modernist standardisation acquires its profound normative dimension. As 
we have seen, this is why although modernist standardisation can be seen to 
relate to problems of normalisation, it essentially remains on the side of what 
Foucault calls more specifically procedures of normation and discipline. Once 
again the problem is one of normalisation: it is a question of modulation. But 
faithful to its standard conception of universality, modernism proposes 
solutions that are more deterministic than probabilistic.  
 The logic developed by the representatives of what I proposed to call 
critical modernism and that, generally referred to as the radical movements 
of the ‘60s and ‘70s, include members of Archigram, Archizoom and 
Superstudio as well as the more solitary trajectory of Constant, largely draws 
on this conception, but transforms it quite decisively. Projects such as No-
Stop City (Archizoom, 1970-1971), already discussed in the first chapter, are 
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exemplary cases.181 Like the modernists, they start by considering that the 
structure should be polyvalent. The main difference appears in the way they 
understand possible permutations. For them, function is no longer attached 
to structure. Structure is no longer necessarily dependent on the hierarchical 
distribution of different functions, but a more abstract and anonymous entity 
that can accommodate their probabilistic unfolding. This anonymous 
structure allows them to understand an open-ended permutation of 
functions, to which they attribute a playful dimension. The users having 
revealed their permutation, these functions are no longer necessarily fixed in 
advanced as was the case for modernist architects. But while their structure 
is open-ended and can expand indefinitely, their projects rely on fixed 
entities. The open structure is in fact populated by an open ended number of 
fixed and definite entities. Critical modernism hence reverses the picture, for 
their models no longer rely on a determinate though polyvalent structure but 
rather on elementary entities that can only expand quantitatively.  
 
 
 
Archigram. Plug in City (1964) 
 
                                            
181 Branzi. Op cit., 2006.  
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 From this standpoint, I would argue that it is possible to define the 
relation between the generic and modularity in terms that both follow these 
previous conceptions and radically transform them. Following Koolhaas, it 
seems possible to argue that, more than starting with a structure, the generic 
conception of modularity starts with an inductive attention paid to  
conditions. Generic modularity, perhaps more visible in Koolhaas’ theoretical 
models than in his architectural practice, starts by identifying generic 
constants and generic requirements, rather than with design questions. 
Organisational constants as well as programmatic and potential ones are 
identified, unfolding according to the inductive identification of emergent 
capacities. These constants traverse Koolhaas’ theoretical texts and his 
design proposals. From his project for the parc in La Villette to the analytic 
relation his text on the generic city entertains with the actual organisation of 
cities such as Singapore and Atlanta, this problem is recurrent throughout 
Koolhaas’ work.182 Emergent, complex, and undetermined conditions come 
first, and it is only then that one can start thinking about the minimal 
structure able to accommodate these various requirements. This minimal 
structure accepts no other requirements than the idea that it should allow 
polyvalent and open-ended permutations. This time however, these 
permutations are no longer only open-ended quantitatively, but also 
qualitatively.  
 From this standpoint, I would argue that it is possible to understand 
the concept of the generic as providing a different understanding of the 
relations between complexity and normativity than what has been theorised 
by both the Modern Movement and critical modernism. While engaging with 
these relations in ways that still depend on what Foucault defines in terms of 
normalisation, it also indicates the possibility of considering norms 
differently. No longer understood in terms of standards, generic normativity 
cannot be understood according to the definition of average norms. 
Standardisation worked through the definition of the normal in terms that 
correspond to lowest common denominators. By arguing that the generic city 
represents the apotheosis of the multiple choice concept — all boxes crossed 
                                            
182 See notably Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995; Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2000; Idem. Op cit., 2001.  
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— Koolhaas points towards another logic. Less reductive than the idea of the 
lowest common denominators, the generic indicates converging points that 
are closer to the paradigmatic. While standardisation always refer to a 
previously determined model that is then replicated in linear and identical 
terms, and while it essentially refers to modularity in terms of a fixed set of 
possibilities, generic norms can be seen to be paradigmatic in the sense that 
they correspond rather to abstract functions that are not necessarily 
concretely present in all the particular instances it accommodates. Generic 
normativity hence effects an open-ended modulation of probabilities rather 
than a fixed set of permutations. Because structure is not opposed to fixed 
entities which, as with the cellular automata at the basis of critical Modernist 
models, entail only quantitative modulations, generic normativity rather 
refers to structures that are, as Laruelle argues, indifferent to differences. As 
such, they entail the possibility of qualitative modulations affecting both the 
entities present in the paradigmatic structure and the paradigmatic structure 
itself. Although this particular type of modulation can be seen to come close 
to the logic of control identified by Deleuze, I argue that it is this structural 
element that prevents it from being fully associated with the logic Deleuze 
described in terms of universal modulation.183 Deleuze argued that 
disciplinary mechanisms of normation could be seen to seek ideally to 
concentrate and distribute in space, to order in time, and to compose a 
productive force in analogy to the industrial machine. But he defined the 
different control mechanisms as inseparable variations. According to the new 
common model or language of the digital and numerical code, these 
mechanisms were seen by Deleuze to be essentially short-term, 
corresponding to rapid rates of turnover that ultimately found their logic in a 
universal system of deformation: “Like a self-deforming cast that [would] 
continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose 
mesh will transmute from point to point”.184 Following Laruelle, it may 
however be argued that the generic no longer seeks to produce difference, 
that it does not work as a universal system of deformation, but rather 
                                            
183 Deleuze. Op cit., [1990] 1992.    
184 Idem.   
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through the more structural and operational function of idempotence.185 
Indifferent to difference, this function defines the generic as a multiple and 
relatively undetermined force of intervention. Generic normativity may hence 
escape the cybernetic logic of modularity as much as it escapes the 
mechanist logic of standardisation. No longer merely allowing for 
permutations, it does not either seek, as with the mechanisms of control 
defined by Deleuze, to work with difference, to follow permutations in their 
detailed organisation, but rather work with indifference, with those structural 
invariants that, though not completely escaping the principle of universal 
equivalence to which they are part, nevertheless transform it.186  
 
2.2 Non standard normativity 
 
From this relatively vague standpoint, it seems possible to argue that, while 
not completely moving away from the problems posed by both 
standardisation and differential modulation, the generic points toward the 
possible definition of a non standard normativity. Although the relation that 
this non standard normativity may entertain with the more general process of 
normalisation described by Foucault remains to be addressed, it seems 
nevertheless possible to argue that, because it contrasts with both Modern 
standardisation and post-Modern logics of control, generic normativity 
cannot be reduced to processes seen to correspond essentially to modes of 
capitalist indexation. This indifference Laruelle talks about can in fact be 
seen as a new type of anonymity. In contradicting both logics of standard 
homogenisation and logics of differential modulation — logics that, 
according to Deleuze, can be defined as the management of differences —, 
this anonymity shows how the anonymous can potentially escape the logics 
of economical evaluation to which the development of capitalism is bound. 
This indifference may have nothing to do with the universal principle of 
equivalence according to which the market is defined. Despite making bold 
claims according to which “the force of the generic [would be]   that of the 
                                            
185 Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 242. 
186 Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 240. 
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Stranger who comes as a new type of universal”,187 Laruelle remains quite 
prudent on this matter. I have already argued that the main problem that 
Koolhaas’ work on the generic city may involve is the fact that it mostly 
stands on this ambiguous line where the generic can be seen to escape from 
the standard while mediating new forms of standardisation. And it is 
according to this ambiguity that I will now discuss its relation to the idea of 
non standard normativity.  
 Following Foucault’s understanding of normalisation, Walter Prigge 
shows that although Modern standardisation unfolds according to the 
mechanist understanding of identical and repetitive relations between the 
model and its copies, the modern continuum to which it is bound also more 
profoundly and more generally unfolds according to recursive modulations 
that do not only leave room for variation between the different elements of a 
series, but also reverse the way the unifying norm indexes the series. The 
series no longer unfolds according to the norm it represents and repeats in 
order to produce the normal. Rather it is the normal which, identified 
quantitatively in terms of statistical regularities and constants, becomes the 
norm. From this standpoint, I have argued that the differential modulation 
identified by Deleuze to constitute the logic of control could be seen not only 
in distinction to the disciplinary mechanisms described by Foucault, but also 
in continuity with what the later describes in terms of normalisation and 
apparatuses of security. Although Foucault mostly understood mechanisms 
of normalisation according to management, control and the variable 
adjustment to a norm that was still mainly defined in average terms, 
Deleuze’s definition of control extended this logics to mechanisms of 
modulation that work in closer relation to the production of difference.  
 From this standpoint, I would argue that, while allowing us to draw 
another and more complex history of modernity, the recent debate that has 
arisen around the notion of non standard architecture is not convincing when 
arguing that it would escape the modern regime of normalisation. 
Championed by the French theoretician of architecture Frederic Migayrou and 
Turkish architect Zeynep Mennan who, in 2003, organised the exhibition 
                                            
187 Idem.  
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Architectures non standard (Centre Pompidou, Paris, 2003), this notion 
emphasises the development of new practices.188 These practices have in 
common their use of computational algorithm to generate new complex 
forms that would have been unthinkable before. Exemplified in the works of 
Frank Gehry, Greg Lynn, and Zaha Hadid and Patrick Schumacher, that they 
may indicate a completely different genealogy of modern rationality in 
architecture, according to Mennan. Rather than being grounded in the purist 
and standard models imagined and designed by people like Le Corbusier and 
Walter Gropius, this alternative genealogy would rather be connected with 
the Baroque than with Classicism, and could be related, notably, to Antoni 
Gaudi. Mennan argues that this trajectory traces the underlining current of 
modernity which, having been despised by Modernism, comes back to the 
fore. Focusing on formal questions and favouring free association and free 
creativity over measure and analysis, this trajectory frames, beyond 
postmodernism, the rational definition of what I call generative architecture. 
   While Modern standardisation considered the programme as a 
condition, generative architecture defines its own programme. It generates it, 
having only analogical and metaphorical relations to its external conditions. 
Mennan describes the development of a new formal vocabulary that, from the 
embryologic variations of Greg Lynn and the slime-like structures of NOX to 
the hyperbodies imagined by Kas Oosterhuis, depicts a new interest for the 
organic, the dynamic and the animated:  
 
  "Formal stability collapses due to an architectural environmentalism 
and vitalism that constantly transfigures the form, controlled by morphogenetic 
capacities that are in constant development, following both rational and sensible 
deployment.  The right angle capitulates in a relaxation that releases an open, fluid, 
supple and adaptive inflexion; form explodes, goes beyond itself following constant 
changes and variations,  integrating and registering forces and information, 
configuring itself as well as its environment.”189 
 
                                            
188 Mennan and Migayrou. Op cit., 2003.  
189 Zeynep Mennan. “Des formes non standard, un “gestalt switch””, in Zeynep Mennan and 
Frederic Migayrou. Op cit., 2003: 34.  
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Talking about what Charles Jencks has alternatively called “the new paradigm 
in architecture”, the “second stage of postmodernism”, or “complexity two” in 
terms of non standard architectures, Zeynep Mennan and Frederic Migayrou 
develop ideas that can be more closely associated with what Charles Jencks 
now calls critical modernism than to what is now commonly defined under 
the label of postmodernism.190 Yet its legacy seems more postmodernist than 
modernist, as it does indeed focus more on pure formal concerns than 
anything else. The fluid, supple and adaptive morphogenetic capacities 
Zeynep Mennan discusses seem unrelated to the more serial and hence both 
more discrete and more linear continuum that determined the Modern drive 
for standardisation. The continuum in question appears to be able to change. 
It is mutable, metastable, in constant development as it changes according to 
a growing number of related parameters. It no longer unfolds according to 
the strict compatibilities that could be made between stable and solid objects 
and elements that were defined according to Euclidean geometry and 
Cartesian metaphysics. Rather it follows the constant mutations of fluxes of 
information that can redefine both content and form over time. While 
Mennan argues that new computational technologies allow the emergence of 
new morphogenetic capacities that, by generating moving forms that are able 
to change over time, could be seen to extend non identity to infinity, it is 
more difficult to agree with her when she contends that this is sufficient to 
challenge the idea that these forms no longer embodies models implied by a 
norm.191 Foucault’s distinction between processes of discipline and 
normation on the one hand, and of control and normalisation on the other 
hand, allows several distinctions here. First, it must be said that, if non-
standard forms are indeed an enunciation of non-identity that is extended to 
infinity, then the non-standard is indeed opposed to standard normation, 
but not necessarily to normalisation properly speaking. Second, if it is true 
                                            
190  Jencks. Op cit., 2002.  
191 "The non-standard form is a statement of non-identity extended to infinity, it is a 
powerful challenge to the entire organization of the human experience and philosophical 
thought, which always oscillate between order and chaos, identity and difference, invariable 
and change, universal and singular, essence and appearance. Generated and managed by an 
extra-formal normativity, these antinomies define the form as the incarnation of a model 
implied by a norm. Mennan. Op cit., 2003: 34.  
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that the antinomies she speaks about have indeed defined, under the 
authority of an extra-formal normativity, the form as the incarnation of a 
model implied by a norm, this seems again only true of standard normation, 
but not necessarily of normalisation. And third, it must be noted that, 
focusing exclusively on the formal and generative dimension of architecture, 
Mennan dismisses from the start the possibility of addressing the extra-
formal normativity that can be seen to bear on the production of non-
standard forms. Contrary to the way non standard architecture seems mainly 
discussed in total disconnection from the normative and hence political 
relation it entertains with the contemporary city, I would argue that, precisely 
because architecture has increasingly and continuously been subjected to the 
autonomisation and complexification of urban dynamics, it is only by 
continuing to address what constants and norms shape them that 
architecture can be truly consistent with the technological, economical, 
political and cultural transformations in which it participates.  
 The argument has already been made that non-standard architecture 
— and notably in the case of parametricism which, Patrick Schumacher 
claims, represents the new global style for architecture and design (see 
Schumacher 2009) — is a manifestation of “the cultural logic of late 
neoliberalism.”192  Luciana Parisi notably argues that its “(…) postcybernetic 
relational operations of positive feedback, structural coupling, and mutual 
correspondence are now defining the ubiquitous surface of smooth 
design”.193 But while she recognises this, she also argues that she is “(…) not 
particularly concerned with criticizing parametricism or its excessive 
formalism for its inability to address infrastructural issues and the political 
implications of lived space” (Parisi: idem). Although this critique is not the 
particular subject matter of this thesis, it is however in relation to this 
argument that I rather explore the possibilities entailed in Koolhaas’ work on 
the generic to more directly engage with these political questions. Contrary 
to Parisi, I contend that it is only by analysing architecture from the outside, 
                                            
192 See notably Owen Hatherley. Op cit., 2010; Ingeborg M. Rocker. “Apropos Parametricism: 
If, in what Style Should We Build?”, in Log, No 21: March 2011.   
193 Luciana Parisi. Contagious Architecture: Computation, Architecture and Space, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013: 86. 
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through its hermeneutic relation to present urban conditions, that we may 
indicate ways in which architecture can really provide alternatives to its 
dominant relation to control mechanisms that are ultimately indexed on the 
global principle of equivalence defined by the market. While it is not yet the 
object of the present project to explore the ways the idea of generic 
normativity can provide an alternative to the formal and logical arguments 
proposed by Parisi to distinguish between the topological logic of control and 
what she calls mereotopological space events, this thesis takes a different 
perspective on architecture. Much more concerned with this hermeneutic 
relation between architecture and urban dynamics than with the relation 
between architecture, computation and formalist questions, this thesis 
similarly considers the generic according to its epistemological and 
operational dimensions, but according to architecture’s external relation to 
present urban conditions rather than according to internal questions of 
design. This may also be seen to unfold according to the distinction I have 
proposed to make between inductive architecture and generative 
architecture. While the question for generative architecture may be more 
about the way computational technologies transform what architecture can 
do in terms of the production of forms and objects, the question for 
inductive architecture is more about knowing how architecture can build 
reflexively on the relation it entertains with the city and the way it envisions 
transforming it.  
 From this point of view, I contend with Frederic Migayrou that the 
growing complexity of urban dynamics, understood to be notably following 
the “(…) instauration of a continuous and homogeneous computational field” 
on the one hand, and the fragmentation of most inclusive spheres on the 
other, cannot be opposed to the Modern standard in terms of antinomic 
deregulation and randomness.194 Mennan argues that:   
 
                                            
194 Migayrou. Op cit., 2003: 13.  
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 "Non standard architecture is the adaptation of serial modes of production to 
changing modes of conception, orientating simultaneously mental and physical 
processes towards a continuum that truly impose the norm’s fluctuation."195 
 
According to what has been argued before about modularity and control, it 
may however be argued that this continuum, understood in more structural 
and generic terms, cannot be merely identified with formal conceptions that 
would impose to the norm to fluctuate. I would rather contend that, as it was 
argued before, the concept of the generic rather points towards another 
understanding of normativity. Far from imposing fluctuation, it proposes to 
understand the establishment of structures that, drawn from invariants 
identified through an inductive method, could rather be seen to be 
indifferent to differences that it neither proposes to directly generate nor to 
simply homogenise. Following Koolhaas, it is repetitition and anonymity that 
may become more interesting when, in the domains of industrial production 
and information technologies, capitalism seems much more driven by the 
demands of singularisation than by those of standardisation. While 
customisation becomes the new key word for capitalism, the virtues of 
anonymous structures may become more blatant. This does not mean that 
we ought to reclaim the way modernism used to valorise standardisation. 
Rather we ought to consider that there may still be something particularly 
interesting to match the political challenges prompted by capitalist driven 
urbanisation. More than working towards modularity, we need to look at 
polyvalent structures again. Here I turn to the mathematical and 
philosophical work of René Thom on topology. Thom has looked at the 
relations between the local and the global in terms of an articulation between 
discrete and continuous processes; these kinds of relations need to be 
further examined.196 The transformations implied by his work are enormous 
and difficult to apply directly to architecture theory and urban studies. He 
distinguishes between the substrate space of empirical observation, which 
should not be limited to direct human perception faculties, for it includes all 
                                            
195 Mennan. Op cit., 2003: 34.  
196 Thom. Op cit., [1980] 1983.  
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kinds of technological instruments that can extend these faculties, and the 
ideal mathematical space, which orientates the qualitative properties of the 
substrate space. This distinction is particularly relevant. I agree with Mennan 
when she argues that "Continuity is a property of the ideal space in which the 
dynamics that are at the origin of morphology play, even though it presents 
itself as a discontuinty in the substrate space.”197 The generic is better 
understood in terms of an abstract structure than in terms of ideal space; 
however I argue that the conceptions developed by Thom follow Mennan’s 
distinction, and that it is through this distinction that it may be possible to 
discuss the relation between the discrete and the continuous, between the 
space of multiple and differentiated actualities and the virtual plane to which 
they are bound, to speak more like Deleuze, in ways that would repeat 
neither the arguments of absolute idealism, nor the grandiloquent contextual 
explanations given by critical theory. Whatever the complexity and subtlety of 
these transformations, whatever the profound mathematical and geometrical 
mutations they imply, it seems that the definition of the non standard in 
architecture cannot be discussed seriously if it is not previously and 
resolutely considered in relation to the material, technical and rational 
continuum that characterises modernity. Although many of these generative 
architects associated with the development of non-standard conceptions 
may indeed be looking for a new formalism, that is, an indexical rather than 
symbolical formalism, I would argue that these transformations go beyond 
the formal and semiotic perspective adopted by post-Modernism. This 
transformation entails profound mutations in the modern project of 
rationalising environmental adaptation. Considered as mere biological 
dynamics, non-standard conceptions risk floating like mere spatial 
metaphors, indexing the capitalist structure of social distinction and 
economic valuation much more readily than they respond to the challenges 
prompted by the advent of the Anthropocene. 
 
                                            
197 Mennan. Op cit., 2003: 39.  
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3. Norms and models 
 
This problem invites us to think again in terms of structures and models. 
Once again, this thesis does not focus on generative models that, from 
interactive to parametric architecture, define new relations between 
algorithms and building, between computation and conception, and between 
architecture and culture. Rather it focuses on models that can be seen to be 
the extrapolation, generalisation or radicalisation of a present condition. This 
appears quite clearly in Koolhaas’ work. I have already argued that his text 
on the generic city was in fact mainly a generalisation of conditions observed 
in Atlanta and Singapore. Presenting an extrapolated and radicalised version 
of these conditions, however the generic city does not merely simplify the 
more complex dynamics at play in these cities. Very much like the models 
imagined by critical modernism, it must be argued that the generic city 
already underlines an analytical relation to this complex dynamics that is not 
directly descriptive, but also, and at the same, speculative. It is this 
speculative dimension that renders this model particularly interesting. In 
addition to analysing realities already at play in these cities, this speculative 
quality of Koolhaas’ model makes it also capable of registering possible 
futures, and hence of understanding the present conditions according to 
their potential futures. Following René Thom, I would argue that the relation 
between generic structural invariants and complexity does not follow the 
necessary distinction between epistemological constructions and ontological 
realities. Typological invariants were categories according to which 
complexity could be pinned down to a simple relation between forms and 
functions. The topological quality of generic models on the contrary relates 
to their abstract and speculative dimensions and to the fact that, while 
uncovering generic morphologies, they also constantly reflexively relate to 
the conditions that make these uncoverings possible. Koolhaas’ text on the 
generic city constantly oscillate between these two dimensions. Alternatively 
discussing emergent generic properties, standard forms, and the 
contemporary city in generic terms, his text reveals a logic that is also more 
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generally at play in complexity theory. Following Mennan here, I would argue 
that:    
 
  “While a typological pulse remains recurrent in their (i.e complexity 
theorists’) search for common rules and simple and iterative methods for the 
generation of complex forms, these theories do not seek to derive ideal invariants 
from empirical morphologies, but rather seek to develop a new language to decrypt 
and rationalise forms in motion"198 
 
This last section analyses the generic as a general epistemological structure. 
In the first chapter, I argued that the generic pointed towards another 
epistemological model. Underlining very different relation between difference 
and repetition, it defined another form of the universal. René Thom’s insights 
on the possibility of a potential new formal language to decrypt and 
rationalise forms in motion will help  show that the generic may reveal 
another type of normativity. I would like to argue that a resolutely vague 
conceptualisation of the generic in relation to change can be useful in 
developing strategies to decrypt accurately complex urban dynamics. 
Contrary to the strict homogenisation drive that characterise standardisation 
in relation to its linear understanding of typological variations, the definition 
of generic indifference may provide architecture with conceptual instruments 
to enhance its structural relation to change. I contend that generic models 
can, by defining constants that are, following Laruelle, indifferent to 
difference, positively transform architecture’s relation to structural 
invariants, and hence in relation to both potential and change.199 
 
3.1 Descriptive and operational models  
 
Models are usually criticised for being normative. Arguments about 
complexity are increasingly mobilised in order to judge models as reductive 
                                            
198 Idem.   
199 Although I do not directly address his work, the work of Pier Vittoro Aureli on the generic 
language of architecture is relevant here. See notably Pier Vittoro Aureli. “The Common and 
the Production of Architecture: Early Hypotheses”, in David Chipperfield, Kieran Long & 
Shumi Bose (eds), Common Ground: A Critical Reader, Venice, 2012.  
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and normative perspectives, products of a failure to acknowledge complexity. 
Whether it concerns whole urban masterplans or building scale models, the 
argument seems the same: while urban scale alone is already beyond the 
scope of any masterplan, actual buildings are necessarily bound to escape 
the plans and models made by the architect. I would however argue that all 
models are not necessarily reductive and normative in ways that, as we have 
seen in the previous sections, they were in the models imagined by 
modernist architects. This is certainly not in the case of the models I discuss 
here.  
 I am not referring to the concrete scale models used in the design 
process, but rather to these theoretical models that entertain an inductive 
relation with actual urban conditions, and that, while not directly informing 
the design process, nevertheless define certain orientations with regard to 
the relation between architecture and the urban environment. However, I will 
largely draw here on Albena Yaneva’s ethnographical work on design. Her 
conception of architectural scale models, and the way they participate in the 
design process and relate to buildings can be analogically translated in the 
case that this thesis explores: namely theoretical models and the way they 
participate in the definition of architecture in relation to urban conditions 
(see Yaneva 2009).200 The opposition Yaneva identifies between physical 
models or diagrams that are now mostly used by architects to communicate 
about their projects and to document them after they have been completed 
and the foam models that are used by OMA’s architects as experimental tools 
leads her to argue that far from being purely representational objects, 
architectural models are at once operational, indexical and heuristic parts of 
the design process. Following this definition, I would argue that the models I 
have been discussing from the beginning of this text are both rational 
constructions and normative proposals. Applying Albena Yaneva and Albert 
C. Smith’s definitions, it is possible to posit that the theoretical models 
imagined by architects — should they involve actual architectural models, 
                                            
200 Albena Yaneva. Made by the Office of Metropolitan Architecture: A, Ethnography of 
Design, Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2009.  
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drawings, or purely literary forms — possess a double dimension.201 On the 
one hand they imagine possible futures. They are experimental machines, 
not only imagining future representations but also testing various scenarios, 
accommodating present constraints and possible configurations. On the 
other hand they entertain specific though changing relations with what Smith 
calls the reference standards. Architecture models are not freewheel 
machines. They are measuring machines that do not only set their own 
standards, but are also set against the backdrop of existing standards. 
Measuring the unknown always goes in comparison with a carefully 
conserved known – the reference standard.202 It seems hence possible to 
argue that architecture models — whether they be scale models participating 
in the design of a building to come or pure theoretical projections involving 
architecture’s general relation to the city and present conditions — are in fact 
machines for imagining and accommodating the future under the constraints 
of controlling measures, whether they are reference standards or normative 
schemes. As discussions are emerging on the definition of non-standard 
conceptions in architecture and urbanism, it is important to keep in mind this 
double dimension of models. It is only from this point of view that, 
distinguishing between the term “standard” and the less frequently employed 
notion of “norm,” that it is possible to understand the difference at stake 
between the standard and the generic in their relation to models and to 
change. Considering that the theoretical urban models produced by Koolhaas 
are both descriptive and operational, I would argue that the generic plays a 
double role in his work: one the one hand it defines a specific relation to 
knowledge and to the heuristic value of conceptual models; on the other, it 
indicates ways in which the forces of enclosure and structural determination 
at play in architecture can accommodate the complex and unpredictable 
nature of urban dynamics. 
                                            
201 Albert C. Smith. Architectural Model as Machine: A New View of Models from Antiquity to 
the Present Day. Montreal: Architectural Press, 2004.  
202 The argument here is comparable to what Bruno Latour argues when he affirms that no 
measure can be made without what he calls measuring measures. For Latour, these 
measuring measures cover the general meaning that is given to the term standard in English. 
Like the standard meter measure or the many standards stated by the International 
Organization for Standardization, they are for Latour at once benchmarks and frames of 
reference. See notably Latour and Hermant. Op cit., 1998.  
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3.2 Making norms explicit 
 
 
 
Constant. New Babylon (1960-1970) 
 
Despite largely emphasising representation, Albert C. Smith’s descriptions 
are very useful in understanding the many transformations this relation 
between models and norms has been subjected to throughout history. While 
this relation to the future seem to have remained quite constant throughout 
history, their relation to the established and establishing standards has 
profoundly changed. From the guiding plans that the Greek used to 
contemporary computational models, it can be argued that architectural 
models have always been scale devices that, according to Albert Smith’s 
definition, “(…) help humans to extend their intellectual might in an attempt 
to understand and define the measure of a complex whole.”203 But the way 
these guiding plans were used to achieve the harmonious standards of form 
and proportion that represented the ideals of Greek architecture has almost 
nothing to do with the way Marcus Vitruvius defined their technical relation 
to the complex structures of domes and spheres that dominated Roman 
                                            
203 Smith. Op cit., 2004: 64.  
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architecture.204 It was however only during the Renaissance that the relation 
between models and reference standards changed dramatically. The relative 
decrease of religious or traditional standards and the growing influence of 
Humanist philosophy and principles according to which Man became the 
measure of everything gave models a more experimental character. For both 
Michelangelo and Leone Battista Alberti, their engineering dimension became 
as important for the architect as for the patron.205 Allowing both study and 
communication on the project, small-scale models enable all the involved 
parties to take prior account of the relevant considerations and to envisage 
the future with more clarity. Made of many materials, models become actual 
mechanisms to think, foretell and conceive future designs. Considering the 
architect as the paragon of the Renaissance figure, combining skills in music, 
mathematics, painting, philosophy and engineering, Alberti largely 
participated in defining models as projecting and demonstrating design 
machines.  
 These important breakthroughs are similar to those identified by Peter 
Sloterdijk. The first important transformation corresponds to the progressive 
passage from metaphysics and religion to humanism and rationalism. 
Copernicus’ explosion of the geodesic model of the universe has had a 
profound impact on architecture models. Much more concerned by space 
than many other disciplines, architecture has been deeply affected by the 
conception of an infinite universe. But very much like what Quentin 
Meillassoux argues about the counter-Ptolemean revolution performed by 
philosophy and especially phenomenology since Kant, architecture has also, 
notably in the case of modernist architecture, deeply reterritorialised this 
infinity on the human subject.206 Mathematics nevertheless becomes the 
decisive science that sets new norms determining the way architectural 
models will work and the laws they will follow. Since Leonardo Da Vinci, the 
                                            
204 Far from only representing ideas of future buildings, models became actual engineering 
mechanisms that were used both to invent forms and for testing different parameters, 
acknowledging problems of size and feasibility, notably by understanding the proportional 
strength of material limitations of the small-scale model. See Smith. Op cit., 2004: 8-17.  
205 Leon Battista Alberti. On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph Rykwert, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988: 33-35.  
206 Quentin Meillassoux. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray 
Brassier, London: Continuum, [2006] 2007. 
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scale model had been informed by geometry, physics and calculus. But it is 
only with Descartes that it became a mechanism. Following the idea that all 
living bodies are in fact seen, like the universe itself, as machines, forms of 
automata mechanically responding to simulation, the scale model became a 
conceptual machine moving in a mathematically measurable clockwork 
system.207 Once again, it seems possible to argue that the history of relations 
between models and norms in architecture throughout modernity unfolds 
according to the same history of explicitation that Peter Sloterdijk describes. 
However, very much as Sloterdijk argues, the relation between models and 
explicitation does not only concern rationality in terms of knowledge, but in 
terms of normalisation. While the conditions on which life depends are made 
more explicit, it is also in technical terms, in terms of adaptation and 
manipulation. The general dissolution of absolute reference standards and 
the growing autonomy attributed to conventional norms have hence 
determined the general relation that developed between models and norms. 
This may be what Sloterdijk saw in Constant’s critical utopia. Contending that 
Constant is “(…) the most important visionary and analyst of the second 
culture of the city (…)”, Sloterdijk argues that the models for Constant’s 
famous New Babylon (1960-1970) were perhaps less envisioning the future 
than describing present and emergent conditions.208 For Sloterdijk, 
Constant’s models are not just projections. They are also descriptions, 
displaying not only metaphorical, speculative, and visionary eloquence, but 
also reflexive, analytical and theoretical qualities. This may be what 
differentiates them the most from both the prescriptive models designed by 
Le Corbusier, and the speculative models imagined by El Lissitsky.209 
Certainly the revolutionary dimension of El Lissitsky’s work made his models 
much more radical than those designed by Le Corbusier. Le Corbusier was 
perhaps less modern than El Lissitsky, for his affirmation of the new never 
escaped the humanist perspective according to which the techno-scientific 
explicitation that characterised modernity should be adapted to human 
                                            
207 Smith. Op cit., 2004: 73.  
208 Sloterdijk. Op cit., [2003] 2005: 583.  
209 See Stedelijk Van Abbemuseum and El Lissitzy. El Lissitzky, 1890–1941: Architect Painter 
Photographer Typographer. Utrecht: Municipal Van Abbemuseum, 1990.  
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nature. For El Lissitsky, on the other hand, progress can only be made by 
accepting this explicitation, and by following it and accommodating it 
beyond any given conception of human nature. The model imagined by 
Constant follows another path. While the opposition to Le Corbusier and his 
faith in deterministic scheme seems indispensable for somebody who started 
to experience change, superposition, modulation and chaos, Constant also 
departs from El Lissitsky in reintroducing a critical dimension. While the 
revolutionary conditions in which El Lissitky conceived his Prouns allowed 
him to concentrate only on the future, the fact that Constant’s model was 
conditioned by a revolution that was yet to come gave it a more critical 
dimension. Although speculatively imagining large meta-structures which, 
built on piles, would spread over the actual physical territory like immaterial 
and post-historical metaphors, they also present themselves as reflexive 
models displaying analytical and theoretical qualities concerning the more 
general nature of models. The difference with these more recent models is 
that they are both speculative and critical. Their analytical and theoretical 
qualities do not only concern models’ relation to the future but also their 
relation to “(…) the concrete interpretation, although indirect, of the 
present.”210  
 It is according to this general argument that I now wish to turn to 
Koolhaas’ work on Lagos. Not yet published in its comprehensive form, 
Koolhaas’ Lagos project is the third he conducted with the Harvard Project on 
the City. Contrary to many of his other works, this project seems to look at a 
situation that has nothing to do either with modern standardisation or with 
the generic. It could at first glance seem that as much as it may appear to be 
the great other of contemporary globalisation and the great other of 
Modernisation, Lagos stands as an alien case amongst Koolhaas’ research 
projects. It is however here that his generic conception of theoretical models 
confronts most radically the questions raised in his text on the generic city.  
  
 
 
                                            
210 Sloterdijk. Op cit., [2003] 2005: 581.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTINUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS, THE EXAMPLE OF LAGOS211 
 
 
 
The previous chapters have explored both the rational and normative logic 
which underlines architecture’s relation to the modern city. Although they 
have explored variations and differences between different logics and 
models, I have also argued that it is possible to isolate continuous dynamics 
that have generated the abstract model that I proposed to call the 
anonymous city. Producing increasingly anonymous conditions, modernity 
has been thoroughly defined in terms of explicitation and in terms of this 
movement identified by Peter Sloterdijk as one that has made our relation to 
our environmental conditions of existence always more explicit.212 From this 
standpoint, it has been argued that Rem Koolhaas’ work on the generic 
should not be seen to be defining a standard model. On the contrary, it has 
been shown that this work was part of a broader discussion about 
conceptions that have run throughout the entire modern history of 
                                            
211 Although this chapter starts by going through relevant historical and geographical facts 
about Lagos, it does not constitute a study of Lagos as such, but rather an analysis of 
Koolhaas’ research project on this city. Considering that Koolhaas did not abandon the idea 
of publishing a book about Lagos despite it being continuously delayed, it has however been 
impossible for the moment to access other material than what has been already published. 
Focusing on this published material, this chapter also explores the many reactions, 
comments, and articles that have since then been published. Mostly critical, these accounts 
provided elements to which Koolhaas’ approach can be contrasted. This chapter does not 
merely put Koolhaas’ account in the context of these critiques. Rather it goes through them 
in order to further pursue and develop the claims made in this thesis. See Rem Koolhaas and 
Bregtje van der Haak. Lagos Wide and Close: An Interactive Journey into an Exploding City, 
The Netherlands: Submarine DVD, 2006; Idem. Koolhaas/Lagos, The Netherlands: Pieter van 
Huystee Film, 2003; Koolhaas. “Fragments of a lecture on Lagos” (2002), in Okwui Enwezor 
and al. (eds.), Under siege: Four African cities. Freetown, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lagos, 
Dokumenta 11_Platform 4, Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002: 173-184; Koolhaas and al. 
Op cit., 2000.   
212 Peter Sloterdijk. Op cit., [2003] 2005.  
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architecture. Ultimately unfolding in architecture’s relation to urban space 
and the city, this discussion essentially concerns relations between the 
different and the same, the particular and the universal. I have shown that 
this discussion addressed crucial questions about planning and complexity. 
Notably discussing architecture’s normative disposition in terms of 
modularity, I have shown that the problem of knowing the degree of 
complexity that architecture is able to accommodate may in fact constitute 
the most tangible diagrammatic question according to which it becomes 
possible to read architecture’s relation to modernity in continuous terms.  
 It is precisely because Koolhaas’ work on the generic addresses these 
questions, because it aims at reframing the articulation between the different 
and the same, that it can be seen as a decisive contribution to the analysis of 
contemporary global urbanisation, and to the definition of new relations 
between architecture and the city. From this standpoint, I argue that 
Koolhaas’ Lagos project is the best example to further explore this question, 
and to disconnect the question of the generic from that of determining the 
most or least generic city. Choosing to discuss Lagos has nothing to do with 
its being generic or not. Rather it is precisely because Lagos appears 
immediately far less standardised than many other cities that it is an 
interesting situation to explore the generic in terms of relations between the 
different and the same, in terms of a principle of organisation, rather than in 
terms of a fixed set of qualities and attributes. This follows what has been 
previously said about the move from typology to topology. What is important 
is the logic of transformation, and not the model that is replicated.  
 The complex and marginal relation that Lagos entertains with 
modernity is another reason to focus on Lagos. Having been subjected to a 
series of modernisation failures, Lagos displays conditions that are 
paradigmatic of the analysis of global urbanisation and the Anthropocene. 
The anonymous city here further contrasts with the homogeneous metropolis 
imagined by modernists architects, but not because it would not have yet 
been affected by good modernist plans. Lagos rather appears to display 
conditions that, following Latour, can be seen as the unconscious of the 
Moderns. Not the chaotic conditions they wanted to suppress through 
 135 
standardisation, but that which standardisation produced along the forces it 
could not contain. The actual organisation of Lagos shows ways in which 
modernisation’s failures have been systematically reappropriated, deviated 
and subverted from their initial programme, and this following dynamics and 
functions that modernisation plans precisely aimed at suppressing. Far from 
representing past conditions from which modernity would have emancipated 
the West, Koolhaas argues that Lagos may display conditions that modernity 
may be catching up with in the future. I would argue that Lagos does at least 
display conditions that are both paradigmatic of our current Anthropocene 
era, and subjected to generic dynamics that the exceptionality of this city 
may only make more explicit. 
  
 
 
Rem Koolhaas and Edgar Cleijne. Lagos (2000)213 
 
                                            
213 This image is extracted from the collective book Mutations. See Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 
2000.  
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1. Explosive urbanisation  
 
The capital of Nigeria until it was officially moved to Abuja in 1991, Lagos is 
world’s 25th biggest city. With 13 million inhabitants as of a 2013 survey, it 
can be said to be at least the size of London, while dramatically lacking the 
corresponding infrastructures.214 I would argue that this comparison plays an 
important role in Koolhaas’ original, provocative and radical argument 
according to which Lagos is not waiting to become modern, but rather 
represents a highly developed condition to which modernity may lead215 But 
more decisive than these static figures is Lagos’ explosive urban growth. In 
2008, UN Habitat estimated that Lagos had a growth rate of 5,7% per year, 
which roughly means that Lagos was at the time growing by 2000 inhabitants 
per day. Although this explosive growth could appear simply contingent, it 
corresponds to social and economic dynamics that have roots in the long-
term history of Lagos as much as they are determined by present global 
dynamics. The comparison between Lagos and London underlines their 
respective position in relation to contemporary dynamics in the global 
economy and geopolitics, but it also points to the long colonial history that 
links the two cities. Koolhaas has been criticised repeatedly for not 
accounting for the historical, social, political and economical causes of what 
he seems simply to analyse in terms of formal order and morphological 
complexity. I would like to start this chapter by actually addressing Lagos’ 
history, in order to decipher some of the dynamics that may be at play in 
shaping the contemporary conditions that Koolhaas observes in his work. 
Though I draw on Matthew Gandy’s work on Lagos, I do not entirely follow 
his critique of Koolhaas. Gandy mainly argues that Koolhaas’ formal analysis 
eschews historical, social and political dynamics as much as it eschews the 
                                            
214 Source UN Habitat 2013: http://www.devinfo.info/urbaninfo/. This figure contrasts with 
the numbers given by Lagos State’s census of 2006, which only surveyed around 8 million 
inhabitants. Source National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria: http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/. 
But it also largely exceed the figures given by UN Habitat in 2008: 9.5 million inhabitants. 
Source Lurg.org, Lagos Urban Research Group: 
http://lurgnetwork.wordpress.com/category/lagos-facts/ 
215 This is the main argument developed by Koolhaas about Lagos. See notably the 
introduction to the film Koolhaas/Lagos, Koolhaas and van der Haak. Op cit., 2003; and 
Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2000.  
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actual practices that shape the city. Seeking at once to expand, radicalise and 
divert some of Koolhaas’ proposals, this chapter does not oppose his project, 
but rather parallels his analyses. Although it explores the reasons why his 
work eschews a certain number of questions, this chapter does not consider 
Koolhaas’ approach to be essentially wrong. Rather it uses his account in 
order to further analyse relations between modernity, the anonymous and 
the generic.  
 
1.1 Lagos and London 
 
The comparison with London appears especially interesting as an approach 
to Lagos and Koolhaas’ contention that the West that is catching up with 
Lagos rather than the contrary. Exemplifying the condition of the modern 
Western metropolis, London combines a high density of people with a high 
density of efficient infrastructures. Lagos on the contrary combines an 
extremely high density of population with an extreme lack of infrastructures. 
The administrative limits of the city of Lagos define an area of approximately 
1,000 km2. According to UN Habitat statistics, this stands for a population 
density of approximately 13,000 inhabitants/km2. Although this does not 
place Lagos amongst the most dense cities in the world (e.g. Manila, the 
most dense city in the world with 43,000 inhabitants/km2, or Delhi with 
almost 30,000), it makes it far more dense than London which, according to 
the OECD has 1,608 inhabitants/km2. Due to the largely informal 
development of Lagos, these figures do not account for the high disparities 
between the upper class housing zones and the large slums that host the 
majority of the population. While London manages this density through a 
dense meshing of formal infrastructures — from transport systems to energy 
networks, political organisations, and the omnipresence of signs and voice 
messages telling the population how to circulate, how to behave and what to 
do when in the train or in the tube’s corridors —, Lagos seems to rely 
essentially on direct and informal interactions between people. Following 
Abdou Maliq Simone, in Lagos as in Johannesburg, people are 
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infrastructures.216 I would indeed argue that this accounts for the negative 
image of infrastructures according to Latour: considering the increased role 
played in most Western cities by formal, informational and mechanical 
infrastructures, Latour has often argued that these infrastructures perform 
actions that were before or would otherwise be performed by humans.217 
While Saskia Sassen considered London to be one of the best examples of 
what she called global cities (i.e. cities indexing capitalist globalisation as 
major financial centres, communication hubs, centres of information, and 
places where social, economical and cultural disparities are the greatest), 
Lagos seems indeed rather paradigmatic of cities of the global south: 
uncontrolled and explosive growth of population, massive corruption, 
exploitation of natural resources by foreign companies whose investments 
and profits fly over the heads of the majority of this population, 
concentration of rich areas in few small and well protected residential 
locations with slums expanding in every direction. GDP alone speaks for the 
great disparities between the two cities: Lagos’ GDP in 2010 was said to be 
80 billion USD, while in 2008, London’s was 560 billion USD.218 This very 
general comparison between London and Lagos reinforces the idea that 
Lagos indeed represents a condition totally alien to Western modernity. But it 
may at least be argued that, while Koolhaas provocatively reverses this idea 
by arguing that it may not be Lagos that is catching up with modern Western 
cities like London and Los Angeles, but rather London and Los Angeles that 
may be catching up with Lagos, Lagos’ deterioration has been proportional to 
the development and accumulation of capital in these Western cities.219  
 
 
 
 
                                            
216 See notably Abdou Maliq Simone. For The City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four 
Cities, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004; Idem. “People as Infrastructure: Intersecting 
Fragments in Johannesburg”, in Public Culture, 16(3), 2004: 407-429.  
217 See notably Latour and Hermant. Op cit., 1998.  
218 Source: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=48227 
219 See notably Matthew Gandy. “Learning From Lagos”, in New Left Review #33, May-June 
2005: 37-52.  
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1.2 Colonial past 
 
The colonial history of Nigeria provides unavoidable evidence with which to 
understand Lagos’ present situation. Situated on the northern shore of the 
Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, Lagos developed from the island principality of 
Oko, initially populated by Yoruba fishermen and farmers. From the sixteenth 
century on, the Portuguese progressively transformed it into a busy slave-
trade centre. The British took over the city in 1861, but is only after the 1884 
Berlin conference conferred the protectorate of the region to Britain and the 
military expeditions conducted by Frederick Lugard, that the unified colony 
of Nigeria was created in 1914. Whereas the colonial administrator preferred 
the hierarchic structures of the Muslim emirs in the inland North to the more 
decentralized Yoruba power structures of the coastal South to enforce 
indirect colonial rule, the capital was nevertheless established in Lagos. 
Despite many debates, Lagos remained Nigeria’s capital until it was 
definitively moved to Abuja in 1991. This largely explains the great 
disjunction there has always been between the colonial elites and the African 
majority. The explosion of immigration to the capital notably due to the 
ecological disaster provoked by the exploitation of oil in the Niger delta — 
notably by the Dutch company Shell — only made this worse. In Gandy’s 
words, “European villas with wide verandas and sweeping gardens (contrast) 
with the growing congestion of the ‘African quarter’, while the advanced gas, 
electricity and street lighting of the high-class commercial and residential 
districts compared favourably with the colonials’ homelands”.220 Although 
this colonial partition is quite common to major African cities, the explosive 
growth to which Lagos has been subjected since the sixties seem to have 
pushed this logic to extremes. The sanitary crisis provoked by an epidemic of 
plague provoked a reaction from the colonial administration which, after 
years of relative indifference to the poor areas, decided to create the Lagos 
Executive Development Board in the 1920s. By the 1950s, the Board had 
however become more interested in land speculation than in infrastructural 
improvements in water supply, drainage, sanitation and housing for the 
                                            
220 Gandy. Op cit., 2005: 43 
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majority of the population. The independence of Nigeria does not seem to 
have changed the situation. Gandy argues that the optimism that 
characterised Independence era Nigeria did not mask for long these latent 
and continuous economic and political tensions.221 
 
 
 
 
Koolhaas and van der Haak. Lagos wide and close (2006) 
 
1.3 Beauty and the beast 
 
Despite these endemic problems and tensions, Lagos has since then been 
repeatedly presented as the jewel of African economical development. Very 
much like its South African counterpart Johannesburg, Lagos is considered to 
be not only one of the main economical driving forces of the continent, but 
also an important cultural centre where Africa seems to be propelled into 
                                            
221 “Fast growth in conjunction with minimum social investment led to overcrowding, 
exorbitant rents and arduous commuting distances, worsened by a gradual deterioration in 
rail, tram and ferry services. A critical trend was the growing dislocation between 
employment opportunities and the availability of affordable housing. By the mid-1960s land 
values in central Lagos neared those of similarly sized United States cities and the little 
space available for development was consistently allocated to elite low-density 
developments, in a continuation of colonial housing policies. The new ruling class and their 
generally Western-educated architects, engineers and planners favoured prestige projects 
that could attest to their vision of African modernity; Lagos soon boasted one of the 
continent’s first skyscrapers”. Gandy. Op cit., 2005: 44. 
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modernity.222 Unlike Johannesburg, which hosted the Football World Cup in 
2010, Lagos has not yet hosted a major international event. But the emphatic 
claims that surround the construction of Eko Atlantic City, Lagos’ new 
financial and leisure district, suggest with confidence that Lagos could soon 
become another global city.223  
 Built on land reclaimed from the Atlantic Ocean right at the entrance of 
Lagos’ bay, the Eko Atlantic City is envisioned by both the Lagos State 
government and its private associate in the project South Energyx as the 
African city of the 21st-century. The project recalls the situation that 
prevailed in the years when Lagos saw its first skyscrapers emerging on 
theskyline. While most of the city continues to struggle with the endemic lack 
and failure of basic urban infrastructures, the promoters of the project, both 
public and private, argue that the new city — since the project is not called 
the Eko Atlantic District but the Eko Atlantic City — will “combine space for 
residential, commercial, financial and tourist development.”224 While the city 
struggles to fulfil basic infrastructural needs that the state is too indebted to 
guarantee, the same state is however one of the main funding agents of what 
literally appears to be an urban transplant. This gigantic project is designed 
to spread over 10 km2 of an artificial island extending Lagos’ boundaries 
over the ocean. Discussed with Chinese and Dutch experts, it started in 
2003. The main contractors are China Communications Construction Group, 
a global company specialised in dredging and landfill operations, and the 
Chagoury Group, one of the largest conglomerates in Africa. South Energyx is 
a subsidiary of the Chagoury group. Created specifically for this project, in 
2006 it was awarded the concession to supervise land reclamation, develop 
infrastructure and “act as the exclusive authority over the development of 
Eko Atlantic” after completion in 2015.225 While it is expected to act as a 
global catalyser and attract investments capable of transforming Lagos into 
                                            
222 See notably Sarah Nuttall and Achille Mbembe (eds.). Johannesburg: The Elusive 
Metropolis, Duke University Press, 2008; and Enwezor. Op cit., 2002.  
223 This according to the definition given by Saskia Sassen. See Sassen. Op cit., 2001.   
224See on the official website for the promotion of the Eko Atlantic City: 
http://www.ekoatlantic.com/press-pr/south-energyx-eyes-londons-partnership-for-eko-
atlantic-project/ 
225 http://www.ekoatlantic.com/media/timeline 
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“the new financial epicentre of West Africa by the year 2020”226, the Eko 
Atlantic City is also designed to protect Lagos’ littoral from erosion and 
flooding. Made of concrete blocks designed in the form of X’s, the Great Wall 
of Lagos will enclose the new artificial island and protect the bay over more 
than 8 km. The Clinton Global Initiative recognised Eko Atlantic as: “An 
environmentally conscious city, built with nature to restore an original 
coastline and to protect Victoria Island, Lagos, from the severe risk of ocean 
surge and flooding...”.227 But it seems quite difficult to argue that this 
transplant from Dubai, designed according to standard plans and schema 
that have nothing to do with Lagos’ general situation and problems, will 
restore, in harmony with nature, the original coastline of Lagos. Despite the 
fact that it may prevent the bay from future surge and flooding, this project 
is nothing else than a standard product designed to attract capital and 
generate investments that are not likely to benefit the city in general.  
 This project perfectly depicts the 1960s situation Gandy describes. The 
fact that the last elections appeared to be the most transparent the country 
has ever known does not seem to have truly inverted the structural 
tendencies that have determined Lagos’ explosive and uncontrolled growth 
since then. While in the 1970s, old working-class areas were taken down to 
make way for the many bridges, viaducts, and flyovers that were needed for 
the development of the oil industry, the money that this generated never 
really benefited the population that were first affected by these major 
transformations. The combination of the successive military dictatorships 
that have ruled the country since 1966 and of the later policies of structural 
adjustment conducted under the tutelage of the IMF — from the slashing  of 
tariffs and agricultural subsidie to, devaluing the naira, stripping out what 
remained of public education provision, deregulating finance, selling off 
state-owned industries and indulging in narco-profiteering on a massive 
scale — have profoundly exhausted both the country and the landscape. The 
Eko Atlantic City may now appear as a sign of Lagos’ dynamism and 
economic growth. But its proximity with the floating slum of Makoko also 
                                            
226 http://www.chagourygroup.com/real-estate/eko-atlantic/ 
227 Idem.  
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reveals that these structural divides are even more critical than they used to 
be.  
 Faithful to the performative power of spectacular figures, Koolhaas 
repeatedly refers to Lagos’ projected population numbers to argue that: 
“Every hour, more than 50 people start their new lives in the African city of 
Lagos”.228 But these figures mask crueler facts. Joseph Godlewski argues that 
between 1975 and 2000, Nigeria earned almost $250 billion in oil revenues. 
Yet during the same period the average income declined by more than 15 
percent, while the number of people living with less a dollar a day more than 
quadrupled.229 This reality can also be read in the urban landscape, where the 
dilapidated structures that were built to support the oil boom “(…) now 
encircle much of the inner core of the city, casting their shadows across the 
shacks and stalls that have colonized every available space”.230 The 
systematic exploitation of oil resources by dictating elites facilitating the 
profit made by international companies that were exempted from any social 
engagement generated “an extreme income polarization, hyperinflation, 
currency collapse and rising poverty and unemployment, as industrial and 
agricultural exports were devastated by the overvalued naira” — Nigeria’s 
national currency.231 Lagos’ situation was made even worse by the decision to 
move the capital to Abuja. Wanting to get closer to their domestic base in the 
North of the country, the military oligarchs diverted many crucial investments 
Lagos needed in order to build their own shining city in Abuja. Due to this 
strategic move and to Nigeria’s growing debts most of the infrastructure 
programmes planned in the 1970s — from the port and airport to roads, 
bridges, oil refineries and steel mills — were abandoned incomplete or left 
deteriorated beyond possible repair.  
 According to Gandy, “Lagos provides ample evidence for Mike Davis’s 
contention that rapid urban growth in the context of structural adjustment, 
currency devaluation and state retrenchment has been a ‘recipe for the mass 
                                            
228 See Koolhaas’ introductory remarks to the first film the project produced about Lagos. 
Koolhaas and van der Haak. Op cit., 2003.  
229 Joseph Godlewski. “Alien and Distant: Rem Koolhaas on Film in Lagos, Nigeria”, in 
Traditional Dwelling and Settlement Review, Vol. 21 # 2, 2010: 16.  
230 Gandy. Op cit., 2005: 45 
231 Gandy. Op cit., 2005: 46 
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production of slums’”.232 The contrast is sharp between the Eko Atlantic City 
and what makes up the majority of Lagos’ built space. Gandy argues that 
fewer than 5% of Lagos households are directly connected to the municipal 
water supply. The majority are left to illegal connections controlled by 
various gangs, private vendors and other informal installations. Waste water 
traverses the city in open drains while general waste accumulates in massive 
dumps where many people earn their living by collecting, selecting and 
selling recyclable materials. The electric system is known to be unreliable, 
and most of the people rely on private generators to supply most of the 
power. “Kerosene lamps light the shelters and market stalls where the blare 
of music contends with the generators’ roar” Gandy writes; “(…) Most of the 
public street lights were stolen or destroyed years ago and at night the 
streets are eerily deserted, enveloped in darkness, save where illuminated 
billboards cast a faint glow across unmarked intersections, scattered with the 
debris of old car crashes.”233 The Eko Atlantic City provides a good example 
— and may be an intensification — of the way these harsh conditions coexist 
with much wealthier parts of the city. These historically colonial quarters 
have largely been turned into gated communities which, guarded by private 
companies, are almost militarily protected from their surroundings. Nigerian 
architect and anthropologist Tunde Agboda speaks about an architecture of 
fear.234 Close to the apparatuses that were used in South Africa during the 
apartheid but also sometimes like the strategies used by the Israeli army in 
Jerusalem and other occupied territories,235 Agboda describes a generalised 
distribution of defensive devices turning Lagos into a highly segregated city 
in which the marks and material manifestations of seclusion are heavily 
present. From high walls and various other types of fences to barbed wire 
and piled glass put on top of the walls surrounding individual properties or 
larger residential areas, an entire repertoire of defensive and almost military 
                                            
232 Mike Davis, ‘Planet of Slums’, in New Left Review # 26, March–April 2004:10–11 ; Gandy. 
Op cit., 2005: 49.  
233 Gandy. Op cit., 2005: 52. 
234 Tunde Agboda. Architecture of Fear: Urban Design and Construction Response to Urban 
Violence in Lagos, Nigeria, Paris: IFRA, 1997.  
235 Michal Givoni Sari Hanafi and Adi Ophir (eds.). The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy 
of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, London: Zone Books, 2009.   
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architecture reinforces the strong historical division between low to medium 
density areas and the compact and anarchic slums that seem to extend 
continuously.236  
 
 
 
Aerial view of Makoko. DR (2004) 
 
 Compared to this reality, the project of the Eko Atlantic City and its 
promise of an African Modernity that will attract foreign investors and 
connect Lagos to the expanding lines of global financial capitalism seems to 
belong to a very different world. It seems however possible to argue that 
what it promises is not so different from what the big infrastructural 
developments supporting the oil boom were promising in the 1970s. 
Considering what happened then and the similar type of political and 
economical assemblages on which this project is based, it seems possible to 
imagine a similar scenario. Benefiting the oligarchs in charge of the country, 
foreign investors, international companies, and a few privileged Africans, this 
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project could very well increase the debt and political disengagement of the 
State from its responsibilities towards the majority of the population. It 
seems thus possible to imagine that what appears now as the promise of a 
shining future for the city will end up like those heavy infrastructures that, 
abandoned incomplete or left deteriorated beyond any possibility of repair or 
even destruction, make up Lagos’ present dystopian landscape.237  
 
2. Koolhaas in Lagos 
 
This speculative scenario shares much with Koolhaas’ radical and provocative 
hypothesis. As he has stated, Koolhaas was driven to Lagos by a will to 
understand a city that was probably amongst those to change the fastest in 
the world. His main contention, however, is that, far from representing 
conditions en route to entering modernity, Lagos presents conditions that 
modernity may on the contrary only be catching up with:   
 
 “We are resisting the notion that Lagos represents an African city en route to 
becoming modern… Rather, we think it possible to argue that Lagos represents a 
developed, extreme, paradigmatic case-study of a city at the forefront of 
globalizing modernity”238  
 
Contrary to the common idea that African cities may only be catching up with 
modernity, Koolhaas quite radically suggests that Lagos may on the contrary 
represent the future of modernity. Connected to this hypothesis is the 
argument, implicitly running throughout the study, that Lagos’ apparently 
undecipherable chaos in fact produces forms of organisation that we may 
learn from. Central to his discussion of the opposition between architecture 
and urban complexity, the concept of the generic is not explicitly brought to 
the fore here. But I would argue that it nevertheless runs throughout his 
entire account and renders his analysis of the generic more complex. No 
longer attached to the relation it entertains with Modern forms of 
                                            
237 See Gandy. Op cit., 2005: 45-46) 
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standardisation, no longer attached to these highly ordered and formalised 
cities that lead him to the model of the generic city, his analysis of Lagos 
rather looks at the qualities of informal and vernacular forms of urbanism 
that, though unplanned, are nevertheless not less generic. Not less generic 
here essentially means two things: on the one hand it means that, although 
highly diverse and heterogeneous, urban dynamics and morphological 
organisations appear in Lagos to be also highly repetitive, relatively 
homogeneous, and determined by more structural rules; on the other hand, 
it means that although highly specific and contextual, the problems that 
Lagos copes with and the particular solutions it has recourse to appear to be 
much more paradigmatic.  
 
2.1 Stardust Lagos 
 
While Koolhaas has not given up the ambition of publishing a whole book on 
Lagos, this project has been continuously delayed, and it is at the moment 
only through fragmentary publications, lectures, and two films, that it is 
possible to account for what this project has produced. The first results have 
been published along with other cases studied by the Harvard Project on the 
City in the collective book Mutations (2000).239 This publication consists in a 
short text written by Koolhaas, which accompanies the aerial photographs 
taken by Edgar Cleijne. The project has also been part of the international art 
exhibition Documenta 11 (2002), in Kassel. Koolhaas gave lectures both in 
Lagos and Kassel, leading to a publication in the book edited for the occasion 
by the Nigerian curator Okwui Enwezor.240 Further evidence of the work done 
on Lagos can be found in the two films made by Dutch film director Bregtje 
van der Haak: Koolhaas/Lagos (2002) and Lagos: Wide and Close. An 
Interactive Journey into an Exploding City (2005). Although they remain quite 
fragmentary compared to the other studies that have been published on their 
own by the Harvard Project on the City, these different works provide an 
interesting basis on which to engage with Koolhaas’ work on Lagos.  
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 These fragmentary accounts have triggered a lot of interest around 
Lagos, but they have also been subject to various criticisms. Although 
Koolhaas’ project is not isolated, it can be argued that it is notably due to his 
project that the city has recently received much more attention.  Replacing 
this project in the context of the growing attention that has been paid to 
Lagos in particular and to African cities in general, Gandy has notably shown 
that it did not “(…) (come) so much from development specialists or Africa 
scholars but from a high-profile convergence of architectural and cultural 
theory and critical urban studies, often focused around major international 
art exhibitions”.241 Emphasising the active role that both Enwezor and 
Koolhaas played in this process, Gandy further argued that this growing 
interest should not mask divergent approaches and interpretations. Gandy 
distinguishes between two dominant approaches. The first is “an 
eschatological evocation of urban apocalypse” that presents Lagos as a giant 
chaos dominated by poverty, violence, disease, political corruption, 
uncontrollable growth and manic religiosity.242 This perspective often 
reinforces the sense that it represents the great dystopian other of 
globalisation. Lagos appears to be a nightmare heavily contrasting with 
Western dreamlands, where informality means crime, and where the 
combination of political corruption and a dramatic lack of infrastructure 
constantly threatens the city’s total collapse.243 Despite sharing the same first 
observations, the second privileged approach sharply contrasts with this 
perspective. This is notably the case of Koolhaas who, as mentioned before, 
radically reverses this argument. According to him, the chaotic dimension of 
Lagos’ development only highlights “the homeostatic complexity of newly 
evolving socioeconomic structures, with the city conceived as a series of self-
regulatory systems”.244 Lagos’ chaotic organisation is no longer seen to be 
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abnormal. Rather it may prefigure another model, completely ignored by the 
standards prevailing in Western modernity.  
 
2.2 Change 
 
The first thing that drove Koolhaas to Lagos is the question of change. Part 
of the research programme he conducted at Harvard Design School between 
1996 and 2001, the Lagos project unfolds according to the claim that the city 
has not only changed significantly, but continues to do so at an incredible 
speed.245  
 Lagos appeared to Koolhaas as a possible manifestation of radical 21st-
century urbanism.246 This may seem too provocative to be considered 
seriously. But I would argue that it is precisely this kind of provocative 
argument that makes Koolhaas’ account so interesting and worth studying. 
This argument is not an apology of the apocalyptical scenario to which 
modernity would necessarily bound. Koolhaas does not announce 
modernity’s premonitory funerals, but rather explores in Lagos conditions 
that can be read symptomatically. Lagos is a symptom of global urbanisation. 
Koolhaas adds the idea that the solutions invented there every day to cope 
with this situation may not only work, but may  address challenging 
questions to architecture and more formally modernised cities. The 
important aspect that Koolhaas emphasises again concerns the problem of 
architecture’s relation to urban complexity, and challenges the idea that the 
chaotic is necessarily opposed to harmonious order. Lagos indeed shows that 
order is not necessarily harmonious, and that discovering homogeneous and 
simple rules of organisation does not necessarily mean deterministic 
planning. Constant change also produces certain forms of order, which may 
not be obvious, but may be more implicit. However, it is possible to decipher 
them: what appears at first complete chaos, the dystopian result of an history 
marked by military dictatorship, natural disasters, economic crisis, explosive 
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246 See Koolhaas and van der Haak. Op cit., 2006; Koolhaas. Op cit., 2002; Koolhaas and al. 
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growth and heavy debts, nevertheless produces (alternative) regimes of 
order. This is notably how Tim Hecker describes Koolhaas’ project:  “In 
essence, Lagos appeared to be the epitome of disorder on a massive scale, 
but (Koolhaas) wanted to examine what regimes of order lurked beneath a 
veneer of urban chaos”.247 Koolhaas contends that behind apparent chaos 
and dysfunction lies something in fact highly ordered, even systemic, 
something that works. Insisting on emergent properties, he argues that 
Lagos is in fact at once a dystopian manifestation of the possible future of 
Western cities and a manifestation of radical 21st-century urbanism, a radical 
manifestation of (non-Western) modernity.  
 Criticised by different scholars for being superficial and for eschewing 
real forces at play in this city, Koolhaas’ approach nevertheless provides an 
interesting lead concerning the transformation of this relation between 
architecture and the city that, despite having been solved by modernism in 
terms of standardisation, seems to have then simply been rejected by a 
postmodernist valorisation of complexity as sheer (and subjective) diversity. 
Although Koolhaas’ argument here seems indeed to share much with the way 
postmodernism repeatedly praised differences, contradictions, complexities, 
diversity and, in brief, everything that was supposed to reassess 
architecture’s normative relation to the built environment, I would argue that 
his attempt to understand the implicit order lying underneath Lagos’ urban 
chaos is what needs to be further developed. Koolhaas seems to have derived 
this idea from the aerial visit he made on board the Nigerian president’s 
helicopter, but I would argue that a more careful exploration is necessary, 
namely through a methodology of topological navigation.  
 
2.3 Order from the air 
 
Faithful to his more general approach to changing situations, Koolhaas’ 
method is one of cold observation, limiting subjective judgement and 
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emphasising function.248 Cultural theorist Frederic Jameson argues that 
Koolhaas’ aim is to “explore a new reality”, not to come up with solutions.249 
But while Jameson eventually suggests that this method could prove to 
trigger new critical possibilities and strategies, many authors argue on the 
contrary that this “amnesty of the existent” cannot but ultimately be 
complicit with the forces shaping the reality Koolhaas observes.250 
 Hecker argues that Koolhaas’ attempt “(…) to show Lagos as rational 
and organised instead of a city of apocalyptic chaos” is largely undermined 
by his rhetorical argument according to which Lagos must be first presented 
“(…) as a mirage of disorder, chaos, unbelievable population density, and an 
apparent breakdown of conventional forms of infrastructure” in order to be 
then almost magically “recovered as an icon of human ingenuity” providing 
more paradigmatic solutions.251 Following Hecker, it can indeed be argued 
that this reversal of chaos into systematic order is actually bound to the 
aerial perspective Koolhaas and his collaborating photographer took from the 
presidential helicopter. Koolhaas indeed approached the city following three 
main steps. The first time, Koolhaas recalls that, out of fear and intimidation, 
they merely visited Lagos by car, without adventuring further into the city’s 
violent atmosphere:   
 
 “Our initial engagement with the city was from a mobile position. Partly out of 
fear, we stayed in the car. That meant, in essence, that we were preoccupied with 
the foreground . . . Lagos seemed to be a city of burning edges. Hills, entire roads 
were paralleled with burning embankments. At first sight, the city had an aura of 
apocalyptic violence; entire sections of it seemed to be smouldering, as if it were 
one gigantic rubbish dump.”252 
 
This first visit does not mention the order later analysed by Koolhaas. 
According to the perspective allowed by the moving car, they were only able 
                                            
248 Jencks. Op cit., 2002: 180. 
249 Frederic Jameson, “The Future City”, in New Left Review # 21, May–June 2003: 66.  
250 Rem Koolhaas. « Changements de dimensions », interview with Jean-François Chevrier 
(1998), in L’architecture aujourd’hui, n°361, November-December 2005.  
251 Hecker. Op cit., 2010: 264.  
252 Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2000: 652. 
 152 
to make superficial observations in keeping with “the eschatological 
evocation of urban apocalypse” that Gandy identifies in other accounts. On 
their second visit, they left their cars. And while this seemed to largely 
confirm their first observations, it nevertheless allowed them to refine their 
account, and to begin to understand the more complex processes that were 
taking place in this “gigantic rubbish dump”:  
 
 “On a later visit, ‘we ventured out of our cars’ and discovered that there were 
in fact ‘a number of very elaborate organizational networks’ at work on the garbage 
heaps: The activity taking place was actually not a process of dumping, but more a 
process of sorting, dismantling, reassembling and potentially recycling. Underneath 
the viaducts there was a continuous effort to transform discarded garbage.”253 
 
But it is only during their third visit, which this time, took the form of a flight 
over the city in the Nigerian president’s personal helicopter, that Koolhaas 
truly started to speak about systemic order:  
 
 “Finally, on the third visit, ‘we were able to rent the helicopter of the 
President’. This allowed the team to swoop in comfort over the city’s slums, 
marvelling at the swarm of human activity below: From the air, the apparently 
burning garbage heap turned out to be, in fact, a village, an urban phenomenon 
with a highly organized community living on its crust . . . What seemed, at ground 
level, an accumulation of dysfunctional movements, seemed from above an 
impressive performance, evidence of how well Lagos might perform if it were the 
third largest city in the world.”254 
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Koolhaas and Cleijne. Oshodi Market, Lagos (2000) 
 
Comparing this aerial account to the famous argument made by Le Corbusier 
after he flew over Rio de Janeiro, Hecker argues that this observed order is 
actually illusory, generated by a panoramic perspective that can only escape 
and misunderstand the concrete practices that shape this reality. Arguing 
that these photographs adopt a low-oblique perspective that eschews the 
horizon and magnifies the infinite forms of Lagos’ urban sprawl, Hecker 
strongly opposes Le Corbusier’s famous sentence according to which “the 
airplane indicts the city”.255 For Hecker, this only reproduces the modernist 
illusion of order and harmony, and eludes political and economical dynamics. 
Koolhaas’ contention that Lagos provides evidence of an homeostatic 
morphological system generated from the chaotic aggregation of many 
competing and contradictory individual practices is only an illusion produced 
by aerial sublimation. Although the second film produced as part of 
Koolhaas’ project is designed to bring together and to allow navigation 
between these different levels of analysis, it is again the aerial gaze, floating 
above the entire city and capturing it in a few series of strong and bold 
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affirmations that dominates. The film allow the viewer to choose between two 
different points of view: a close, mostly pedestrian, and a wide perspective, 
made largely of aerial footage taken from the helicopter; and between three 
different soundtracks: interviews with Lagos’ inhabitants, sounds of the city, 
or Koolhaas’ comments. Godlewski connects this to the distinction Michel de 
Certeau used to make between the “walking city” and the “panorama-city”. 
While de Certeau defined the walking city as that reality that is experienced 
from the ground, at the same level and speed as its inhabitants, he defined 
“the panorama-city [as] a ‘theoretical’ (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a 
picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and misunderstanding 
of practices. . . .”256 Following this, Godlewski argues that Koolhaas’ 
arguments are ultimately nothing more than “panoramic speculations” which, 
much like the aerial musing of his collaborating photographer, “commit the 
same ‘misunderstandings of practices’”.”257 
 The general critique is that Koolhaas’ speculations are essentially 
oblivious to the historical and political complex causalities that underpin 
Lagos’ chaotic reality. Not only omitting these dimensions, his analyses have 
also been criticised for ultimately imposing a systemic and harmonious 
fantasy on this reality. This is notably significant in Gandy’s account, 
“Learning from Lagos”.258 Having produced the most thorough and probably 
harshest critique of Koolhaas’ research project, Gandy argues that Koolhaas’ 
neo-organicist position is ultimately linked and limited to the flawed 
celebration of what exists. Comparing Koolhaas’ assertions to the classic 
organicist texts of urban discourse, Gandy argues that whereas the latter 
used to metaphorically mobilise concepts and theories from biology to 
explain urban dynamics in the terms of the alimentary, breathing and 
nervous systems, Koolhaas relies on cybernetic metaphors to contend that 
urban space actually expands and transforms like a self-organising 
multiplicity of horizontal networks.259 This in turn allows him to argue that 
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the functioning of Lagos, seen from above in more systemic and ordered 
way, “illustrates the large-scale efficacy of systems and agents” considered 
informal or illegal, and the fact that its survival strategy “might be better 
understood as a form of collective research, conducted by a team of eight-
to-twenty-five million”.260 According to Gandy, this cybernetic metaphor only 
reinforces the contention that the micro dynamics that organise Lagos’ 
informal economic life are those that ultimately allow Koolhaas to argue that 
Lagos is a city that works, and where violence, poverty, and chaos, can be 
turned into forms of ingenuity generating both opportunism and optimism. 
Most of Koolhaas’ arguments are indeed grounded in his observations of all 
these markets and economical sites of exchange that flourish everywhere 
and contaminate every available space — from traffic jams and decayed 
infrastructures to rubbish dumps and the ocean. All of Koolhaas’ pubished 
accounts indeed emphasise informal economy as being the indicator that, 
although it does not function the way most Western cities do, Lagos is a city 
that works. For Koolhaas, Lagos’ informal economy is not only proof that the 
city works, but it proves we may have a lot to learn from this city, and it may 
even be an interesting model of radical urbanism for the century to come. 
Again, the most evident critique is that this completely eschews the political 
and historical realities that have precipitated and that maintain this city in the 
chaotic and violent state in which it is. As Gandy writes: “The informal 
economy of poverty celebrated by the Harvard team is the result of a specific 
set of policies pursued by Nigeria’s military dictatorships over the last 
decades Under IMF and World Bank guidance, which decimated the 
metropolitan economy.”261 The problem with Koolhaas account is that, while 
it does try to understand according to which simple rules and redundant 
principles such a chaotic city as Lagos is organised, his panoramic answer 
merges with an account of individual behaviours that seems indeed to mirror 
the work of economists such as Hernando de Soto and Coimbatore 
Krishnarao Prahalad who, following neoliberal doctrines, see the informal 
economy to be the outcome of micro entrepreneurs using their inventive and 
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individual creativity. In their analyses, they quite fantastically reconceptualise 
the notion of the urban poor.262 
 
 
 
Recycling in Lagos Dump. Credit: Boellstiftung.263 
 
 Koolhaas’ provocative argument about Lagos’ relation to global 
modernisation seems indeed tainted by a hasty sense of homeostatic order, 
and by the contention that the ability to sustain and encourage market 
relations is the main function that a city can perform.264 This is more 
problematic with Lagos, where this fantasy of individual entrepreneurship is 
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pasted on behaviours which, despite displaying ingenuity and courage, are 
nevertheless merely dictated by survival in conditions under which Koolhaas 
would surely not want to live for five seconds’ time. This articulation between 
an order that only emerges once one looks from a distance, and the 
explanation of this emergence in terms of chaotic but vivid and innovative 
types of informal market relations, may underline another problematic 
articulation in Koolhaas’ work. Except for Jameson, all the authors I have 
mentioned reproach Koolhaas’ distant and functionalist perspective, which  
mainly serves to celebrate the city’s extreme conditions. Gandy writes:  
 
 “In a final passage in Mutations, Koolhaas and his colleagues cite with 
approval Robert Kaplan’s call in The Coming Anarchy for ‘a new round of 
postcolonial ‘exploration’ of West Africa, with ‘different intentions and a more 
intensive methodology’ than those of the 19th century. But what intentions? In the 
19th century, colonial campaigns aimed to impose new forms of power relations; is 
the goal of 21st century exploration nothing more than to celebrate the outcome of 
existing ones?”265 
 
Gandy’s argument seems even more crucial in that it recalls the more general 
critique made of Koolhaas’ work on the generic city. Although it has 
triggered less fully developed reactions than the unpublished Lagos project, 
Koolhaas’ text on the generic city has generally been received in the same 
way. Acclaimed by many for being an original and incisive realist account of 
contemporary global urbanisation, it has been mainly criticised, for the 
almost same reasons, of merely and dangerously celebrating the outcome of 
existing conditions. Before further developing this account of the generic in 
architecture in relation to Lagos, I would like to return, although less 
specifically, to the politics of Koolhaas’ generic.  
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3. The politics of Koolhaas’ generic 
 
Although the Lagos work published so far indeed dramatically lacks political 
and historical accounts, I am hesitant to agree entirely with Gandy’s 
conclusions. Considering that what has been published represents 
hypotheses rather than fully developed work, and considering that when 
entirely published, the other projects conducted by Koolhaas at Harvard 
seem much more convincing to incorporate these dimensions, it may be 
argued that most flaws about the Lagos project are linked to its being 
unfinished, unpublished and provisional. However, this does not prevent us 
from fully engaginng with what has effectively been published. And, as it has 
been shown, from this point of view many critiques seem largely justified. It 
is even more the case of Gandy’s particular critique, for it seems to run 
generally throughout all of Koolhaas’ work. Gandy mainly reproaches 
Koolhaas’ celebration of the existing conditions. I would however argue that, 
although it echoes the way Modernist architects spoke about the industrial 
revolution, celebrating and applying to the city and architecture the 
corresponding logic of standardisation that was structuring the revolution, 
Koolhaas’ work on the generic dimension of architecture in times of global 
urbanisation does not simply celebrate what exists. More so, it corresponds 
to what Jean Francois Chevrier defines in relation to Baudelaire and 
modernity. Recalling the way Foucault saw in Baudelaire an attitude typical of 
modernity, Chevrier argues that Koolhaas presents a similar method which, 
despite echoing in emphatic and heroic terms the present changes and 
transformations, does however not dismiss the possibility of imagining 
alternative and critical scenarios.266 Jameson positions Koolhaas in a similar 
way. Arguing that it may now be easier to imagine the end of the world that 
the end of capitalism, Jameson argues that Koolhaas’ emphatic and realist 
method can indeed point to new critical possibilities. Jameson explains 
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Koolhaas’ strategy by saying that while “(…) someone once said that it (was) 
easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism, 
(it was possible to) now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine 
capitalism by way of the end of the world”.267 Because capitalism seemed to 
have pre-empted any possibility of imagining other futures and utopias, the 
idea of reversing the argument by speculating on the basis of actual 
dystopian situations could indeed lead to another and revived type of critical 
positioning. According to Jameson, Koolhaas’ speculations could in fact be 
considered to be “a sharp edge inserted into the seamless Moebius strip of 
late capitalism”.268 I would argue that Koolhaas’ Lagos project follows a 
difficult and very tenuous path between this, and the possibility for his 
“textual proclamations and visual shock therapy (…)  [to also] encourage a 
laissez-faire logic of self-help.”269 And while in Lagos this may entail greater 
ethical and political problems than in many other situations, I would 
nevertheless contend with Hecker that this method is “(…) as much an 
apolitical ambivalence as [it is] a new type of realist-critical positioning.”270 
 
3.1 Lagos wide and close 
 
When taken generally, the critique of the distant and wide perspective 
adopted by Koolhaas seems to apply to most of his theoretical work. The 
repeated comparison with Le Corbusier is especially interesting in this case. 
Hecker argues that Koolhaas’ aerial perspective only repeats Le Corbusier’s 
idea that “the airplane indicts the city”. This, he contends, generates illusions 
of order necessarily produced by large-scale analyses. This is a relatively 
simple and well know phenomenon. What on close examination appears 
highly complex and differentiated becomes more ordered and simpler once it 
is apprehended more distantly. Distance eschews the details, erases many 
distinctions, many contradictions, and ultimately generates more coherent 
pictures. It has already been shown that this general critique of all 
                                            
267 Jameson. Op cit., 2003: 76. 
268 Idem.  
269 Hecker. Op cit., 2010: 266. 
270 Idem.  
 160 
encompassing models and distant perspectives can be related to the 
unfolding of post-Modern critique. Echoing the way Venturi repeatedly 
criticised Modern over-simplification and univocal models, these critiques 
also arguably repeat De Certeau’s argument against the panorama-city. 
Opposing concrete historical and social facts to formal morphology and 
systemic abstraction, these critiques ultimately do not seem to do more than 
opposing what de Certeau calls the walking city, the city experienced at 
human scale, perceived in presence, to what he called the panorama-city, 
this abstract and indefinite figure that seems to float anonymously above any 
possible subjective apprehension. As discussed in the introduction of this 
thesis, I would however contend that the conditions that characterise our 
presence in the anthropocene have precisely eroded the foundations on 
which such claims could be made. Having eroded the distinctive opposition 
between subjective interiority and objective exteriority, the anthropocene has 
also completely destroyed any meaningful aspect of opposing the micro and 
macro in terms of absolute position and size.  
 This appears quite significantly in Lagos. Highly complex, vibrant, 
expanding indefinitely and subjected to various transformations and 
morphisms from one area to the other, Lagos does not seem to be arguably 
more adequately decipherable from de Certeau’s close walking perspective 
than it is from more distant positions. Although I would not contend that the 
helicopter is the best way to apprehend the city, and that the aerial views 
produced in Koolhaas’ project are not problematic, I would nevertheless 
argue that the problem is not in abstraction as such. The problem is not in 
the opposition between the close and the wide perspective. The problem 
does not even lie in their articulation. Rather it lies in the fact that they can 
no longer unfold in terms that would associate the close perspective with the 
detailed locality directly available from the ground on the one hand, and the 
wide perspective with the overall explaining context on the other.  
 The paradox is that, while the anthropocenic situation requires 
understanding that these different planes are no longer progressively 
ordered from the smallest to the largest, that they no longer linearly unfold 
from the more complex and chaotic to the more simple and stabilised, they 
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must however be seen to be heterogeneous. For modernist architects, these 
different planes were actually homogeneous. Differing in size, they could 
however be ordered linearly. This characterises Le Corbusier’s approach for 
example. Theoretically inductive, his method was deductive in practice. 
Because induction could work in linear fashion, going from the particular to 
the universal, the universal could be then also applied in linear way. And 
standardisation was the industrial vector allowing this linear application, this 
materialisation of the universal model. The way Koolhaas approached Lagos 
seems to share much with the modernist position. From the mobile car to the 
more immersed state of the walking visit and the comfortable aerial 
contemplation of the city from the presidential helicopter, Koolhaas’ 
argument also goes from the most chaotic to the more systemic. In that 
sense, Koolhaas follows a similar inductive path. The way back however, 
whether it would be question of architectural practice or of further theoretical 
definition, seems much more obscure. The problem is that Koolhaas’ general 
argument about homeostatic order is then applied in the same linear terms. 
Contrary to this, I would argue that this second move, criticised by most of 
the authors I have discussed above, is in fact made impossible by the fact 
that the first movement can no longer be seen in linear terms. The systemic 
order observed by Koolhaas from above does not contain the chaos observed 
on the ground. It is hence not this systemic order that is illusory, but its 
linear relation to the other planes of observation. This is the paradox 
emphasised by the Anthropocene. While modernism’s dialectics were able to 
envision the transcendental and homogeneous integration of planes whose 
heterogeneity could nevertheless unfold according to linear measurements, 
the present problem is to know how it is possible to articulate planes that are 
at once heterogeneous, incommensurable, and nevertheless immanent. I use 
the term incommensurable because their differences no longer unfold in a 
linear fashion. But I also use the term immanent, because it would be illusory 
to think that, because Koolhaas is able to fly concretely over the city, his 
position can be detached from the immanent plane of relations that shape 
Lagos more generally.  
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 I would argue that this is precisely the question that unfolds in 
topological terms. I have shown that, although Latour’s actor-network 
framework allowed for a move away from this pre-established linear account, 
it also more problematically eschewed the question of more systematic 
dynamics. However, topology may give us the necessary tools to invent 
adequate ways of navigating these complex planes. The question bears on 
the continuities between these different planes, about articulations allowing 
the passage from one to the other, to connect one with another, without 
integrating them into either some more general context or some constant 
structure. Despite the modernist residues that lie in Koolhaas’ Lagos work, 
his generic drive towards the understanding of morphological and dynamic 
continuities also address this question in ways that can no longer unfold 
either in absolute chaos and contextual descriptions, or in standard 
explanations.  
 
3.2 Political ambivalence 
 
As it was argued earlier in this thesis, I think that it is this dynamic and 
relatively undetermined dimension in which the generic seems to unfold that 
radically distinguishes it from any notion of standardisation. As it was also 
shown before, the ambivalence remains in Koolhaas’ work. Koolhaas’ interest 
for the generic seems to have unfolded according to a general will to 
understand urban dynamics that no longer corresponded to the traditional 
view of the city. Contending that this traditional view was essentially 
modernist and European, Koolhaas started by looking at different situations. 
First in the United States, with the notable effort he made to understand the 
suburban condition of Atlanta. Then in Asia, where he was particularly 
interested in the incredible speed and scale of changes prompted by 
urbanisation. The explosive development of entire regions, like in the Pearl 
River delta, appeared to him to display a new form of urban condition. New 
continuities appeared between domains that European modernity used to 
understand as being clearly separated. The Harvard Project on the Pearl River 
Delta particularly focused on infrastructures, and the way they were building 
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and organising new forms of landscape that were no longer bound to any 
strict opposition between the natural background and the active organisation 
of urban space, but rather merged natural and built elements in various 
different ways.  
 
 
 
Koolhaas. The generic city (1994)271 
 
 Koolhaas discussed the way differences between cities and between 
different elements and areas within these cities were increasingly radicalised. 
But as it was also argued before, what Koolhaas started calling the city of 
exacerbated differences should not be read against the generic model he 
extrapolated from both Atlanta and Singapore. Far from being the opposite 
of the generic city, the city of exacerbated differences insists on the fact that 
generic continuities are precisely generated by this exacerbation. This is 
what most notably contrasts his position with the postmodernist emphasis 
on the desirability of differences and variations. Contrary to many 
postmodern architects who would see in this proliferation of differences the 
manifestation of some generalised liberation from modern standardisation 
that should be further encouraged, Koolhaas insists on the fact that to 
                                            
271 Image extracted from Koolhaas. Op cit., 1995: 1238.   
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consider contemporary cities in terms of complex systems does not mean 
that they are ultimately irreducible to the production of more generic 
outcomes. While this is indeed substituting another logic for that of 
standardisation, it does not mean that standardisation is no longer operative. 
Far from opposing complexity to the generic, Koolhaas rather implicitly 
contends that, whereas standardisation determined architecture’s relation to 
the modern city, the generic determines its relation to the complex city. 
Koolhaas thus engaged his readers to consider the qualities of these generic 
patterns, forms, and functions. While everybody was looking at differences 
against standardisation, his text on the generic city reversed many 
expectations. It argued that repetition was perhaps becoming more 
interesting than the different and the particular. The text thus unfolded 
according to the provocative argument that while the critique of modernism 
was still bound to the postmodern valorisation of diversity and difference, it 
was in fact the repetitive, the redundant, the generic that was the promising 
and interesting thing.  
 This provocative reversal of argument proposed by Koolhaas may have 
acknowledged before many other authors and architects that it was actually 
differences that had become the driving force of capitalist economy.  
Consequently, revealing the qualities inherent to the ambivalent notion of the 
generic could open new critical possibilities. As industry ruled as the driving 
force of capitalism, standardisation appeared to be its best mode of 
normative development. But now that this driving force can be said to have 
shifted from industry to finance and free market relations, it seems that it is 
differences, more in terms of personalisation than in terms of real 
singularisation, that has become its new prominent vector. It is according to 
this change that Koolhaas’ interest for the generic must be read.  
 I would further contend that it is indeed also according to this 
perspective that his provocative argument on Lagos must be read. Here his 
emphasis on the market and self-organisation appears even more 
problematic. It indeed seems highly dubious that, as C.K. Prahalad would 
argue, the informal ingenuity that allows the majority of Lagos’ inhabitants to 
survive and cope with poverty could represent an interesting entrepreneurial 
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solution to both poverty and urban planning’s inherent flaws.272 It indeed 
sometimes seems that Koolhaas’ optimistic emphasis on market relations 
and informality’s potential does no more than relay those ideas according to 
which populist neoliberal proponents seek to eliminate poverty through 
profit. Very close to what Koolhaas sometimes argues, these people see 
enormous potential in the vast population of marginalised workers in 
situations where informal economy dominates. The problem does not reside 
in the highly debatable argument according to which the solution to the 
extreme inequalities and poverty produced by capitalism would lie in the 
larger development of capitalism itself, but may be even more in the fact that 
they reduce everything to market relations and entrepreneurship. Godlewski 
writes:  
 
 “Koolhaas’s observations fetishize economic activities, yet the subjects 
he studies seemingly have no means to meaningful political action. Instead, 
they’re diminished to simple economic actors in a city conceived as a giant 
‘teeming marketplace.’”273 
 
Reducing these marginalised workers to pure economic actors, this emphasis 
even more problematically avoids addressing the more general dynamics of 
domination that maintain them in these marginalised conditions. Celebrating 
the poor’s entrepreneurial ingenuity and resilience is also a way to avoid 
dealing with the mechanisms that allow the rich to stay rich. At this point, 
Koolhaas’ account of Lagos from the presidential helicopter seems almost 
unbearable, for the illusion of immunity that supports his homeostatic 
observations is the same that prevents him from addressing the more 
general conditions that force these people to be economically ingenious and 
creative. Koolhaas’ emphasis on the market and informal self-organisation 
seems to deepen the ambivalence that could be found in his earlier texts. I 
have already argued that the accusation of cynicism that is continuously 
addressed to Koolhaas may in fact be bound to the way his text on the 
                                            
272 Godlewski. Op cit., 2010: 10 
273 Godlewski. Op cit., 2010: 11 
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generic city kept hesitating between the valorisation of the generic in terms 
of something that was unevenly produced by modern standardisation and 
could be transformed, and the sheer celebration of the form of 
standardisation that neoliberal capitalism organises. But in what he 
published about Lagos, his emphasis on economic and market relations is 
not explicitly articulated around this question. Without an articulation of 
what the generic could mean there, not only for architecture’s relation to the 
city but for the way he envisions and conceives his models, Koolhaas’ 
conception of Lagos seems indeed merely to reproduce the standard vision 
that neoliberal economists develop to encourage the status quo.  
 
3.3 Planning and emergence 
 
What seems however more promising is the way Lagos forces Koolhaas to 
think again more explicitly about planning, and about architecture’s 
responsibility faced with the city, not only theoretically but also practically. 
Koolhaas’ emphasis on self-organisation comprises another, more profound, 
and more interesting argument about planning. More than simply celebrating 
the qualities and potential of Lagos in terms of a gigantic self-organising 
system, Lagos seems to have given to Koolhaas an occasion to think about 
the relation between planning and change in a more nuanced way. Answering 
a question that Bregtje van der Haak asks him about the relation between 
what he saw in the Alaba international electronic market and his thoughts 
about planning, Koolhaas says:  
  
 “In the early nineties, I was very skeptical about the value of planning — 
about what it could do. Lagos was a confrontation with that scepticism. Initially, I 
thought: yes, this shows planning makes no sense — it’s irrelevant. But now I’ve 
begun to see the subtleties in Lagos — that self-organization is inscribed upon an 
organized model of the city. There’s a weird interdependence between the planned 
and unplanned. . . . If you extrapolate current trends, there are many signs that 
show the world is going to be a horrible place. There are many reasons to believe 
laissez faire is not the answer. So planning is becoming more interesting to me. It 
represents a cycle from skepticism to an awareness that we have to try to assume 
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the role of planners, perhaps in a new way.”274  
 
Moving away from the omniscient masterplans imagined by modernist 
architecture, this long answer given by Koolhaas suggests that, contrary to 
what the authors that criticised his Lagos work argue when saying that his 
approach ultimately lead to nothing other than a speculative and provocative 
celebration of Lagos’ disastrous conditions, his approach has something to 
do with more general questions about what architecture and urbanism can 
do. More than simply reversing Lagos’ apocalyptic situation into some 
positive dystopian model for the future, Koolhaas sees in it an example of 
what could be conceived as an alternative theory of modernity in 
architecture, speculating on the possible combination of the rigid and the 
free, and arguing that “self-organization is inscribed upon an organized 
model of the city.” 275  
 Although Koolhaas has not yet related these observations and relatively 
loose speculations to his arguments about the generic, Lagos represents an 
interesting case to see how this could be further articulated. We have already 
seen that Laruelle’s take on the generic supposes that, although the category 
of the generic does not escape the capitalist structure of the economy to 
which it is bound, it is however indifferent to the differential economy that 
structures contemporary capitalism. According to Laruelle, the generic does 
not “(destroy) the market and capitalist structure of exchange and 
equivalence”.276 But because it no longer simply reproduces this by 
introducing a difference, it does nevertheless transform this structure. 
Laruelle identifies this transformative power with the operation of 
idempotance that characterises the generic, that is what remains the 
indifferent to different iterations (Laruelle 2010: 72). And while Koolhaas 
seeks in the model of Lagos a solution for architecture and urban planning 
that would at once diverge from modern standardisation and from laissez 
faire, I would argue that it is in this particular function of the generic that it 
might be found. 
                                            
274 See Koolhaas and van der Haak. Op cit., 2003.  
275 Koolhaas. Op cit., 2002: 177; Godlewski. Op cit., 2010: 12  
276 Laruelle. Op cit., 2011: 242 
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 Koolhaas’ interest in the generic can be said to be connected to the 
general question of change. While everybody seemed to seek novelty in the 
increasing diversity that characterised post-industrial urbanisation, Koolhaas 
looked at places that were relatively foreign to this question. Foreign because 
they were relatively immune to the fact that this emphasis on differences was 
only reversing the question while still profoundly connected to the way it was 
framed by modernism, and because they were in fact displaying alternative 
forms of modernisation that its dominant European framing was unable to 
understand. This, I believe, first led him to seek in the generic the 
qualification of another type of convergence to which global urbanisation was 
aspiring. No longer the linear mode of identical repetition imposed by 
standardisation, but a more open and immanent redundancy that for him was 
not only indifferent to differences and variations, but could also appear to be 
necessary to their proliferation. His first move was thus concerned with 
epistemological questions. The question was to qualify this convergence, and 
to qualify the relation it entertained with change and variation. The generic 
appeared to be another kind of constant, another kind of invariant, necessary 
to understand before moving to another type of change.  
 This different type of change can be conceptualised in terms of 
emergence. Manuel De Landa argues that emergence started to be 
conceptualised around the middle of the nineteenth century when philosophy 
discovered that there are different types of causality in physics and 
chemistry. This is notably true when considering molecular composition. 
Water is for example very different from what its components are when taken 
separately. Emergence generally defines the production of novelties that 
cannot simply be deduced from initial conditions. The properties of water 
cannot be deduced from the separated and individual properties of hydrogen 
and oxygen. This appeared to be very different from the movements of 
addition, attraction, repulsion, collision and mechanical causes in general 
that physics explored at the time. Emergence, De Landa argues, thus reveals 
layers of complexity that go beyond any axiomatic deductive dream. 
Emergence is not simply deterministic. According to De Landa, mechanisms 
of emergence are ontologically irreducible. They can nevertheless be 
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subjected to epistemological reducibility. Even if the type of causation 
involved in emergence is ultimately unpredictable, it is possible to explain 
what happened. For De Landa, this requires not only looking at initial 
conditions in terms of properties, but also in terms of capacities. Following 
Deleuze, De Landa contends that this unfolds in terms of potential. And that 
it hence the structure of the space of possibilities that one should look at to 
understand emergence: “(…) what is needed is a way of specifying the 
structure of the space of possibilities that is defined by an entity’s tendencies 
and capacities”.277 Whereas standardisation stands for mechanical types of 
linear causation and constitutes conditions in which all possibilities are 
contained in the initial conditions, the concept of the generic defines a 
structural or systemic space allowing an open-ended series of possibilities. 
This argument was employed earlier in the discussion of modularity. Vis-à-
vis emergence, it must be further argued that, contrary to the critiques that 
reproach Koolhaas for simply avoiding mentioning historical and social 
causes explaining why the city works the way it does, even the exhaustive 
sum of these causes could not explain the emergence of order Koolhaas 
observes at an higher level. Far from being simply illusiory, I argue that this 
more general level of order must be addressed in terms that do not rely on 
superficial images, but rather engage fully with the specific complexity that 
this order supposes, at both lower and higher levels.  
 We have seen that the majority of the critical reception of Koolhaas’ 
Lagos work could be said to focus on the opposition between the illusiory 
anoramic perspective and the concrete analysis of practices on the ground. 
According to the discussion of emergence and causality above, it seems that 
this opposition can be further seen to unfold in the relatively classic 
opposition between top-down and bottom-up analysis and arguments about 
causality. Although I have argued that Koolhaas top-down perspective could 
be said to entertain the illusion that Lagos could be taken as an object 
observable from the outside, I cannot completely follow the critiques made to 
Koolhaas for they all seem to oppose to the illusion of top-down accounts, 
                                            
277 Manuel de Landa. Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason, New 
York: Bloomsbery Academic, 2011: 8.  
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the reality of bottom-up causality. I said earlier that the question may much 
more concern the articulation of these dimensions than the maintaining of 
this now impossible opposition. The understanding of Lagos’ complexity 
requires a departure from both types of reductionism that are attached to 
this opposition. Neither the reduction to any simplified and holist image 
understanding it from above, nor the reduction to bottom-up atomism can 
be said to provide an accurate description of Lagos’ complex order. 
Following cosmologist Georges Ellis, simultaneous multiple causality is 
always in operation in complex systems. Any attempt to characterise a partial 
cause as the whole (as characterized by the phrase ‘nothing but atoms’) is a 
fundamentally misleading position. One must acknowledge the entire causal 
web in operation: top-down system explanation and bottom-up explanation 
are simultaneously applicable.278 And this is why we need to develop a 
topological understanding of the morphological transformations that affect 
those passages.  
 Finally, while this debate about Lagos mainly opposed to Koolhaas the 
necessity to address more profound historical and political dynamics, this 
cannot be done according to the opposition between the ground level of 
reality, and the distant and abstract gaze looking at the city from above. 
Repeating an old and exhausted opposition between theoretical abstraction 
and practical realities, this opposition cannot stand the massive 
transformation entailed by our entry in the anthropocene. Although this entry 
was conceptual, it points to a reality that has a completely different 
ontological geography. While cities can no longer be studied as models that 
can be looked at extrinsincally, abstract models helping to navigate and 
define this geography are even more essential to any analysis of urban 
dynamics. Koolhaas’ emphasis on market relations and economic actors 
creatively involving themselves in the development of a huge informal system 
does not appear as much misleading as it is essentially biased. Avoiding 
addressing the profound causes and the territory onto which these dynamics 
spread, Koolhaas’ account on Lagos appears indeed very dangerously to  
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celebrate conditions that merit no celebration. Going around his radical 
hypothesis, it seems however possible to argue that, far from representing 
modernity’s past, Lagos could very well not only represent the possible 
future of many cities, but exemplify many present changes. On this aspect, I 
can only but follow him, arguing that it is only by acknowledging how the 
informal development of this gigantic and chaotic city also produces and rely 
on the formation of more generic structures and invariants that it is possible 
to further understand both how Lagos actually works, and what can be 
learned from it. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPLEXITY AND ANONYMITY 
 
 
 
This thesis has drawn the genealogy of what I propose to call the anonymous 
city. I have argued that, although it was intimately connected to the 
homogeneous urban models imagined by modernist architects, the 
anonymous city was nevertheless the product of the broader, more 
continuous and more ancient movement of modernity. This argument largely 
borrowed Latour’s idea that we must distinguish between what modernity 
thought it was doing (i.e. the teleological drive of modernisation), and what 
modernity did in practice. While the former can be defined according to the 
constant purification of the different domains it separated, the later has on 
the contrary multiplied the relations between heterogeneous spaces, ideas, 
and practices.279 From this standpoint, the anonymous city cannot be seen as 
the sole product of modernist standardisation. It does not strictly correspond 
to the models imagined by Hilberseimer and the principles posed by Le 
Corbusier, but rather indexes the space that lies between them and 
contemporary existing conditions.  
 It is by following the same idea that I have argued that, far from being 
the model of the contemporary global city, Koolhaas’ generic city more 
profoundly addressed the general logic governing contemporary global 
urbanisation. The generic articulates a new relation between the different and 
the same. Although it must be read in continuity with modernist 
standardisation, it underlines another logic. The generic supports variations 
better than the standard does. Not only because, unlike standardisation, it is 
                                            
279 See notably Latour. Op cit., [1991] 1993; and Idem. Op cit., [2012] 2013.  
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neither deterministic nor deductive, but also because it remains much less 
determined, much more vaporous, and much more abstract. While 
standardisation mainly corresponds to the procedures of normalisation and 
repetition according to which a predefined model (i.e. the standard) is 
reproduced identically, the generic corresponds to procedures of abstraction 
that emerge from differences. Standardisation always supposes the 
possibility to establish standards, whereas the generic qualifies invariant 
structures that do not need the definition of any preconceived model.  
 Discussing the common in architecture and the production of 
architectural knowledge, Aureli argues that “(…) architectural language must 
be thought as a generic language that engenders singular forms.”280 Notably 
drawing on Deleuze, Gilbert Simondon and Paolo Virno, Aureli contends that 
what is common, the generic, entertains with the singular a relation that can 
be explained as the relationship between potentiality and actuality.281 This 
means that the generic in architecture must be thought to be a generating 
principle. The generic is for him what defines architecture’s potentiality. 
Although this only loosely resonates with Plato’s ideal types, it does explicitly 
relate to Simondon and Deleuze’s ideas of the pre-individual.282 Always 
potential, the generic is what always lies beyond any individual architectural 
objects, always beyond its actualisation in singular forms. Defined in 
linguistic terms, the generic can be said to be the ultimate structure over 
which the language does not stop stumbling. Virno explains this in relation 
to what is common to all linguistic acts: the possibility of actually saying 
something.283 Following the same kind of loose definition, I have argued that 
the generic could be both defined as what allows a passage from one 
category to another, and as that which allows to make comparisons. It is 
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281 Idem.  
282 See notably Gilbert Simondon "The Genesis of the Individual," in Jonathan Crary and 
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what does not change, the invariant that allows change and difference to be 
registered.  
 Drawing on Latour and Laruelle, I have argued that this however cannot 
be defined well in potential terms.284 The generic is an actual abstraction, one 
that does not simply allow epistemological moves, but also points at actual 
ontological processes. Laruelle argues that the generic is mainly an 
epistemological category. But he does nevertheless argue that it also points 
to actual truths. The fact that these must be taken as generic truths is for 
him the difference between the generic and the universal. The universal 
remains attached to the definition of standard models. More or less tied to 
average values and recurrent processes, the modernist universal was 
concretely definable. It could be drawn, measured, explicated, as Le 
Corbusier argued with his Modulor. Both standard and universal, modernist 
models were seen to correspond absolutely to ontological principles that had 
to be applied to a reality that was still imperfect. And standardisation 
ultimately implied that this absolute universalism should unfold according to 
proper homogenisation: the collapse of differences onto the same. While I 
have shown that modernist architecture was nevertheless concerned with 
modularity in ways that actually allowed the same to support a certain 
number of differences and variations, I have also shown that these were 
mainly categorical and typological: differences existed between functions 
that were ultimately considered to unfold under universal forms and values. 
Defined as indifferent to difference, the generic appears much more vague 
but also and as such, able to accommodate a greater number of differences 
and variations.285 Far from being a model, the generic is both a dynamic 
category and an abstract structure that operates as a medium of exchange 
between the general and the specific. The generic does not articulate the 
different and the same. It does not play on identity. It does not mediate 
between the particular and the universal; but rather unfolds according to its 
indifference to variations. It privileges convergence over difference in a way 
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that does not prevent them from flourishing. Rather it organises almost 
imperceptible relations between the general and the specific.286 
 
 
 
Kazimir Malevich. White on White (1918) 
 
 I have argued that the generic does not correspond to homogeneous 
standards, but rather indicates invariants in complex systems. Complex 
systems escape the limits imposed by standard conception. It has been 
shown that, while this was true of the logic of difference and repetition at 
stake in contemporary global urbanisation, it was also true in spatial terms, 
for the spatial complexity of contemporary urban dynamics could no longer 
be understood in Euclidean terms. Drawing on topology, I argued that this 
complexity also produced generic patterns, and that generic forms and 
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functions indeed emerged from complexity. This is evident is Koolhaas’ 
theory of Bigness. Contending that an ensemble of technical innovations has 
led architecture to deal with increasingly larger structures, the problem of 
bigness concerns the way in which, having reached a certain scale, global 
urbanisation substituted much more complex and unpredictable conditions 
for the homogeneous and integrated city that prevailed before. Passed a 
certain size, problems become too complex for architecture to contain them, 
Koolhaas argues. Challenging the relation architecture and architectural 
knowledge entertains with the city, with this urban condition that expands 
well beyond what we used to call cities, this new situation also more 
profoundly invalidated standardisation. The complexity of contemporary 
urban conditions expands well beyond standard conceptions. Connected to 
the large scale, this complexification at once corresponds to a proliferation 
of differences, and to an increasing interconnection of always more 
numerous variables. Koolhaas’ central and crucial argument consisted 
however in showing that this also produced more generic outcomes. 
 Allowing diagrammes that can trim down complex phenomena to 
simpler rules and dynamic morphologies, the generic can prove crucial in 
navigating the heterogeneous and complex landscape of global urbanisation. 
Following Laruelle, contrary to more standard perspectives and modes of 
abstraction, the generic allows for subtractions that are not prejudicial to the 
complex reality they index, but rather form the basis of possible translation 
and navigation between heterogeneous examples and different modes of 
knowledge. I have argued that while standardisation involves identical 
repetition, the generic implies redundancy. The way in which these 
redundancies emerge from complex dynamics largely remains to be 
explored. But by delimiting the problem and developing a series of concepts 
involved in this debate, this thesis has tried to show both its relevance and 
its importance today. Although this was not the explicit subject of this thesis, 
I have suggested that beyond its decisive epistemological implications, the 
concept of the generic could also prove to be crucial for contemporary 
architectural practice, and that may have more profound and even more 
interesting political consequences.  
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 The anonymous city indicates the space that has defined the relation 
between architecture and the existing city throughout modernity. But it also 
defines the space that has been defined by this relation. Grasping the ways in 
which architects have sought to understand and to imagine the future city, it 
also points to the limited ways in which these models have really transformed 
existing cities. The use of the term anonymous does not only underline that 
the principles that have been described here were sought to be applicable to 
any possible city. More profoundly, it stresses the dynamic movement that 
the relation between architecture and the city followed, towards increasingly 
anonymous conditions, towards less identity, towards larger, less particular, 
and more simple forms. The diagrammatic concept of the anonymous city 
thus seeks to emphasise this movement as a movement of ‘genericisation’.   
  The increasingly important ingression of the concept of the 
Anthropocene in the arts, sciences and humanities suggests that the 
anonymous may less correspond today to the bland and standard conditions 
imagined by modernist architects, and more to the disruptions provoked by 
the increasing complexity of the environment in which we live. Connected 
and dependent on an increasing number of complex variables, our individual 
and collective existence seems also much more contingent. Following 
Sloterdijk, I argued that, more explicit, this contingency profoundly 
challenges the way we conceive, produce, imagine and construct the 
immunological spheres and structures in which we live. The way this 
transforms processes of subjectivation and modes of living remain largely to 
be addressed and explored, but this thesis revealed the more ancient 
trajectory to which these transformations were bound. It revealed that we 
were experiencing a transformation in the way in which differences and 
repetition were articulated, no longer according to the dialectic of the 
universal and particulars but according to transits between the general and 
the specific. Drawing on Foucault and Canguilhem, I argued that this relation 
not only concerns the production of architecture knowledge, but also 
architecture’s normative relation to the built environment. The discussion of 
Foucault’s conception of normalisation showed that modernist architecture 
could be seen to occupy an original and delicate position between normation 
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and normalisation, that is, between the production of deterministic and 
standard structures of immunisation and a more selective and adaptive 
relation to the increasing explicitation of the complex variables to which our 
individual and collective existence is bound. Caught up between disciplinary 
mechanisms and the logics of control, modernist models occupy an 
interesting heuristic position. They reveal all at once the project of modernity 
and the conditions of its critique. It is from this ambivalent position that I 
have read the models that this thesis explored. By examining both their 
principles (i.e. considering that the city they imagined could be effectively 
built) and their limitations (i.e. considering the fact that no existing city ever 
corresponded to this), I have tried to show that, although the movement of 
generic urbanisation should be read in line with the establishment of modern 
logics of normalisation and with the expansion of the capitalist system, it 
could also index common properties escaping these dynamics of capture.  
 I would like to end this thesis by making a few remarks about the way 
in which I see the potential development of this question. First, the reversal 
of generic dynamics towards a possible architecture of the common implies 
in the current situation a strategic reversal. This thesis has mainly focused on 
the connection it is possible to make between Koolhaas’ arguments about 
the generic city to the logic of standardisation according to which modernist 
architecture mainly unfolds. Aureli seems indeed to think that this remains 
the best way to articulate today the discussion of the generic with the 
question of the common in architecture.287 I would however like to suggest 
                                            
287 The relation I have established in this thesis between the generic and ModernistModernist 
conceptions of standardisation, both continuous and distinctive, delimits this question in 
close relation to what Aureli argues. Although I do not frame the generic in the same virtual 
and potential terms, I would nevertheless argue that his work indicates similar ways of 
tackling this question. Aureli notably writes: “Α commitment towards the common also 
means that the production of architecture itself - in terms of forms - must acknowledge the 
pre-individual origin of any architectural form instead of masquerading them with the 
pretension of novelty and originality at all costs. In order for these forms to make evident 
their common origin, they must exhibit their principium individuationis. An example of such 
architecture would be projects such as Le Corbusier’s Maison Dom-ino and Mies’ “skin and 
bones” building technique. In these examples the pre-individual datum of architecture - the 
industrial techniques that were necessary for their realisation - is not hidden, but fully 
exposed as the very image of architecture. This means that architectural language must be 
thought as a generic language that engenders singular forms. Only when architectural 
language assumes in its aesthetic appearance the reality of the common will it be a true 
manifestation of a potential architecture.” Aureli. Op cit., 2012. 
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that this might be better accomplished by reversing the question, and by 
asking what relation the generic entertains with complexity rather than by 
asking what relation it entertains with the standard.  
 
 
 
Mike Kelley. Memory Ware (2008) 
 
 Focusing on Koolhaas’ Lagos work, the third chapter of this thesis 
suggested that the generic may be best understood today in relation to 
vernacular complexity rather than in relation to the principles that may 
structure this complexity in the first place; in relation to what emerges from 
complexity rather than in terms of what commands this complexity. This 
corresponds to the distinction I have made between inductive, deductive and 
generative approaches in architecture. Focusing on Koolhaas’ work on Lagos 
rather than on Lagos itself, I could only show why Lagos could represent an 
interesting case for further conceptualising the generic in relation to 
vernacular complexity. Although I agreed with many criticisms Koolhaas’ 
diagrammatic assertions about Lagos have been subjected to, I also tried to 
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show why this could not be extended to a critique to diagrammes in general. 
Contending that the generic operates as an abstract structure of exchange 
between the general and the specific, I would argue that Lagos is a 
paradigmatic case for further defining how this impacts architecture’s 
relation to the city, and our understanding of urban complexity. Koolhaas’ 
earlier reflexions about the generic city suggested that contemporary 
urbanisation was overflowing the traditional limits drawn by standardisation 
in ways that were not only producing increasing diversity but also generating 
new phenomena of generic convergence. His move to studying Lagos 
indicates another but nevertheless connected argument according to which 
the vernacular complexity displayed in dystopian conditions may be also 
generating another kind of emergent forms of organisation. The result of 
more spontaneous and contradictory tendencies, the generic patterns 
generated in these conditions could be seen to oppose even more interesting 
scenarios to capitalist modes of seamless organisation, at once more 
heterogeneous and more radical. ‘Ventriloquing’ Koolhaas, it may be argued 
that it is this connection between complexity and the generic that led him to 
resist the notion that Lagos represents an African city en route to becoming 
modern, and to contend that, on the contrary, it may present a developed 
and extreme form of advanced globalised modernity.288  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
288 Koolhaas and al. Op cit., 2000: 653.  
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